Discussion of Study 1

Despite the fact that all observer emotions are influenced by all three cognitive antecedents O, GA and E and/or their interactions, we find considerable differences in the distribution of explained variance for moral as compared to non-moral emotions. Thus, (1) in line with our expectations, for the majority of moral observer emotions (positive: admiration, pride, respect; negative: anger, indignation, contempt), greater amounts of variance is explained by O, E and their interaction (ranging from 35 to 58 % as compared to 31 to 49 % for O, GA and their interaction). In contrast, for non-moral emotions (joy, relief, envy, sadness) greater amounts of variance are explained by O, GA and the interaction of O x GA (19 to 42 % as compared to 1 to 17 % for O, GA and their interaction). This may serve as a first hint that emotions belonging to the first group may be “more moral” than emotions belonging to the latter group.

At first glance, there are three exceptions: disappointment, sympathy and schadenfreude: For disappointment, higher values were obtained for O, GA and their interaction (19%). Here, only 10 % of variance is explained by O, E and their interaction. However, as disappointment may appear as both moral and non-moral emotion (see also van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002), this result is not surprising (for a more detailed discussion, see below). Moreover, for sympathy, greater amounts of variance are explained by O, GA and O x GA (29 %) than by O, E and O x E (5 %). However, sympathy is predominantly characterized by the interaction of O x GA and the main effect of GA (29 %). Thus, as it is only experienced vis à vis non-attained goals (see e.g., Weiner, 2006) this result is also not surprising. Furthermore, sympathy is also influenced by effort, thus sending a strong positive signal for expended effort (as a positive moral behavior, see e.g. Graham, 1991;

Matteucci, 2007) in case of non-attained positive goals (see also Figure 3.1). Similar to Sympathy, schadenfreude is also experienced given non-attained goals only. Furthermore, it is also influenced more strongly by O, GA and the interaction of O x GA (58 %) than by O, E and O x E (21 %). However, most importantly, the highest degree of schadenfreude is experienced in case of non-attained negative goals, given that effort was invested (see Figure 3.1), which reflects a strong negative evaluation of morally negative behavior (i.e., pursuing a morally negative goal and expending effort to attain this goal). In sum, these findings support the inclusion of sympathy and schadenfreude into our definition of moral emotions which is based on their morally positive vs. morally negative evaluative function: Sympathy (as a positive moral observer emotion) sends a positive signal related to positive behaviors, whereas schadenfreude (as a negative moral observer emotion) sends a negative signal related to negative behaviors.

Corroborating and extending previous research (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Rozin et al., 1999; Rudolph et al., 2013; Weiner, 2006), as expected, (2) for all positive moral observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect, sympathy) higher values were obtained for morally positive as compared to morally negative behavior. Furthermore, (3) for all negative moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment, schadenfreude) higher values were obtained for morally negative as compared to morally positive behavior. Especially, as our results are based on the positive versus negative evaluation of other person’s behavior, previous approaches classifying admiration and respect as ‘other praising’ or ‘approval emotions’ (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Giner-Soralla, 2012) and anger, indignation and contempt as ‘other condemning emotions’ (Haidt, 2003) are underlined. According to our results, all positive moral observer emotions signal praise for morally praiseworthy behavior, whereas all negative moral observer emotions signal condemnation for morally blameworthy behavior.

Despite the fact that we also obtained a positive or negative evaluation of outcomes for the majority of moral emotions, these effects are smaller than the effects

obtained for the evaluation of positive vs. negative behavior. Interestingly, with regard to disappointment almost equal effect sizes were obtained for both negative behavior and negative outcomes. In our view, this result reflects the distinction between person-vs. outcome related disappointment (PRD vs. ORD) suggested by van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002). The highest values for disappointment (PRD, in our view) were obtained for morally negative behavior (O- and/or E-). However, the fact that a considerable degree of disappointment was also obtained for O+GA-E+ (i.e., morally positive behavior), suggests that here, ORD is elicited (sending a negative signal for the negative outcome, i.e., that the positive goal was not attained). Thus, according to our results, PRD is a negative moral observer emotion, whereas ORD is a negative non-moral observer emotion (see below).

In short, in line with our expectations positive moral emotions are more likely when effort is expended to attain morally positive goals, thus communicating that the other person’s behavior is right. Negative moral emotions are more likely when negative goals where pursued and/or given that effort was not expended to attain morally positive goals, thus communicating that the other person’s behavior was wrong.

As expected, (4) positive non moral emotions (joy, relief) are more likely given positive as compared to negative outcomes, thus signaling a positive evaluation of positive outcomes. Despite the fact that for joy we also find a positive evaluation of positive behavior (i.e., higher values given positive as compared to negative behavior), these effects are comparatively small. Moreover, both emotions appear mainly outcome- oriented restricting the positive signal for effort expenditure only to successful events (i.e., higher values when effort was invested only for attained but not for non-attained positive goals, see Figure 3.1). These findings support Weiner’s (1986) notion that joy is an “outcome dependent affect”. Moreover, relief (and also joy, to a lower extent), are more likely when morally negative goals are not attained, thus reflecting a positive evaluation of positive outcomes. However, the underlying behavior is negative, as a negative goal is

pursued. Thus, in contrast to Gray and Wegner (2011), our results suggest that relief is another positive non-moral emotion: As is the case for joy, it is most likely when positive goals are attained or negative goals are not attained.

(5) As expected, negative non-moral emotions (sadness, ORD) are most likely given negative outcomes. Sadness becomes especially apparent for non-attained positive goals, but is also felt for non-attained negative goals, which also reflects negative behavior. Nonetheless, the non-moral character of sadness becomes especially obvious by seeing that the highest values for sadness were obtained for non-attained positive goals given that effort was invested. Thus, negative evaluations (i.e., higher values for a negative emotion) would be send for positive behavior, which clearly indicates that this emotion – similar to joy – is mainly directed at outcomes (which is negative in this case) not behavior. Thus, in sum, in line with expectations, negative non-moral emotions are most likely given non-attained positive goals as well as given attained negative goals.

Envy deserves special attention: It only occurs for positive outcomes given positive goals. Thus, we suppose that a similar mechanism as for sympathy and schadenfreude applies: Despite the fact that both the envious as well as the envied person feel bad (Ben Ze’ev, 2000, 2002; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014), envy primarily communicates that another person’s outcome is positive – especially if it is attained without expending effort. Here, we also see discordance (see Chapter 3.2.2.3) between the valence of both the person feeling envy as well as the envied person (which is negative) and the communicative signal of envy. As this signal is restricted to attained positive goals only, we argue that the dominant function of this emotion is non-moral in nature (see also Ben- Ze’ev, 2002).

In sum, we classify respect, sympathy, pride and admiration as positive moral emotions, and schadenfreude, contempt, indignation, anger and PRD as negative moral emotions. Contempt and PRD are mainly influenced by O; schadenfreude, indignation, anger as well as all positive moral observer emotions are determined by judgments of

effort to a larger extent. Joy, relief and envy are classified as positive non-moral emotions, whereas sadness and ORD are classified as negative non-moral emotions.