Emotion-Intention Timing

Having provided some philosophical backing for the view that emotions can be attributed when only stimulus and intentional behaviour are present, I now turn my attention to- wards establishing when emotion occurs in respect to the emergence of its associated intentional behaviour. Since the emotional model I am looking to implement has emo- tion as the sole motivator of intentional behaviour, evidence needs to be provided to argue that an emotion does not always occur after the intentional behaviour has been

performed. So, without an adequate argument capable of resisting this school of thought, I have no basis upon which to espouse emotion as the primary determinant of the in- tentional behaviour detailed in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.

Whilst it may seem commonsensical to argue that an emotion occurs before its associated intentional behaviour is expressed, this notion has been challenged in the past and continues to be today. Therefore, it is only right that I consider alternative theories of when emotion occurs with respect to intentional behaviour. By doing this I highlight why I model emotions in the way proposed in this thesis. This is not to say that I completely disagree with the emotional theories that are not selected to be taken forward but, since I am looking to model particular emotions, some of the theories are not applicable.

To achieve this, I consider a number of prominent psychological theories of emotion that argue for different ways of placing emotion with respect to both intentional and unintentional behaviour. Therefore, this section is split into a further two sections: section 3.1.2.1 discusses theories where emotions occur after intentional behaviour is exhibited whilst section 3.1.2.2 outlines theories that posits the occurrence of emotions before intentional behaviours.

3.1.2.1 Emotion After Intentional Behaviour

Baumeister et al.’s feedback theory of emotion ([11] and [10]) seeks to both critique the theory that emotion causes or occurs before intentional behaviour and to propose an alternative to replace it. Both works cover the same ground yet [11] is more succinct in its discussion so any references are made in context of this paper rather than [10]. The concept of feedback loops presented in [11] and [10] is plausible and could well be used to augment direct causation theory however, it appears that the authors intend for feedback theory to replace direct causation theory (the theory that emotion acts directly upon intentional behaviour) completely. I begin the discussion of Baumeister et al.’s work by first defining what the feedback theory of emotion entails before moving on to discuss their critique of direct causation theory. Highlighting and responding to the arguments relevant to this thesis is important since they may be used to attack the emotion modelling framework proposed.

Feedback theory states that, when a new object or event is perceived or experienced by an agent, the agent will perform some behaviour as a result of this perception or experience. After the object or event has been affected by this behaviour, an emotion is elicited which motivates the agent to appraise the whole episode and learn from the emotional experience. If the event or object is perceived again in the future, affective states associated with that emotion are used in order to cope with the event/object rather than the use of a “full-blown” emotion2. Whilst I do not disagree with the concept of feedback loops, I believe that the removal of emotion as an intermediate between perception and experience of an event or object is fallacious.

2

The definition and distinction of the terms “emotion” and “affective states” (Baumeis- ter et al. cite Russell’s work in [160] as inspiration behind using these terms) proposed in [11] and [10] is the foundation upon which their criticism is built. Emotions are de- fined as a single conscious state (maybe consisting of blends of other states to give one ultimate state), are slow to occur and to dissipate, and are usually the result of cogni- tive evaluations. “Affective states” on the other hand are quicker to occur, are never composed of blended mental states and require less cognitive processing to be elicited than emotions.

The salient argument put forward by Baumeister et al. is that emotions act upon cognitive processes which have an input upon the regulation of decision-making following the performance of an intentional action. Consequently, Baumeister et al. propose that emotions have an indirect effect upon intentional behaviour since the time it takes for an emotion to arise is much too long for the emotion to be considered useful in decision- making in the heat of the moment. Whilst it is not denied that emotions may have a direct effect upon intentional behaviour (which would appear to contradict their earlier argument that emotion does not act directly upon intentional behaviour), Baumeister et al. argue that such effects are sporadic and counter-productive. To further support this point, Baumeister et al. refer to accounts from people who, when placed in a situation that elicits intense fear for them, remain calm and clear headed initially but then are overcome with fear afterwards. Based upon such evidence they assert that emotionmust occur after behaviour since the emotion is only recognised after some behaviour has been noted. There is a failure here to recognise that a person may resist the behavioural effects of an emotion if there are reasons to do so i.e. an emotion creates the potential for an action to be performed but does not guarantee this behaviour being performed. Indeed, the criticism does highlight an important point that the functional correlate of emotion I am proposing needs to account for intentional behaviour not being produced even though an emotion may be active. This issue is addressed in chapters 4 and 5 and so will not be expanded upon here.

Baumeister et al. also argue against direct causation theory by disputing the notion that specific emotions cause specific behaviours i.e. fear causes a person to flee in any circumstance, satisfaction causes the person to celebrate extravagantly in any circum- stance. According to the authors: “emotions are thus not specific enough to give rise to specific behaviours, as the direct causation theory requires”. The argument’s premise is based on the assumption that those who agree with the direct causation interpretation of emotion must also agree that a specific emotionalways triggers a specific intentional behaviour, independent of context or culture. As far as the literature reads however, direct causation theory does not assert that every human emotion produces a single, specific intentional behaviour when that emotion is activated. Ekman states that there are only specific facial behaviours for the basic emotions that may be universally recog- nised [45] and does not mention other types of behaviour (unintentional or intentional) for other emotions. Frijda in [67] proposes that emotions create action tendencies i.e.

intentional behaviours that can be tended towards depending upon the current con- cerns of the subject. Since the context in which these concerns arise may differ then different actions may be produced even if the same emotion is elicited in the different contexts. Cannon’s second argument in [28] notes experimental evidence which indicates that visceral changes associated with one particular emotion also occurs when a different emotional state is experienced. Throwing aside direct causation theory based upon such an argument seems both over-zealous and erroneous.

It is also proposed by Baumeister et al. that, whilst it may be true that emotions evolved to directly influence intentional behaviour in other organisms:

“...this function of emotion has been rendered somewhat obsolete by the fur- ther evolution (in human beings at least) of a complex and powerful cognitive system and a sophisticated capacity for self-regulation.”

Essentially, it is posited that human beings are capable of overriding the behaviour that may be produced in response to an emotion and therefore, emotion does not directly cause intentional behaviour. Personally I consider this to be a flawed argument since, although human beings are capable of overpowering the expression of an intentional behaviour caused by an emotion, the emotion still sets up the tendency for a behaviour to be expressed (Baumeister et al. even acknowledge this by stating that emotion engenders a behavioural impulse).

Another point argued in [11] is that it is usually negative emotions that are invoked to fortify the argument that emotions have a direct effect on behaviour. It may be that the examples used typically use negative emotions such as fear, but this need not be the case. As we shall see later in chapters 6 and 7, the positive emotions of gratitude and admiration also give rise to characteristic intentional behaviours.

3.1.2.2 Emotion Before Intentional Behaviour

This section will discuss the stance taken by some psychologists that emotion occurs before intentional behaviour and exerts a direct influence on such behaviour (direct causation theory). Whilst this theory may not be entirely correct for all emotions, it is at least true for some and therefore, theories of emotion that advocate this notion should be mentioned. I begin by outlining Lowenstein and Lerner’s review of the role of affect in decision making [118] before moving onto Zeelenberg et al.’s concept of “feeling-is-for-doing” [215].

Loewenstein and Lerner In [118], two types of emotion are proposed: “expected” and “immediate” emotions. Expected emotions are emotions that are taken into consid- eration when deliberating about the consequences of an intentional behaviour i.e. will a negative emotion be experienced as a consequence of some particular behaviour and if so, how intense would that emotion be? In this way, emotion can be viewed as ex- pected utility insofar as the decision regarding what intentional behaviour to perform

is based upon how one expects to feel emotionally as a consequence of performing that intentional behaviour. Immediate emotions on the other hand are experienced at the time of decision-making. With respect to this thesis, I am interested in the immediate emotions of Lowenstein and Lerner and whilst I do not think that expected emotions are unimportant, I consider them outside the scope of this work.

As argued by Lowenstein in [117], the more intense an immediate emotion is, the less it is mediated by expected emotions or cognitive processing. Again, the concept of activation thresholds makes an appearance since Loewenstein and Lerner give evidence to support the idea that it is only when an emotion is highly intense that it has a direct effect upon a person’s intentional behaviour. The effect of immediate emotions are also exemplified by investigations conducted by Goldberg et al. [76] where anger is intentionally induced in human participants by showing a video of a man violently attacking a helpless teenager. Following this, some participants are told that the man was punished whilst others were told that, due to a legal loop-hole, no punishment was incurred. Participants were then asked to read fictional legal cases regarding different crimes and to specify what punishments they considered appropriate for the defenders. Those who had been told that the man in the video received no punishment viewed harsher punishments as appropriate in the fictional cases. Such a result would indicate that in some cases, emotion does have an immediate effect upon behaviour.

It is also proposed by Lowenstein and Lerner in [118] that some emotions are adap- tive, time-tested responses to universal, re-occurring situations. Lazarus’ work in [108] is cited as support for this claim since he proposes that each emotion has a core-relational theme (a convenient summary for the harm or benefit related to the person and their current environment). If a core-relational theme is matched then the corresponding emo- tion is elicited and an action impulse is produced. For example: if a demeaning offence against me has occurred then anger will be elicited in response and an appropriate ac- tion impulse will be selected. Note that there is no specific behaviour attributed to the emotion elicited, which stands in opposition to Baumeister et al. (see section 3.1.2.1) who state that proponents of the direct causation theory prescribe specific actions for specific emotions.

Zeelenberg et al. The pragmatic “feeling-is-for-doing” approach of Zeelenberg et al. in [215] places emotion as being the primary motivator of goal-directed behaviour. The paper states that whilst the feedback theory of emotion advocated by Baumeister et al. in [11] and [10] may be correct (since it provides a person with information about progress towards a goal) it could also be the case that emotion provides a way to achieve the goal in question. The “feeling-is-for-doing” approach proposes that emotions are elicited when an event or outcome is relevant for a person’s particular concerns or preferences. The emotion(s) elicited will then prioritize behaviour that addresses these concerns accordingly. Zeelenberg et al. present details of two experiments that provide evidence for the validity of the approach proposed.

The first experiment by Nelissen et al. [132], details the effects of guilt and fear in context of social dilemmas. According to Zeelenberg et al., [132] contains the best example of goal-activation mechanisms becoming activated when emotional states are induced. The results presented in [132] illustrate how fear and guilt can be used to respectively reduce and increase cooperative behaviour. The study discovered a signif- icant interaction between a participant’s emotional state and their social values. Fear decreased the likelihood of pro-social players (players whose behaviour tended to be more altruistic) cooperating whilst guilt increased the likelihood of cooperative behaviour from pro-self players (players whose behaviour tended to be more selfish). In [132] it is stated that fear activates a goal to avoid personal risk but guilt activates a goal to make-up for transgressions. According to the results obtained, goals are only altered if the goal activated by the emotion is not already activated by virtue of the social-values of the player. Therefore, fear only has an effect on pro-social players as pro-self players have a constant, long-term goal to avoid losing to the opponent anyway. Conversely, guilt only has an effect on pro-self players as pro-social players have a constant, long-term goal to keep the opponent’s interests in mind thus avoiding transgressions. This would indicate that emotion (in this case, fear) does have an effect on behaviour that is to be performed in the future. It can also be asserted that emotions arise from a consideration of behaviour (as with guilt) and this in turn can have a direct effect on subsequent inten- tional behaviour. Such a result gives validity to the assertion that emotions both occur before and after intentional behaviour and do in fact directly motivate such behaviour. The second set of experiments mentioned by Zeelenberg et al. are conducted by Hooge et al. and are documented in [39]. In [39], two forms of shame are defined: endogenous and exogenous shame. Hooge et al. posit that shame motivates pro-social behaviour when it is relevant for the decision at hand (endogenous shame) but that shame has no such effect when it is not relevant for the decision at hand (exogenous shame). The decision to study shame was taken due to its classification as a moral emotion by Haidt [82] who proposes that shame is linked to the interests of others and is responsible for motivating pro-social behaviour3. By using three different emotion inductions and two different dependent measures, endogenous shame does indeed appear to motivate pro-social behaviour. After imagining shame with a scenario (experiment 1), pro-self participants displayed increased levels of pro-social behaviour towards the audience in a social dilemma game and these findings were replicated when participants recalled an event involving shame (experiment 2). When experiencing shame after a failure on a performance task (experiment 3), pro-self participants acted pro-socially towards a laboratory audience. Finally, the results from experiment 4 showed that this effect could be generalized beyond social dilemmas to helping tendencies in everyday situations. Ultimately, this experiment allows for the assertion that emotion (in this case endogenous shame), does have a direct effect upon subsequent intentional behaviour

3_{Further links between shame and pro-social behaviour have also been proposed by Emde and Op-}

and it is this notion that I will take forward when functionally modelling emotion for computational use.