Existing literature: contributions and limitations

Two different analytical approaches have tackled the issue of regime juxtaposition. The first approach, which I term the “territorial politics approach,” focuses on how the politics and political conflict that play out at the intersection of national and provincial arenas affect SUR continuity.17 A core assumption of this literature is that central governments and their territorial subunits are politically linked. Thus, the linkages18 between the center and

17

Territorial politics, as Tarrow (1978) notes, “is not about territory, but is about how politics is fought out across territory (1978:1). The territorial approach to politics has been used extensively in the subfield of European politics, especially within the literature of state building, political parties, and regionalism (see the works by Rokkan 1970, Rokkan and Urwin 1982, 1983; Keating 1998; Tarrow 1978; Tarrow, Katzenstein and Graziano 1978, among others). Recent works inspired by the territorial approach to politics are Gibson (1997, 2005, 2008); Falleti (2003, 2005, forthcoming); Eaton (2004), Wibbels (2005), among others.

18 _{Linkages, as Gibson (2005:112) notes, can include all types of institutions regulating intergovernmental}

relations, such as agencies monitoring provincial activities and expenditures, revenue and communication flows, and diverse networks of exchange, such as unions, parties, etc.

periphery of the political system, as well as the skills and resources of the politicians who serve as gatekeepers between each level of government, are central to understanding how different sub-systems (i.e., higher and lower arenas of government) interact with each other, and in turn, how national political events shape political outcomes occurring in subnational arenas (Tarrow 1978; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; Gibson 2005, 2008).

Several works illustrate how the interconnectedness of higher and lower arenas affects SUR continuity. For instance, Snyder (1999; 2001) shows that events occurring at the federal level of government, such as the implementation of neoliberal (market) reforms, can contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of SURs. These reforms, as he notes, trigger reregulation projects in the states through which incumbent nondemocratic elites generate rents and resources to survive. Alternatively, Gibson (2005) contends that national

incumbents’ strategic needs may lead federal politicians to foster SUR continuity. As long as subnational nondemocratic rulers meet these needs, national democratic incumbents have incentives to prevent democracy from trickling down. On a similar note, in an analysis of Argentina, Gervasoni (2006) argues that the institutions of fiscal federalism shape the prospects for democratization in subnational arenas, as provinces that are highly dependent on federal transfers are better equipped to maintain SURs in place. Finally, Cornelius (1999) and Montero & Samuels (2004) argue that processes of decentralization, which shift political, fiscal, and administrative power away from the national government toward subnational units, give nondemocratic state-level rulers greater autonomy, resources, and leverage to strengthen and maintain SURs alive.

The second approach to the study of regime juxtaposition, which I here refer to as “the provincial approach,” posits that the linkages (see footnote 18) that make

intergovernmental connections possible are not always prevalent. As a result, this strand of reasoning holds that it would be wrong to assume that political outcomes unfolding at the subnational level are a direct consequence of events occurring at higher levels of

government. Advocates of this approach argue that SUR continuity is better understood by looking at specific provincial factors present in each SUR.

Echoing this approach, Montero (2007) claims that, in countries such as in Brazil, where subnational politicians neither have the desire (i.e., progressive career ambition) nor the resources (i.e. party structures) to venture into national politics, SUR continuity cannot be explained by looking at the intersection of national and provincial arenas. Instead, he argues that the level of provincial capitalist development and citizens’ economic autonomy from the (provincial) state are the main factors explaining SUR continuity in Brazil (Montero 2007).19

Each of these two approaches separately offers key analytical and theoretical insights to better understand the prospects for subnational undemocratic regimes continuity in

contemporary Latin America. Yet, because each of them views subnational politics from rather opposing viewpoints, they fail to provide a comprehensive and accurate explanation of the political dynamics that unfolds in the subnational world and that feeds SUR continuity. For instance, the “territorial politics approach” is correct in assuming that in any large-scale system of territorial governance, such as federal states, political institutions are entangled across space and precisely for this reason political outcomes and political action are not limited to a single arena.

19 _{McMann (2006) offers a similar argument to explain subnational undemocratic regimes in Russia and}

Yet, with its emphasis on intergovernmental interactions, this approach underplays the influence of provincial factors on the prospects for SUR continuity. In fact, many of the elements that shape the interaction between higher and lower-level incumbent politicians are determined by provincial variables. The leverage that national politicians can exercise over subnational arenas, as well as undemocratic incumbents’ capacity to thwart national leverage in subnational arenas is, to a large extent, determined by structural subnational variables (such as the level of economic provincial/state independence from the center, and the type of state-administrations –which facilitate or hinder political penetration from federal actors and institutions). Thus, by focusing on the processes (i.e., intergovernmental interactions), rather than the structural subnational variables that shape national and subnational actors’ ability to feed SURs, the territorial approach misses an important part of the explanation of subnational regime continuity.

By the same token, the provincial approach, which centers exclusively on the effect of subnational variables, overlooks key “exogenous” (i.e. national) factors, such as the incidence of national parties, institutions, and actors in subantional arenas, all of which may drive political continuity in subnational units. The provincial approach assumes that

subnational units are isolated entities, impervious to the political, economic, institutional, and social events occurring at the national level (or even other subnational units themselves). Still, despite the legal autonomy conferred to them by the constitution, subnational units are embedded in a larger (national) political system, and consequently they cannot be regarded as sovereign countries, as the provincial approach does. As Gibson (2008) notes, “in a country, the intervention of the central government in provincial affairs is regular and substantial” (2). Thus, an explanation of SURs’ continuity necessarily must incorporate variables that capture

the political and institutional incidence of the national government on subnational political dynamics (as suggested by the territorial politics approach).

Given that each of these two approaches emphasizes different and important elements of the national-subnational reality, which should be taken into consideration when studying SUR continuity, the analytic framework I develop and test in this dissertation synthesizes the central building blocks of each of these approaches into a more satisfying model. From the territorial politics approach, I borrow the idea that SUR continuity should be understood from an intergovernmental and “system-based” perspective. As mentioned before, given the interconnectedness between higher and lower levels of government (i.e., subsystems), and the constant interplay between these arenas, political outcomes in the subnational world are necessarily shaped by what happens in higher (and also cross-provincial) levels of

government. Thus, any theory about SUR continuity should incorporate the interactive dynamics that take place at the intersection of national and provincial politics (see Gibson 2005, 2008).

From the provincial approach I borrow the idea that provincial variables play an important and decisive role in shaping SUR continuity. As I will show in the coming sections of this chapter, structural provincial variables such as the nature of state

administrations20, and the fiscal/financial autonomy of provinces from the center, are key to understanding how the interconnectedness across levels of government operates, and, in turn,

20 _{State administrations are here understood as the set of institutions and rules that organize government. These}

institutions establish the parameters through which rulers exercise the (political) power conferred to them by their ruling position. Following Max Weber (1925), state-administratios can take be patrimonial or bureaucratic.

how SUR continuity and reproduction ensues.21 Put differently, the politics that play out at the intersection of national and subnational arenas, which is central to determine the

territorial strategies that give way to SUR continuity, cannot be understood without taking into consideration political, institutional, and economic subnational factors.

II.Explaining SUR continuity in contemporary Latin America: control, autonomy, and