A two-level framework to explain trajectories of SUR continuity

Regardless of what instruments of territorial control and autonomy are available to presidents and governors, respectively, national incumbents can only gain leverage over subnational incumbents or subnational politics/arenas if a combination of (national and subnational) variables is present. To be able to politically/territorially penetrate, and thus exert control over, undemocratic provincial arenas, presidents need the means necessary to

35 _{One of the main advantages of two-level theoretical models, as Goertz & Mahoney (2006) note, is that they}

allow researchers to model the impact of variables that pertain to different levels (i.e., national and international) in a rather simply way.

subjugate an undemocratic governor, and in turn, undemocratic governors’ capacity to resist penetration from above must be minimal. Neither of these two conditions alone (except at the extremes) is sufficient for a president to gain leverage over provincial arenas, rather it is the combination of both that is necessary and jointly sufficient.

For instance, a president with high levels of fiscal discretion will most likely be able to exert control over financially dependent subnational rulers (albeit not over financially autonomous governors). Similarly, presidents are more prone to exert control or penetrate in subnational districts where their party has a strong electoral presence (and not where his/her party is electorally and territorially weak), and where bureaucratic state-administration enable presidents to take hold over local opposition party structures. In summary, the capacity of presidents to penetrate, and thus control, provincial arenas is determined not only by the absolute (fiscal and/or partisan) power of presidents, but also by the capacity (or lack thereof) of subnational rulers to neutralize presidential power.

Each of the 3 clusters of variables (located in the left-hand side of the figure 2.2) denotes different combinations of national and subnational variables that are needed for a president to attain control over undemocratic governors/arenas. Each of the three clusters of variables is made up of four variables (five in the last cluster). The lower two boxes in each cluster denote the instruments of territorial autonomy available to governors (i.e., the type of provincial state infrastructure and the level of financial autonomy), while the upper two (three in the last cluster) depict the instruments of territorial control available to presidents (i.e., electoral presence of of the presidential party and extent of presidential fiscal power).

These three clusters of variables produce three different “paths of control” through which presidents can wield power and influence over undemocratic governors and arenas,

namely, the fiscal path of control, the partisan path of control, and the fiscal-partisan path of control.36 These paths are presented in figure 2.2 with the dotted arrows, which denote substitutability. The reason why the three paths of territorial and political control are schematized as substitutable responds, as noted earlier, to the fact that there are multiple paths through which presidents can control penetrate provincial arenas and either one is sufficient to attain territorial/political control over SURs. For instance, presidents in country A (or at t1) may be able to exercise territorial control over undemocratic governors via their political party, whereas presidents in country B (or at t2) may stand in a good position to exercise political and territorial control by means of fiscal instruments. Both means of exercising control and wielding power over governors are perfectly substitutable.

36 _{The paths of control are named after the predominant instrument of territorial/political control available to}

presidents. The paths exhaust all possible combinations of presidential instruments of territorial and political control identified in this study, and thus illustrate the only 3 possible ways in which presidents may discipline undemocratic governors.

Figure 2.2: A two-level (sub-)model of presidential territorial and political control

The fiscal path of presidential control takes place when the main instrument of control available to presidents is fiscal, i.e., when they enjoy high levels of fiscal discretion and their party lacks a high electoral presence. However, this control only ensues when governors are financially dependent on the center. If this is not the case, financially responsible and economically sound governors will stand in a position to neutralize

High presidential fiscal discretion Bureaucratic state administration

Low elec. presence of president’s party

Provincial financial dependency

Bureaucratic state administration

High elec. presence of president’s party High presidential fiscal discretion

Bureaucratic state administration High elec. presence of president’s party

Low presidential fiscal discretion

Governors’ party = presidents’ party

Provincial financial dependency

Governors’ party = presidents’ party * * + * + * * + + Fiscal path Fiscal-partisan path Partisan path Presidential territorial /political control + + Legend: ontological causal substitutability

conjunction of necess. causes + logical OR

* logical AND Bureaucratic state administration

presidential manipulation and control, no matter how much fiscal discretion presidents have.37

The partisan path of presidential control occurs when the president’s party has a high electoral presence and low levels of fiscal discretion. Here, the main mechanism through which presidents can wield power and exercise control over undemocratic rulers is through partisan structures. For this to happen, two variables must be present, i.e., undemocratic governors must belong to the president’s party –and thus be subjected to direct partisan control from above, or in the case of belonging to an opposition party, the province/state must have a bureaucratic state administration, as these administrations facilitate presidential penetration.38

Finally, the fiscal-partisan path of presidential control takes place when presidents have high levels of both fiscal discretion and partisan presence. In this case, presidents gain leverage over subnational arenas/governors by disciplining provincial incumbents and by controlling them via party structures. For this to happen, undemocratic governors’ financial dependency must be low, or one of the following variables must be present: either the governors belong to the president’s party or their provincial state administration is bureaucratic.

37 _{Presidential fiscal control can also become effective if subnational units have bureaucratic state-}

administrations. Despite the fact that this variable is not necessary (thus the sign “+”), such an administration allows presidents to win over local organized groups and opposition mayors. It is by funneling transfers directly to the municipalities that presidents may expand their capacity to exert pressure (and ultimately control) over governors from below.

38 _{Recall, that bureaucratic state-administrations facilitate the subsistence of opposition forces (either at the}

municipal or legislative level), and consequently enable presidents to side with local groups and rely on their local party branch to challenge and control undemocratic rulers from below.

These three alternative paths of presidential control indicate instances in which national incumbents can effectively subordinate undemocratic governors. Yet, I have noted that presidential is not always attainable. This occurs when any of the three relevant

subnational variables (i.e., provincial financial autonomy, governor’s party=president’s party, and type of state-administration) scores in the opposite direction.