methods of justifying the capabilities and her claim that she consulted a wide-range of diverse perspectives. She explains that after “discussions” with people from India, primary changes were made, which include “bodily integrity and control over one’s environment…and a new emphasis on dignity and non-humiliation” (Nussbaum 2000b, 78 n.82). She does not tell us the extent of these discussions and with whom they took place, but they had an impact on her. In Chapter 2, I will examine the plausibility of these discussions on the alterations and justifications of the list.
3. Expanding on the Dignity Version
3.1 Introduction
The dignity version of capabilities demands that each and every citizen be given the opportunity to exercise all capabilities from her list up to an adequate threshold level.
This section will explore thresholds for some capabilities from the list. I will then explain a problem surrounding individuals who are not given the opportunity to fulfill all central capabilities, but instead are forced to choose between one central capability or another.
Nussbaum calls such decisions “tragic”. I will suggest, following Nussbaum, that one possible way to temporarily address tragic choices is to identify capabilities that lead to the possibility of manifesting other capabilities, namely, “fertile capabilities”.
3.2 Thresholds and Tragic Dilemmas
Nussbaum argues that in order to live a dignified human life the capabilities from her list cannot be met at just any level, but must satisfy a certain threshold. Any society that falls short of ensuring that each individual is able to satisfy the threshold for all
capabilities on the list cannot be considered just. However, the threshold cannot be set too high. Nussbaum (2011b) is aware of navigating this space when she writes that we need to “select a level that is aspirational but not utopian” (42). This is a precarious position since it is difficult enough to identify tangibly the “appropriate” threshold, much less articulate it. Nussbaum settles on the claim that thresholds must be set at a “reasonable level”. One can go beyond the threshold requirement. For instance, Nussbaum argues that the threshold for children is secondary education, but one may pursue post-secondary education if one chooses. Nussbaum admits that this is one of the largest gaps in her theory; that is, discussing the nature of justice above the threshold.
There is no exact measurement to determine a reasonable threshold level. So, Nussbaum advocates for approximate and general levels for two reasons: first, the threshold may shift over time, and second, the appropriate threshold level, at the margin, may require adapting to its context. For example, Nussbaum says we can argue over whether leaving school at an appropriate age should be 17, 18, or 19, but not 12 in light of employment opportunities.
The fact that capabilities must be secured at an appropriate threshold level for everyone does not tell us how much each person should be guaranteed. Nussbaum says some capabilities must be secured “equally,” while others only “adequately”. Capabilities such as political, religious and civil liberties can be “adequately secured only if they are equally secured” (Nussbaum 2006, 293, her emphasis). Equal security must be the goal of
capabilities in situations where any lack of that capability would result in harming one’s dignity. For instance, there is no adequate amount of voting rights that some deserve more than others. All citizens deserve the equal right to vote.
However, not all capabilities demand equality. For instance, adequate housing is required in order to satisfy the capability of “control over one's environment”. Recall, there are two ways to have control over one's environment—politically and materially.
Material control over one's environment includes the ability to hold property and have the same access to property as others. Nussbaum says adequacy could be understood as an
“ample minimum”. Houses do not need to be equal in size, but everyone should have adequate housing and shelter compatible with human dignity.
Nussbaum acknowledges that achieving an adequate level of capabilities for each and every person is a fantasy in the current state of affairs, and thus we are often left with what Nussbaum calls “tragic choices”. A “tragic choice” occurs when two or more central capabilities collide, and therefore any action will involve wronging someone.12 Tragic dilemmas are especially problematic for Nussbaum since none of her central capabilities can be expended for another. She presents the following example. In Kerala, a state in India, it was more advantageous for children to stay home and make an income to help their family meet basic needs than to attend school. The tragic choice here
involves the children receiving an education, on the one hand, and attempting to provide a basic living for their family, on the other. Nussbaum maintains that both education and nourishment are fundamental entitlements; thus, for an individual to be forced into a position to choose one or the other is tragic.
One possible response to the tragic dilemma is to offer more of a certain capability in order to compensate for the loss of another capability. However,
Nussbaum's (2006) approach forbids trade-offs since these fundamental entitlements are
“radically nonfungible,” that is, a lack in “one area cannot be made up simply by giving
12 For a full discussion of tragic choices, see Nussbaum (2000a).
people a larger amount of another capability” (166-7). In contrast to aggregate
approaches that could offer more of something else to compensate for a loss, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach demands all central capabilities be secured at an appropriate level for each and every citizen.
Nussbaum's primary solution to a tragic dilemma problem is “ingenuity and effort,” and she praises the state of Kerala as one example of what she means by solving a tragic dilemma in this way.13 Kerala set up a school program with “flexible hours” that also offered a “nutritious midday meal”. This solution nearly wiped out illiteracy in the state. India would eventually adopt the midday mandatory meal for all schools.
Nussbaum praises Kerala for their ingenuity and effort to wipe out illiteracy while still providing nutrition to the children. Nussbaum (2011b) demands the state “ask what the best intervention point is to create a future in which this sort of choice does not confront people” when individuals are faced with a tragic choice (38). For Kerala, that point was offering midday meals to offset the wages otherwise earned from not attending school, in addition to more flexible school hours.
I find the Kerala example compelling. It illustrates Nussbaum’s point that justice requires securing each of the central capabilities for every citizen up to an adequate threshold level. However, we are not afforded many details about the case. It would be important to know how this decision has impacted employment and the families these
13 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to spell out fertile capabilities in any detail, but it’s worth noting this as a strategy Nussbaum uses to address tragic dilemmas. Drawing on concepts from Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Nussbaum pursues a strategy for handling tragic dilemmas that appeals to the idea of fertile capabilities. Fertile capabilities explain how and why it might be necessary, in certain contexts, to privilege certain capabilities. The ultimate goal remains to ensure everyone has the ability to acquire all central capabilities, however, in instances where this is not possible, privileging certain
capabilities, namely, those fertile in that context, become a means to realize as many central capabilities as possible. Nussbaum (2011b) claims we should seek fertile capabilities in order to (1) identify tendencies to alleviate corrosive disadvantages and (2) prepare for a tragedy-free future (45).
children were helping to support. Nonetheless, a greater concern remains with the solution of ingenuity and effort. That is, Nussbaum offers a resolution of what one state did to address a tragic choice, but we are still left with no principled way of moving forward for those situations in which there are in fact no options that are not tragic.