Weak “Justification” of Capabilities

Claassen and Düwell express a similar frustration with Nussbaum’s later justificatory strategies. They argue that she presents “at least three methods

simultaneously, without reflecting on their mutual compatibility” (500).¹⁴ Specifically, overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium are “completely different method[s] of justification and it is prima facie hard to see how the two may be reconciled” (Claassen and Düwell, 501). I am sympathetic to their concern. In an attempt to reconcile the two justificatory strategies of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus, I will explain the terms as articulated by Rawls, and then show how they can be used to justify the capabilities approach in a way Nussbaum wishes.

4.1 Weak “Justification” of Capabilities

Nussbaum (2006) argues that the intuitive force of each capability is a result of

“imagining a form of life” without that capability (78). This method is similar to

Aristotelian internalist essentialism insofar as we, as individual theorizers, are pondering features of human life that are uniquely human. However, unlike internalist essentialism, the imaginative exercise does not demand that we confront beliefs and practices from other societies, and it is not situated with an Aristotelian framework. I believe Nussbaum uses this method as a starting point to subject particular capabilities that constitute her list to further scrutiny.

Consider, for example, the capability of play. Play refers to having the

opportunity to laugh and enjoy recreational activities, following a strict set of rules in

14 I am only discussing two of Nussbaum’s justifications because they are most central to her theory.

However, it is worth mentioning others she considers, for example, imaginative exercises (See Section 2.5), narratives (Nussbaum 2011b, chapter 1), and a “limited and ancillary role” to Jean Hampton’s informed-desire proceduralism (Nussbaum 2000, 158-61).

attempt to win a game or competition, or simply an “openness to being a fool” (Lugones 1987). Nussbaum’s imaginative exercise asks us to imagine a life without play or a life of being forced to “play” in a particular way. In the former case, an individual would be deterred from fully expressing herself, for instance, from using her imagination and emotions, gaining and strengthening relationships, and receiving a break from the challenges and monotony of daily routines. This explains why living a dignified human life entails the opportunity to play. In the latter case, if one is commanded to play, is it really play? The answer is “no” because “if we dragoon people into a total mode of functioning, we are not fully respectful of them” (Nussbaum 2000b, 160). Play, then, cannot be coerced or forced since it would no longer be play, and it would violate one’s dignity insofar as a person is deprived of the opportunities to decide for herself whether she will play or not, and how she will do so. The capability of play makes the list because if a person is denied the opportunity to play, then she would be missing a key feature of a dignified life.

An easy initial objection to this way of justifying Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is that it seems viciously circular. Nussbaum appears to define what constitutes a dignified life through the list of capabilities, on the one hand, and yet maintains that capabilities are an expression of dignity, on the other, that we can intuitively grasp through this imaginative exercise. Nussbaum doesn’t attempt to avoid the circularity problem by offering an independent account of dignity and then showing how the

capabilities is linked to it. Rather, she simply acknowledges that we cannot “look at a life or listen to a story without having some preliminary hunches about what is significant”

(Nussbaum 2011, 15). So Nussbaum seems to answer the above problem with one’s

“hunches”. In other words, the initial criterion to ground or justify her list of capabilities as the right list is in one’s own gut-reactions, so to speak. Nussbaum recognizes this is insufficient to provide a strong justification of the capabilities as universally valid norms, but she nonetheless finds it as a useful starting point because she thinks many of us do and will share these intuitions.

The above example is meant to illustrate two points. First, Nussbaum utilizes these types of imaginative exercises as a way of motivating a weak justification for her list. I say “motivating” because full justifications are a result of general agreement on the capabilities list. All theories must begin with assumptions, and then further justification for those original commitments can be given. Nussbaum starts with a list of central capabilities, which is an expression of her account of dignity and invites us to see if we could really imagine a dignified life without even one of them, and if we cannot, then her list is to some degree justified.

Second, we gain a better understanding of Nussbaum’s account of dignity. We learn that the capabilities list is her substantive account of a dignified human life, which becomes the basis for measuring and evaluating cross-cultural quality of life judgments.

Again, the intuitive exercise does not fully accomplish Nussbaum’s ultimate goal of fully evaluating whether an individual is able to realize all ten central capabilities. However, an individual’s “preliminary hunches” offers the first step toward identifying which capabilities might possibly be the standard against which we judge a person’s well-being.

I have argued that the list should not be divorced from Nussbaum’s account of human dignity but taken as constitutive of it. Assuming one accepts her basic idea of human dignity, which entails the opportunity to secure the ten central capabilities on her

list up to an adequate threshold level, then in principle one would also seem to endorse her single, universal list of central capabilities as fundamental entitlements (as opposed to a thick conception of the good life) to be ensured for each and every citizen.

Intuitions or hunches in regards to which capabilities seem most appealing will vary between and within cultures. So, Nussbaum’s next move is to bolster support for her intuitions by demonstrating that she has refined her beliefs by considering alternative perspectives. Nussbaum calls this a “narrative” method of justification.