Importing Values in Reflective Equilibrium

we hold closest to us. It is the method itself that concerns Ackerly, not its poor use.

Ackerly (2000) explains that “Nussbaum’s argument furthers her criticism of Aristotle’s application of his method, but goes no further toward restoring confidence in the method”

(104). A missing step in Nussbaum’s methodology is a way to check our own biases, which is necessary in order to avoid claiming a value as universal and yet interpreting it so narrowly that it is merely representative of one’s own culture. So, just as Aristotle’s method imports values associated with only the lives of male citizens while supposedly seeking essentially human functions, Nussbaum’s method “allows her to import into her definition of an essential human life the liberal values of autonomy and independence that may be more culturally specific than she treats them” (Ackerly 2000, 105).

As we have seen, Nussbaum uses internalist essentialism to justify the flourishing version of capabilities, but she has since abandoned this version in favor of the dignity version. One method Nussbaum offers to generate and defend her list for the dignity version is reflective equilibrium. However, as I will show, this problem of uncritically and covertly importing values that troubles her early method of justification also applies to this later method.

1.2 Importing Values in Reflective Equilibrium

Nussbaum’s position of power as a Western academic and theorizer, in addition to the arbitrary manner in which she selects competing theories to shed light on her list, has allowed her to uncritically import liberal values into her dignity version of the

capabilities and to avoid subjecting the theory to genuine scrutiny. Recall that reflective equilibrium for Nussbaum begins with an individual pondering what is implicit in the

notion of dignity. She then seeks to achieve equilibrium between her moral judgments on dignity, background assumptions, and theoretical commitments. Furthermore, since Nussbaum is committed to wide (rather than simply narrow) equilibrium, she must elicit challenges to better assure herself that the equilibrium is trustworthy. So in some sense her version of reflective equilibrium takes on a “dialogue”-like form. However, this

“dialogue” is not really a dialogue where an individual discuses a subject with an actual interlocutor. Instead, Nussbaum claims to “engage” other worldviews (not any specific person). This is problematic since she never says what she in fact means by “engage other worldviews”. She might simply ponder from her armchair how others would respond to her list or research extensively on how they would challenge her perspective. Regardless, we are not afforded the details of her engagement.

As I noted earlier, Nussbaum argues that the items on her list offer everyone the power to challenge her perspective and give marginalized voices the opportunity to speak. To some extent, this is certainly true since the capabilities of bodily integrity, affiliation, and control over one’s environment, among others, are necessary

preconditions for a person to have a genuine opportunity to share one’s worldview and challenge others—to speak and be heard. However, a deeper concern is that Nussbaum defends her list of capabilities as compatible with “our” intuitions of what it means to live a life compatible with human dignity, and yet presents virtually no serious challenges to any of the capabilities.

I am not wholeheartedly against her list of capabilities (in fact, I am quite sympathetic to many of them), and it is not obvious that any of the feminist critics from this chapter would deny the value of Nussbaum’s list, but if Nussbaum wants to achieve

cross-cultural support for her list then she must take her critics seriously. This will include critically engaging them at multiple levels. In terms of reflective equilibrium, she must engage more than simply her account of human dignity since other perspectives may yield a different list of capabilities or, perhaps, a different interpretation of a given capability from her own. I have already discussed the trouble with espousing the

capability of education and its particular manifestation, however, there are certainly other capabilities that are subject to the same concern. For example, Nussbaum interprets the capability of bodily integrity to include an absolute prohibition on female genital circumcision (FGC). However, as I noted in Chapter 1, Theresa Tobin has argued that because FGC cannot be captured by a single procedure, event, or ceremony, but rather has multiple meanings in different communities, to simply assert that “this” practice is an obvious violation of bodily integrity from the outset fails to consider perspectives of women in communities who practice and themselves endorse some version of FGC. That is, Nussbaum automatically dismisses the views of women who might challenge the idea that bodily integrity and FGC are in some sense compatible in part because the theory yields an oversimplification of a set of practices that have different physical

manifestations and different cultural and social meanings in different places.

Furthermore, because Nussbaum’s version of reflective equilibrium is Socratic in nature, she must also engage others who do not share her worldview and then either show why her list is superior to competing versions or amend her list accordingly. If she

continues to ignore other perspectives, then she is merely constructing a Nussbaumian ethic cloaked under the guise of a global ethic that pays special attention to the way in which marginalized voices (especially women) suffer injustice. Until a genuine effort is

made by Nussbaum to take critics seriously, then she will continue to suffer from the criticism that she imports liberal values into her theory (including her list) without adequate defense.