Theftost-Modern State
GLIMPSE ON THE INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY
Drawing some broader lines from the literatu re discussed above, w e can
identify four domains w here a w eak state suffers from fragility or fracturedness. These
are critical fo r stability and improving the conditions of any state, nam ely security,
political, economic, and social arenas. M o reo ver, these fo u r domains are basic
functions as well as indicators th at measure th e perform ance of a state. N orm alcy in
126 Buzan, People, States, and F e a r: An Agenda fo r In ternatio n al Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era.
these four areas is a prerequisite fo r any stable country to ensure th a t its citizens are
enjoying basic rights anticipated out of th e fo u r spheres.
As previously m entioned, security is a to p priority on the hierarchy of political
goods th a t every citizen o f a state seeks. A state's prim ary purpose is to "ensure basic
social order and protect inhabitants from th e th re a t of violence from internal and
external forces."127 Due to a lack of effective security arrangem ents in w ea k states,
citizens feel insecure from criminals and terrorists and fear fo r the safety o f th e ir
private belongings. As a state also fails to impose its m onopoly of th e use o f force, it
can feel insecure on its frontiers due to a m irage o f existential threats from neighbors
and seem less interested in imposing an effective political order. Highlighting th e
im portance o f the security dimension, th e fo rm e r Resident Representative o f UNDP in
Ghana and Nigeria, Alfred Fawundu, feared th a t fragile and violent societies produce a
negative outlook fo r th eir own people and neighbors too. He stressed th a t, w h ile the
"security o f states worsens, the proliferation o f small arms flourishes, and as the arms
proliferation flourishes, th e conflicts expand across boundaries."128
On political grounds, a state is responsible fo r providing "legitim ate,
representative, and accountable governance under the rule of law ."129 As a result, a
transparent system helps citizens to enjoy a g reater deal o f freedom , and th eir
fundam ental rights are protected. In contrast, th e fragile statehood of w eak and
127 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, 24.
128 Debbie Hillier and Brian W ood, "Shattered Lives: The Case fo r Tough International Arms Control,"
(Eynsham 2003), 78.
129 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and In ternatio n al Security, 25.
"decapitated" states fails to create proper institutional checks and balances.130
Eventually political corruption em pow ers chronic and despotic leadership, and these
corrupt political elites then enjoy political freed o m w ith o u t any fear o f accountability.
The higher the position these elites occupy, th e higher the desire to stay longer
in pow er. The desire for reaching higher and staying longer in power encourages
corrupt political elites to prepare fo r "grabbing and retaining power a t all costs,
form ing alliances, and taking decisions w ith longer personal objectives in m in d ."131
States in Africa, Asia, and Latin Am erica witnessed a prolonged perm anence o f despotic
and corrupt elites, as they legitim ized th e ir corrupt rule through constitutional
am endm ents. M ichael Comer and Tim othy Stephens, w hom have done extensive w ork
on corruption focusing both on least developed and developed countries, quo te John
M ukum M baku w hile describing th e ram ifications o f poverty and corruption on African
polities, explaining th at th e "internal causes of poverty in th e African continent, which
significantly outweigh external ones, includes excessive control of econom y, massive
and pervasive corruption, merciless exploitation o f the peasantry and ethical violence
verging on genocide."132 W ith the passage o f tim e, corruption becomes
institutionalized exacerbating the coercive corruption, which underm ines th e "integrity
130 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198.
131 Michael J. Comer and Tim othy E. Stephens, Bribery and Corruption : How to Be an Impeccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT: G ow er Pub., 20 1 3 ), 12.
132 Bribery and Corruption : H ow to Be an Im peccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen (Burlington, VT:
G ow er Pub., 2013), 14.
of basic state institutions."133 So the en tire society becomes a victim to th e com pletely
unjust and no speedy justice system.
The econom ic sphere is the th ird im p o rta n t dom ain o f a state's responsibility,
th at is, to "create a legal and regulatory fra m ew o rk conducive to econom ic grow th and
d evelopm ent."134 The economic fra m ew o rk process enables a m arket to grow, a ttra ct
foreign investm ent, create favorable conditions fo r entrepreneurs, and enrich hum an
capital. The state defines a set of rules and regulations so private entities and investors
feel attracted to m arket friendly policies. The political economic conditions o f fragile
and weak states are always fluctuating and rem ain doubtful to dom estic and foreign
investors.
The developm ent economist and fo rm e r director of th e Shell Foundation, Kurt
Hoffman, explicitly refers to the problem s of corruption th a t cripples dom estic
economic conditions and discourages entrepreneurs support initiatives th a t would
counter poverty and help fragile economies. Hoffm an w rites that th e "entrepreneurs
and businesspeople can help governm ents and the m ajor donors m ap o u t the value
chain of activities and stages w here corruption or lack of governm ent capacities
impinges on enterprise creation."135 As com m on features in weak states, such as
133 Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, ed. H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (Boulder, N ew York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1999), 26.
134 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and In ternatio n al Security, 25.
135 Kurt Hoffman, "Placing Enterprise and Business Thinking at the H eart of the W a r on Poverty," in Reinventing Foreign Aid, ed. W illiam Easterly (Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press, 2008), 492; Bertram Spector also explains th e ways "the corruption im pedes economic growth" and discourage foreign and domestic investment... See, Bertram I. Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries: Identifying
Causes/Strategies fo r Action, 1st ed. (Sterling, V a.: Kumarian Press, 2012), 26-27; Charles Funderburk, Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective : Sources, Status and Prospects (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 2.
freq u en t capital flights, bankruptcy, and seeking bribes from foreign investors becom e
customized traditions, unem ploym ent and poverty increase.
To sustain the state's costs, a state becom es involved in "extraction of
resources" through taxation and im position of d uties.136 However, political elites and
decision makers can also engage in additional "extraction o f foreign resources" i.e.
foreign aid and loans. In th e case of w eak states, m ost of th e foreign extracted
resources "may be sought to pay off supporters," o r used fo r personal w ea lth
accumulation through justified m eans.137 In o th e r words, th e chronic political econom y
of w eak states establishes various ways o f leg itim ate corruption, w h e re dom estic
taxpayers fund as well as "aid funds are m isappropriated through patronage-sw ollen"
(meaning, the m isappropriation of resources under the legitim ate protection of corrupt
political elites).138 The notion of legitim ate corruption and tactics used at international
forum s to extract foreign resources can be understood in th e following words, as th e
author writes that;
"Domestic instability, or the fe a r thereof, tem pts insecure leaders to use foreign policy as a supplem entary resource in th e ir political [and econom ic] struggles. A rising defense budget, or efforts to secure high levels of m ilitary assistance, may be a w ay to keep the arm y happy.... Foreign aid may be sought to pay off
supporters, not to raise domestic investm ent rates ... use m eetings and speeches at the UN may be designed to alleviate psychic insecurities, not to deal w ith substantive problem s."139
Corruption can be controlled if political and legal institutions becom e stronger
136 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and W eak States : State-Society Relations and S tate Capabilities in the Third W orld (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.
and economic entities enjoy m ore open and orderly access to the political decision
making process.140 Due to th e absence o f effective judicial structures, the
accountability system could not succeed to curb th e m enace of corruption.
Interestingly, in most w eak states, a judiciary exists, but it is either under th e control
governm ent or th ere is too much of a gap b etw een im plem entation and en forcem ent.
The social sector is the final arena w h ere w eak states fail to provide social
services to society. Society expects th a t a state provide "basic social w elfare " to its
inhabitants, which is considered one of its prim ary functions.141 That includes access to
proper health care and education, w a te r and sanitation, environm ental protection,
access to the Internet, means o f com m unication, infrastructure, etc. In retrospect,
history proves th at social issues o f m alnutrition, starvation, ultra-poverty, diseases, and
societal violence are deeply rooted in poor and decapitated societies.142 O verall, the
fragile conditions of w eak states do not allow th em to provide basic goods and perform
th eir functions in all four arenas. Some w eak states present strength in one sector or
another, but lack symmetrical strength, which ultim ately translates into an overall poor
perform ance.
M any crimes and transnational security threats also stem from issues of u ltra
poverty. W hen a person sees the degradation of human dignity and w hen his/her
fam ily and friends suffer with illness, hunger, and m aterial deprivation, the individual
becomes frustrated and feels pushed to rebel against the system. Ted Gurr refers the
140 Funderburk, Political Corruption in Com parative Perspective : Sources, Status and Prospects, 3.
141 Patrick, W eak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and In ternational Security, 25.
142 Jared M. Diamond, The W orld until Y esterday: W h a t Can W e Learn fro m Traditional Societies? (N ew York: Viking, 2012), 286-300.
societies w ith high scale deprivation accumulates aggregate frustration, and eventually,
it can be observe th at th e greater th e intensity of deprivation, the g reater the
m agnitude of violence can be anticipated.143 Around one-sixth of th e w orld population
(1 billion) lives in extrem e poverty and destitute conditions, called th e "poorest o f th e
poor," and roughly 1.5 billion m ore face difficulties in attaining basic social rights. By
and large, the greater portions of this 2.5 billion population live in w ea k states, whose
populations are "caught in a poverty trap, unable on their ow n to escape fro m extrem e
m aterial deprivation."144 On moral grounds, it is u n fo rtu n ate to see th e "botto m
billion" suffering on "large islands o f chaos," w hen th e rest o f the w orld is enjoying the
benefits of an interdependent globalized econom y which generates zones of com fort
and establishes islands of peace.145 These zones o f chaos actually becom e "zones of
silence" proving the geopolitical (and economic) unevenness of globality ignored th e
root causes of Third W orld societies.146 The growing feelings of transnational
insecurities, stemming from the zones of chaos, are finally seeking atte n tio n to resolve
the fundam ental socio-political and economic problems.
According to statistical data, around "17 m illion of th e w orld's youth are
refugees or IDPs, 130 million are illiterate, as many as 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 fight as child soldiers,
143 Ted Robert Gurr, Why M en Rebel (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1970), 9.
144 Jeffrey Sachs, The End o f P o v e rty : Economic Possibilities f o r Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 18-19.
145 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion : W hy the Poorest Countries Are Failing and W h a t Can Be Done A bout It (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4.
146 David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations (M a ld e n , Mass.:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 171.
and collectively, young people m ake up alm ost 60 percent o f the w orld's p o o r."147
Alarmingly, the age groups most involved in criminal activities are youths, a m ajority o f
which belongs to these strata of global poor. Expressing th e acute im portance of
tackling poverty, Former Secretary o f State Colin Powell stressed th a t "the United
States cannot win the w ar on terrorism unless we confront th e social and political roots
o f p overty."148
The UN M illennium D evelopm ent Goals (MDGs) acknowledge th e notion th a t
poverty contributes to m any criminal and violent activities across the w orld and desire
to tackle th e issue of poverty. Tackling the issue o f poverty before a state exterm inates
the root cause may be only a cosmetic fixation not endured for long. B ertram Spector
develops a correlation betw een corruption, bad governance, and poverty in a society.
Spector writes th a t "corruption has direct consequences on economic and governance
factors, interm ediaries th a t in turn produce poverty."149 Similarly, Jaffrey Sachs' w ork
also illustrates th a t most of the "poverty trap" is due to bad governance and corrupt
leadership o f w eak and poor societies. Consequently, "the poor face structural
challenges th a t keep them from getting even th eir first fo o t on the ladder o f
d evelopm ent."150 In most o f African countries, corruption is one of th e basic factors
th a t contribute to causing poverty and negatively affecting socio-economic conditions
o f the continent, and the similar conditions prevail in Asian and Latin Am erican context
147 Lael Brainard and Derek H. Chollet, Too Poor fo r Peace?: Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 11.
148 Quote in, Too Poor fo r Peace?: Global Poverty, Conflict, an d Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 2.
149 Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries : Identifying Causes/Strategies fo r Action, 25.
150 Sachs, The End o f P overty: Economic Possibilities f o r Our Time, 226.
to o .151 Paul Collier defines th e leaders o f these poor societies as "psychopaths w ho
have shot th eir w ay to power, som etim es crooks w h o have bought it, and som etim es
brave people w ho, against th e odds, are trying to build a b e tte r fu tu re ."152
There are numerous external efforts made through various agencies to bring
some structural reform s to poor perform ing states. H ow ever, most socio-economic
reforms prom oted by external donors develop a vertical hierarchy in which domestic
agencies are m ore accountable to donors, w hich again fail to achieve a horizontal
o utpu t, or th e im pact factor is not kn o w n .153 Since 1991 $ 8 billion have been invested
in Somalia in an atte m p t to give life to its society and strengthen its fragile
statehood.154 Yet the world com m unity has had troubles w ith Somali pirates, and
militants have used Somalia as a safe heaven. In S eptem ber 2013, Al-Shabab, a Somali
m ilitant terrorist group, crossed into neighboring Kenya and terrorized locals and
foreigners by taking them hostage in one of Nairobi's busiest shopping malls. The
m ilitants brutally killed m ore than 60 innocent people, injuring more than 200 civilians,
w ith dozens remaining missing. A country which has been th e focal point of the
international community's a tte m p t in improving its security situation becam e one of
worse cases of failed states.
The above-m entioned exam ple dram atically vindicates the real th re a t scenario
th a t em anates from failed states w ith its transnational affects. The en tire e ffo rt to fix
151 The End o f P o verty: Economic Possibilities fo r Our Time, 191.
152 Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries A re Failing a n d W hat Can Be Done A bout It, 4.
153 Easterly, Reinventing Foreign Aid, 27; Jessica Cohen and W illiam Easterly, W h a t Works in
D evelopm ent?: Thinking Big and Thinking Small (W ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 7.
154 Seth Kaplan, "Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State," The Washington Q uarterly 33, no. 1 (2010):
81.
Somalia's failure seems in vain. A possible reason could be th a t an externally
engineered process to im plem ent and test new form ats on a traditional society is not
viable. The models o f im p ro vem en t could be incom patible fo r such a society, or society
itself could not be socio-politically m ature enough to synchronize w ith m odern norms.
A num ber of African countries have tried to establish a "hybrid state" th a t may
tem porarily help to tackle domestic security challenges and territorial integrity.155
However, w ith o u t engaging local stakeholders, and w ith o u t devolving responsibility
back to th e state itself, th e task to fix th e state fragility is not a viable option.
Evaluation of the security, political, economic, and social aspects o f w eak and
fragile states portrays a frightening image o f increased inequality, u nem ploym ent, and
poverty th a t worsens th e situation in w eak states, and ultim ately breeds favorable
grounds fo r transnational crimes through "new authoritarianism " and violence.156 One
lim itation of w eak states can be predicted through its dealing with crim e and violence
in society. Noticeably, w eak states rem ain oblivious to th e fact that "unpunished
violence by organized crime groups is perhaps the most visible sign of state
im potence."157 It is highly possible th a t most criminal groups emerge due to higher
rates of poverty, and these groups are likely to em brace crim e and becom e
perpetrators o f violence activities.158 The UNDP Human D evelopm ent Index has vividly
highlighted the worsening conditions in Third W orld societies, which host most o f the
155 Ken Menkhaus, "Local Security System in Somali East Africa," in Fragile States and Insecure P eop le? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Louise Andersen, Bjdrn M 0 lle r, and Finn Stepputat (N ew York: Palgrave M acM illan , 2007), 88.
156 Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The N ew Authoritarianism ," 31.
157 "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," 46.
158 Hillier and W ood, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control," 25.
internal conflicts and hum an rights violations due to the absence o f effective
governance systems and high frequency of social fragm entation.