Understanding the state or statehood in a highly interconnected w orld is not
the same as it was during th e W estphalian era. The early shape of states was portrayed
through the writings of Thomas Hobbes' in his w ork Leviathan, which referred to th e
state, the most pow erful political entity, as sovereign and holding a centralized
adm inistrative control of a given te rrito ry .5 This earlier notion set rules fo r political
thinkers to define th e state and seek the "duties o f state," its role, and its relation w ith
society.6 Over a period of tim e , the state evolved through its dual responsibility of
domestic "pacification and external w arfare," and lately, th e nature of state-society
relations has been fu rth er transform ed .7 The transform ative episodes proclaim th a t the
3 M arina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, Colo.:
W estview Press, 1997), 11.
4 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global P o lity : Practice, M en tality, Rationality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 177.
5 Thomas Hobbes and E. M . Curley, Leviathan : W ith Selected Variants fro m the Latin Edition o f 1 6 6 8 (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994), 3-5.
6 See, "Montevideo Convention on th e Rights and Duties of States," Council on Foreign Relations, h ttp ://w w w .cfr.o rg /so vereign ty/m o n tevid eo -co nven tio n-rig h ts-d u ties-states/pl5897.
7 Louise Andersen, Bjprn M pller, and Finn Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure P eop le? : Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century (N ew York: Palgrave M acM illan, 2007), 7.
states are gradually transform ed into m odern or post-m odern states w ith new
obligations. N ew obligations m ean the state has becom e significantly accountable,
both at domestic and global levels, to politically inform ed (aw akened) citizens' vis-a-vis
to institutions as contrasted to traditional functions o f the state. Aligning w ith new
realities, the m odern or post-m odern states becom e flexible, and notably th e nature of
state capacities shifts to cope w ith changing patterns and complex political dynamics.
In a period of com plex interdependence, historicizing and conceptualizing th e
state is a complicated task to undertake. Yet, the exercise helps to develop a b e tte r
understanding about th e fragility o f states w hen looking a t th e form ation,
sustainability, or political decay o f institutions in m odern states. In this regard, th e
notion of nation-state is perceived through various perspectives as an abstract,
ideational form , and its objectives are explained depending on various form s of states.
In the early years of the conceptual developm ent o f state discourse, th e state is view ed
as bound betw een its authority and subjects or "image and practices."8 Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1 7 1 2 -1 7 7 8 ), and John Locke (1 6 3 2 -1 7 0 4 )
referred to this bond as "social co n tract/ social com pact."9
8 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society : Studying H ow States and Societies Transform and Constitute One A nother (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16. Migdal explains th a t th e '(1) image and (2) practices' shape the state, while holistically portraying th e state form ation. Migdal puts it as "(1) the image o f a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation o f the people bounded by th a t territory, and (2) the actual practices of its m ultiple parts."
In addition, According to Buzan, the "Conception o f state in term s of te rrito ry /p o p u la tio n (body) and socio-political character (m ind)" th a t helps to understand th e nature and behavior o f state.
Buzan further insists th a t the "States must have a physical base of pollution and territory; th ey must have institutions of some sort which govern the physical base; and th e re must be some idea of state which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people", see, Buzan, People, States, and F e a r : An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era, 6 8 -7 1 .
9 The concept of social contract provided some early stage intellectual explanation to understand th e ideational essence of state. A Hobbesian understanding of social contract refers to a hum an's natural
As a reality, "the state as norm ative order" persistently engages in a
"pathological hom ogenization" or "ethnification" o f its "imagined com m unities," in
order to retain a "symbiotic" relationship w ith society to assert its legitim acy and seek
"obedience" from its subjects.10 Barrington M o o re (1966), Theda Skocpol (1 979), Atul
Kohli (1986), Charles Tilly (1992), M ichael M an n (1993), and Joel M igdal (1988, 2001)
have contributed extensive explanation of th e dynamics of state structure, state
pow er, and its relationship w ith society. As a broader consensus, an understanding can
Hence, statehood can be depicted through "collectivities o f officials" th a t
tendency of seeking personal interest, which provides a base fo r a contract with th e state, which seeks to fulfill those interests. In contrast, Rousseau agrees th a t th e state is to provide basic common goods to the citizen in return fo r social contracts, which legitimizes th e state's authority. In addition, Locke fu rth e r supports the state's duty to protect the natural rights o f the citizen’s p art of the contract. Thomas Franck explains the social contract through the Hobbesian understanding th a t it is an "im agine[d] contract b etw een person in the state of nature intends to provide the parties w ith such benefits as security of person and property," so th e contract safeguards th e allegiance betw een state and society, see Thomas M . Franck, The Power o f Legitimacy among Nations (N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8.
10 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,"
Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (Jan 1984): 224; H eather Rae, S tate Identities and the Hom ogenisation o f Peoples, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14;
Philip Roeder writes th a t th e nation-states try to "ethnify th e nation, th a t to, propagate a myth of common origin", which actually justifies a legitim ate popular plebiscite in favor of th e existence of nation. See, Philip G. Roeder, W here Nation-States Come From : Institutional Change in the Age o f Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 31; Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism , Rev. and extended ed. (London ; New York: Verso, 1991), 6.Anderson refers imagined communities to nation because, th e "m em bers o f even th e smallest nation will never know most of th eir fellow -m em bers, m e e t them, or even hear o f th em , yet in th e minds o f each lives the image of th eir com m union; Crispin Sartwell, Against the State : An
Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory (Albany: State University of N ew York Press, 2008), 24;
Obedience means, state seek allegiance from th e citizens and state can get it through coercive and voluntary ways. For more explanation, see in Harold Joseph Laski, Authority in the M odern State (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 32-42.
11 Charles Tilly, The Formation o f N ational States in Western Europe, Studies in Political Developm ent (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70.
enable the "capacities o f state" to achieve its goals, specifically from th e "actual or
potential opposition of pow erful social groups or in the face o f recalcitrant
socioeconomic circumstances."12 This practice justifies th e idea th a t "states are
founded on forces," w hile it establishes statehood in a defined te rrito ry through
"compulsory political association w ith continuous organization ... and its adm inistrative
staff successfully upholds a claim to the m onopoly o f the legitim ate force in
en fo rcem en t of its orders."13 In successful conditions, the state first becom es efficient
in "the authoritative allocation o f social values" and then enjoys th e "en fo rcem en t of
order through institutionalizing" th e social and political p o w e r.14 The reason th a t the
state establishes an "in s titu tio n alize^ ] political pow er" is because it helps the
"governm ental institutions of coercion to m aintain a stratified social o rd e r."15
Gianfranco Poggi (2001) w rites th a t "if th e political power is to act as guardian
of th e social order" then it has to institutionalize th a t p o w er.16 It fu rth e r provides a
legitim ate base to hold th e m onopoly of violence as well as to enforce "the
effectiveness o f the political arrangem ents."17 According to Gianfranco Poggi, th re e
processes are involved in the "institutionalization o f political power," nam ely,
12 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
13 M ax W e b e r and John Dreijmanis, M a x Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations (N ew York: Algora Pub., 2008), 156; M ax W eber, A. M . Henderson, and Talcott Parsons, The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, 1st American ed. (N ew York: The Free Press; Oxford University Press,
1947), 154.
"depersonalization (p o w er no longer stays w ith one person as decisive force),
form alization ("the exercise o f pow er becomes m o re o rien ted to rules, procedural
arrangem ents, rituals"), and finally the integrated (codified norms and rules becom e
"increasingly integrated into broader, encompassing order") power relationships."18
Eventually robust codified procedural arrangem ents can deliver b e tte r political goods
to citizens, strengthen statehood, and enhance th e political capacity o f th e state itself
to protect its subjects.
In contem porary w orld politics, th e dem ocratic and stable states have
successfully institutionalized political capacity, w h ile w eaker ones struggle w ith
form alizing the process. In a broader sense, George Sorenson (2005) has identified
some features o f states, such as functions o f governm ent, nationhood, and econom y of
stable or successful (post-m odern states) and w eak states, presented in tab le 1.
Empirical evidence shows th a t successful states have achieved higher levels of
transparency in governance, nationhoods w ith collective loyalty in m ind, and vibrant
economies to sustain the smooth functioning of th e state. W eak states are ham pered
by inefficient and corrupt institutional orders th a t are fu rth e r w eakened by the
dom ination of diverse ethnic or religious com m unities, resulting in diverse groups
extending their support and loyalty to th eir own ethnicities or religious affinities.
The fragile nationhood scenarios develop favorable conditions for dom inant
ethnic or religious groups to attain sway over state power. Ethnic and religious divides
draw pow er struggles on th e basis o f m ajority and m inority; unfortunately, in w eak
18 Ibid.
states, m inorities are always th e targ et o f "discrim ination and victim ization."19 it is
im portant to take into account th a t th e politics o f ethnic and religious divisions also
occur in stable and highly dem ocratic states; how ever, w eak and undem ocratic states
experience th e "deadly outcom e" of these divides.20 For instance, during th e 1990s, the
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups engaged in mass scale genocide in Rwanda, Burmese
nationalists persecuted non-Burmese ethnicities, and Pashtun and non-Pashtun civil
w ar erupted in post-Soviet Afghanistan. These are considerable examples which echo
th a t ethno-nationalism significantly weakens statehood on th e one hand, w hile on the
o th er side th e "m inority or suffering ethnicities feel th eir right to spark ethno-
nationalistic fervors to protect th eir rights" dw elling in a fragile but "im perial s ta te ."21
The challenge o f fragile statehood is missing phenom ena o f unified nationhood, which
means w eak and fragile states are continuously in search and making o f a unified
nationhood.22 As a m a tte r of fact, creating a com m on identity as a nation is becoming
m ore complicated in recent years than it w ould have been perceived in an earlier pre-
and post-decolonization period. This is because, m ulti-ethnic nation states in th e
developing w orld are failing to accom m odate and assimilate minority groups through
developing inclusive political culture, and are, rather, adopting exclusive policies
19 Rita Manchanda, States in Conflict with Their Minorities : Challenges to M inority Rights in South Asia (N ew Delhi, India ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2010), 15.
20 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 144-45.
21 Nil S. Satana, M olly Inman, and Johanna Kristin Birnir, "Religion, Governm ent Coalitions, and Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 1 (2013): 32; Buzan, People, States, and F e a r : An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold W a r Era, 78.
22 Paul James, Nation Formation : Towards a Theory o f Abstract Community (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), 14-15.
underm ining th e rights of m inorities.23 Despite th e com plexity of political situations in
w eak states, a sincere political e ffo rt can help w eak states to mend th e ir problem s. At
an initial stage, hum anitarian-based interventions involving international regimes (such
as the UN) could coerce and help in resolving th e "state-m inority conflicts and
strengthen ethno-cultural pluralism ."24 A t a later stage, th e y could m o tivate ruling
elites in w eak states to show th e ir viable co m m itm en t tow ards dem ocratizing the
system o f governance, which possibly requires "guardianship" by th e international
com m unity in extrem e cases e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan.25 The n ature of
guardianship may also act as a "surrogate sovereign," if a w eak state is on th e verge of
a com plete breakdown, so the zones o f weakness in a state can be fixed .26
23 Harris Mylonas, The Politics o f Nation-Building : M aking Co-Nationals, Refugees, and M inorities (N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 20 1 2 ), 21-22.
24 Stephen D. Krasner and Daniel T. Froats, "M inority Rights and the W estphalian M odel," in The International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 250.
25 Amry Vandenbosch, "The Small States in International Politics and Organization," The Journal o f Politics 26, no. 2 (M ay 1964): 296.
26 peter Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival o f International Trusteeship," The Journal o f Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (M arch 1993): 106.
Table 1: M odern, Postm odern, and Postcolonial W eak States