HoWaddington has gone further than most in asserting that the

12

course of evolution is good in itself. He says: "we must accept the direction of evolution as good simply because it good according to any realist definition of that concept." His reason for believing this is that "the nature of society is such that, in general, it dev­ elops in a certain direction*oo the ethical principles which mediate the motion in that direction are in fact those adopted by that society."

To speak in terms of a ’direction* of development of society is most unhelpful, since it is difficult to define. Waddington’s.formul­ ation also suggests that the ethical principles, of a society are al-- ways adjusted to evolutionary necessity, whereas in fact it is possible that some new evolutionary trend may develop which we might think is very bad but which our surviving descendants, being selected :'in

terms of this new trend, might take to be very good. Human values might change with natural selection, but there can still be a lag bef­

ore they catch up.

Furthermore, it is evident that we can and do question institut­ ions and actions. Waddington is right that evolutionary theory can tell us why it is that we regard some .things as being good - because that is the way evolution has made us - but whether we should regard those things as good is another question. For example, we might rec­ ognize that we value honesty because groups of honest individuals are selected by evolution and therefore become more numerous than groups of liarso Yet we can ask if it is right to be honest* The answer must be

given in terms of our other valuesT that it is right to be honest because honesty promotes social cohesion, makes social life possible, reduces fear and 'suspic"ioh, enables each -of' us to further our own in­

terests more easily than a solitary life, or some other appeal to our values* The ethological approach, with its notion of the funct­ ional nature of ethics, can make that answer more precise.

The real problem with Waddington’s philosophy is that he not only defines the ’direction of evolution’ as good, but believes that the direction itself provides us with a tool for choosing between ethical systems. The ’direction of evolution’ seems to have been elevated to a meta-ethical concept.

There is, of course, no reason why we should take Waddington’s word on the appropriateness of this way of choosing between ethical systems. However, questions about the survival-value of one ethical system as opposed to another do colour our judgement when we choose between them. We want to loiow whether the institutions advocated by one philosopher could ever work, if they could endure, if they

would promote social cohesion, or if they would interfere with natural inhibitory mechanisms and thus havè unforseen consequences* These are types' of questions about moral .systems which we need to know when making a choice. It is not true that the ’direction of evolution’ is an indis­ putable way of choosing between ethics: but it is true that an under­ standing of the evolutionary nature of our social and moral psychology makes the person doing the choosing far better informed about the prob­ able consequences of the adoption of any particular moral code* This, again, is why the ethological view is necessary in ethics,

(e) Flew’s ’law of self-preservation’

A confusion about evolution and its role in ethics which has been 13

set down by Anthony Flew in his book Evolutionary Ethics can be men­ tioned briefly in passing, because it illustrates the individualist

conception which most philosophers have concerning natural selection, al­ though a group selection concept would be more accurate. He says that if there is some "law of self-preservation, under which all our actions could be subsumed, there could be no point in appealing to this law as

a reason for acting in one way but not another**." If all our actions ^ are the result of evolutionary forces, how can evolution say anything

at all about ethics?

This argument looks convincing, until we realize that evolution sel­ ects groups. The values of a group might be such that the group is pre- served, and under natural selection this is likely to be the case. Yet the individual members of the group might know nothing of the survival value of their morality* It is too strong a use of language to say that their actions are subsumed under the ’law of self-preservation*. They are not; they are included under human ethics* Also, a society may be ’preserved’ even though not all its members act in furtherance of the general welfare; is their action ’subsumed under the law of self- preservation®? Of course it is not. When we tell someone.that self- preservation suggests a certain course of action, we do so to make them aware that actions have different implications about self-preservation. This might be a point over which they were confused or misinformed, but if our observations concerning self-preservation actually impinge on their own desires and values, then we have provided a reason for action.

Summarizing this section: the evolutionary views of Needham and Marx, De Chardin and Waddington are confusing and open to misinterpret­ ation because of their various degrees of reliance on concepts of a

’trend® or ’law® of evolution. Evolution works blindly, and is of use to ethics only in so far as it can help us understand what the events have been which have shaped our values* Furthermore, the view that later or more evolved strains of life are somehow ’better® in an ethical sense is mistaken. Sadly, however, this is the view which most philos­ ophers seem to think is implied by any evolutionary ethical system* Longevity or virulence does not encapsulate ethical value; but our own ethical values have been shaped by the implications of longevity and genetic transmission*

Conclusion

These are the main points which the ethological point of view does and does not imply. It is altogether too easy, torsuppose. thatithe

’direction* of evolution Is inevitable » that we should be entirely

'ï unconcerned about the future of our species (as Russell thought was im- f plied by evolutionary ethics) or that the future of our evolutionary

development is good in itself (as Waddington maintained). None of these conclusions is justified because the theory of evolution, as it applies to humankind, is a statement about past events, not future trends. Past events have moulded our values, and it is from that point of view that we judge the goodness or badness"of actions and future developments.

The main implications of the ethological view are concerned with the clarification of evolutionary psychology; ruling what can and can not be covered by ethical systems and notions of responsibility, ex­ plaining how our values come to be as they are, and showing how certain courses of action or inaction will precipitate outcomes which we might or might not think are ’good®. The details of these broad implications will be covered in the succeeding chapters*