Internal and External Factors

It was evident that different perspectives existed concerning Libya’s shift in nuclear policy and these, not surprisingly, led to different conclusions being drawn. However, what can be said is that only partial analyses have been conducted, and the failure to undertake a comprehensive approach to the Libyan case might well explain the disagreements in the existing literature. The originality of this study consists in its attempt to provide the literature with a consideration of those multiple factors - internal, regional, and international factors – all of which might have affected Libyan policy-making in this area.

2.3.1 Internal Factors

Internal factors usually play a significant role in most states’ decision-making policies.

However, their influence on developing countries, such as Libya, appears to be less important than regional and international ones. In fact, domestic politics have greater effect in democratic states than in undemocratic ones because the authoritarian nature of undemocratic regimes pays little attention to opposition groups or political parties, if they exist.

Accordingly, it is assumed that Libya’s domestic politics played only a weak role in persuading the Qaddafi regime to reorientate its policy concerning its nuclear ambitions. And of course, this can be attributed to the absence of political parties or a recognised political opposition in the country.⁵⁶

Secondly, the ideology of Qaddafi’s regime was an important internal factor. Qaddafi shared the belief of developing leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, Castro, and Nehru for whom colonialism was a continued threat to their national security. Accordingly, Qaddafi’s ideology was an incentive to build nuclear weapons. Contrary to the first internal factor, this one is

56The Libyan regime prohibited the establishment of political parties.

believed to have been more effective in encouraging the political regime and convincing Libyan citizens of the need for a nuclear deterrent for any outside threats.

The third internal factor is related to Libyan natural resources. In fact, the availability of large quantities of oil and gas in the early years of Qaddafi’s rule gave him the means to acquire conventional armaments and eventually to establish a nuclear weapons programme. Similar to the ideological incentive, this availability of finance played a crucial role in allowing Qaddafi to pursue his ambitions to obtain nuclear capability.

2.3.2 Regional Factors

The second category of factors are those at the regional level, and these are seen to play a substantial role in any state’s policy. In fact, the Libyan decision to launch and later abandon the nuclear weapons programme was affected by several regional factors. For instance, Libya’s peripheral states, such as Egypt under Sadat, and Sudan under Numeiry, were considered a threat by Qaddafi’s regime.

During the Cold War, Libya’s neighbouring states had to choose between an allegiance to the Western bloc led by the US or to the Eastern bloc led by the former Soviet Union. Regional rivalries in North Africa and the Middle East were a significant contributor to the decision to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Additionally, the desire for leadership in the region was a decisive element in the acquisition of armaments. Given these two different circumstances – the rivalries, and Qaddafi’s personal ambitions – the Libyan government was persuaded to consider Libya’s neighbours as potential enemies. In fact, there were fears that the bordering states of Libya, particularly Algeria and Egypt, had interests in attacking and overthrowing the regime. The best example confirming the fears of Qaddafi is found in the US secret document, dated 19^th October 1976 (almost nine months before the Egyptian attack on Libya in 1977), which was declassified in 2006, and in which it was stated:

The prospect of an Egyptian military attack on Libya was discussed with FCO officers during highly useful consultation on October 16. …. British swung much closer to what we understand to be current US intelligence assessment that Sadat may attack Libya as part of attempt to overthrow Qadhafi. … British who feel that Sadat must be so aware of the political and military problems involved that the purpose of the Egyptian build up on the border is … two FCO officers in separate conversation with EMBOFF

used the phrase “to shake the tree and see what falls out”. If Sadat really does intend to launch a conventional military attack, British experts are puzzled by his apparent underestimation of the political and particular military difficulty involved.⁵⁷

The second regional factor is related to the Arab/Israeli conflict.⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, the Arab countries were concerned about Israel’s nuclear capability, and such a fact induced them to find a way to create a balance to this.⁵⁹ In fact, the military race was not only between Arab states and Israel, but also between Arab regional states as mentioned above. Therefore, this factor seems to have had substantial influence in the formulation of Libyan security policy in the regional sphere.

2.3.3 External Factors

The third category of motivations for the shift in Libya’s nuclear policy is represented by a number of external factors. First and foremost, the impact of international and regional organisations such as the UN, EU, and NGOs on small states may vary. Indeed, the UN issued numerous resolutions against Libya.⁶⁰ To a lesser degree, the EU also issued several resolutions against Libya on different matters. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in the empirical chapters, the UN response to the Libyan case had an important role in precipitating the shift in the Libyan regime’s policies.

The second external factor is related to the impact of powerful states on Libya.⁶¹ Since the establishment of the UN,⁶² the victors of WWII holding permanent seats in the UN Security Council have been able to wield huge influence on international as well as regional issues.⁶³ The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the main concerns of the permanent security members of the UNSC. In the Libyan case, all the UNSC had explicitly intervened either in favour of Libya (China and Russia) or against it (the US, the UK and France).

57 The full document can be found in Margaret P Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 May 2006 available at:

http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=269449&dt=2082&dl=1345

58 It should be noted that several wars had erupted between Arab states against Israel, such as those in 1949, 1956, and 1973.

59 Iraq and Syria, in particular.

60 For instance, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Libya for almost eight years.

61 Most significantly the permanent members of UNSC: the US, China, Russia, France, and the UK.

62 In the aftermath of World War II.

63 Through the right of veto system.

However, the degree of influence exercised by these actors on Libyan policies varied. For instance, the most dominant state actor was the US, and as will be seen later, the US pressure upon Libya seems to have been the most influential one throughout. Therefore, the role of powerful states will be considered as another external factor influencing Libyan policy.

Clearly, as shown by the above-mentioned factors, powerful states had an impact on Libyan policies, as those states sought to guarantee their own national interests.

The third factor is related to the impact of collective action by the international community against states suspected of nuclear weapons proliferation, such as Iraq. The researcher believes that such an element was indeed influential in forcing the shift in Libyan nuclear policy since Qaddafi witnessed the consequence of Iraq’s defiance in the face of the international accusation that it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Libya did not want to be next and consequently, the Qaddafi regime opted for co-operation and compliance with the West’s demand for it to dismantle its nuclear programme rather than confront the world community.⁶⁴ Accordingly, the Libyan shift regarding its nuclear weapons programme is very likely to have been affected by the invasion of Iraq and the fear of similar military intervention.