Libya’s Development of Nuclear Capacity

Before elaborating on the development of a nuclear programme and discussing the different agreements with states and private companies, it is essential to shed some light on Libya’s official stance regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Libya became signatory to the NPT in 1969, prior to Qaddafi’s coup, and the new regime ratified this in 1975. However, Cirincione et al. (2005:321) underline the fact that despite Libya’s status in the NPT it did not enter into a safeguard agreement with the IAEA until 1980.

The incentives for signing the NPT were various. Firstly, the Russians would not have provided the promised nuclear reactor without such a pre-condition. In fact, when Libya

239 For more details see the article published by Bill Gertz in the Washington Post on 11 April 1991 “China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons”.

ordered a nuclear reactor, Russia reiterated its conditions for providing it.²⁴⁰ Secondly, Libya wanted to openly acquire the nuclear technology from several developed countries, such as Argentina and Belgium.²⁴¹ Libya’s membership in the NPT implied that the regime was able to acquire, from several states and multinational companies, sensitive technology and nuclear materials without being suspected of developing a nuclear weapons programme.²⁴² Despite Libya’s status within the NPT it was suspected by various governmental bodies and analysts that Libya may have conducted nuclear research intended for military purposes.²⁴³ The water project for irrigation known as ‘the Great Man-Made River’, despite its objectives, was believed to be used also for the nuclear weapons programme (Hart and Kile, 2005:636).²⁴⁴ The US in particular was very cautious towards Libya’s real intentions and since the beginning put pressure on several countries (i.e. Russia, Belgium, and Argentina) suspected of providing nuclear assistance to Libya. Eventually, in the mid-1990s Libya supported the NPT Review and Extension Conference without conditions, while Israel refused to join the NPT. In addition, Libya was among the 43 African countries that signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in April 1996 (Cirincione et al., 2005:322).

Having discussed Libyan incentives to become a nuclear power, and the country’s stance towards the international regulations and treaties, it is appropriate to consider the concrete steps taken in the attempted development of a nuclear programme since such consideration will reveal some evidence of Libya’s genuine effort to implement its nuclear policy. Without question, the nuclear weapons development represented a huge challenge for Libya’s rulers because as mentioned earlier, it was difficult to acquire the modern technology and manpower necessary to realise the completion of the nuclear project. The Libyan state was

240 Russia requested Libya to adhere to the IAEA safeguards prior to providing and installing the 10 megawatt nuclear reactor. Indeed, Libya fulfilled the Russian prerequisites in order to obtain the 10 megawatt nuclear reactor, but it had violated the NPT and attempted to manufacture nuclear weapons. Qaddafi’s real intention was not to abide by the NPT or international norms regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons programme, but rather to obtain the 10 megawatt nuclear reactor from Russia. Autocratic regimes, such as Qaddafi’s, are characterised by their tendency to violate international conventions such as those on human rights abuses and freedom of speech.

241 It should be noted here that the intention of Libya to build a power reactor, with the help of Russia, near the Gulf of Sidra, was abandoned due to American pressure on Belgium, which was the potential supplier at that time. See Cirincione et al. (2005:322).

242 On more than one occasion Qaddafi made contradictory statements regarding the issue of nuclear weapons.

243 The United States in particular were very sceptical of Libya’s declared intentions and since the beginning put pressure on several countries suspected of providing nuclear assistance to Libya. The Chad Affair raised the attention of European powers and the IAEA as an institution was judged inefficient in terms of controlling the behaviour of rogue states.

244 The water project was conceived to provide water to cities, towns and to irrigate agricultural lands.

less than twenty years old when Qaddafi started thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons, and there was neither the technical expertise nor the manpower to bring such a project to fruition.

After failing to purchase nuclear weapons from China,²⁴⁵ Libya resorted to India in the 1970s, and suggested it would pay off all Indian foreign debts (approximately $15 billion) in return for the sale of nuclear weapons (Solingen, 2007:213). Later, in 1974, the Libyan regime approached Pakistan, offering to finance the Pakistani nuclear programme in exchange for Pakistan’s nuclear expertise,²⁴⁶ especially on plutonium-reprocessing and uranium enrichment.²⁴⁷ One of the Egyptian nuclear scientists working in Libya noticed an increase in Pakistani nuclear scientists after 1975 (Bhatia, 1987:67).²⁴⁸ However, in a statement to an Indian newspaper in 1986, Qaddafi denied any Pakistani assistance in its nuclear weapons programme, saying “[w]e consider nuclear weapons production against humanity” (Solingen, 2007:213). Indeed, it has been reported by the IAEA that in 1985 Qaddafi’s regime exported uranium concentrate (yellowcake) and uranium hexafluoride (UF6), to a ‘nuclear weapons state’, and this was processed and exported back to Libya. The nuclear components were intended to be used in testing for a uranium conversion facility but were never utilised. These activities were not declared by the regime to the IAEA (Hart and Kile, 2005:639).

Moreover, Qaddafi’s regime did not cease its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons even though it had failed to obtain a ready-made bomb from various countries. Despite the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not beneficial to Qaddafi, in the mid-1990s, his regime attempted to revive the development of its nuclear weapons programme and take advantage of the inherited nuclear stockpile from the disintegrated countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and negotiated on the black market in order to obtain nuclear components (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005:61). And although Libya’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons were not fruitful, the regime still pursued the acquisition of other non-conventional weapons (chemical weapons) in order to secure power, security and leverage.

245 Nasser facilitated the contacts between Libya and the Chinese authorities in 1970s.

246 Libya sought Pakistani assistance in order to set up a nuclear programme.

247 In spring 1976 it was reported by the international scientific community that there was $1 million in gold in a Swiss bank which Qaddafi had offered for a nuclear weapons.

248 The agreement of nuclear assistance between Libya and Pakistan was revoked after Bhutto was executed.

As will be shown in the subsequent sections, Qaddafi’s regime did not give up its quest to obtain nuclear weapons and continued to train Libyan scientists, finally resorting to the black market again.