The Training of Libyan Scientists

An Egyptian nuclear scientist Salah Hedayat asserts that the option of Libya building its own infrastructure was chosen following the country’s inability to purchase nuclear weapons (Bhatia, 1987:67). And the intentions were clear in this respect, as noted by Cooley, who stated in 1981 that:

Of the 2,000 Libyan students now in the United States, approximately 200-300 are studying nuclear physics. If Qaddafi ever acquires a nuclear bomb, its creator may be either Dr. Fathi Nooh, a Libyan nuclear physicist trained at Berkeley, or Dr. Fathi Shingi, another Libyan trained in the British and Indian nuclear establishments (Cooley, 1981:87).

Cooley’s statement was supported by Müller who mentioned the presence of Libyans studying nuclear physics in different parts of the world, ²⁵⁶ both in the East and West.²⁵⁷ As a defensive measure, the US administration decided to prevent Libyan students to study nuclear physics (Müller, 1987: 264).²⁵⁸

Furthermore, in 1984, three years after the building of Tajura, a research centre was established at the same site. This was reported to be

staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians aided by Soviet staff.

Many students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the United States until early 1983 when the United States proscribed training Libyans in nuclear science.²⁵⁹

According to one Libyan senior official with an extensive knowledge of Libya’s nuclearisation programme, the Libyan government went through financial, technical and economic hardship to continue with the programme. This official stated that:

The nuclear programme requires a huge amount of money as well as the establishment of a whole infrastructure with companies and factories. If such a programme was implemented, it would have been very difficult to

256 In the early 1980s, the US was the preferred destination for Libyan students.

257 Harald Müller,(1987), A European Non-Proliferation Policy. Prospects and Problems, Oxford: Clarendon press.

258 Ibid. p.264.

259 See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm

hide its resources, its functioning and its purposes. Libya has always been a country with limited technical capabilities, represented by a small number of experts who studied in Western Universities. Additionally, relying on foreign expertise is not a wise policy, because if identified, it will unveil to the international community a Libyan nuclear weapons programme. The other dissuading factor is the economic one, since Libya does have only one main natural resource, oil. So, due to the enormous financial needed for any nuclear programme, most of the oil revenues would have been dedicated to such a project.²⁶⁰

The declarations of this high ranking official lead to the conclusion that a nuclear project was something beyond Libya’s capacity in terms of the country’s financial and technical capabilities. Indeed, according to this individual, Qaddafi’s ambition to obtain nuclear weapons was far from being achievable. The Libyan case cannot be compared with that of other nations such as Iran because of its lack of technical base and indigenous experts (Müller, 2007:78). Several reasons accounted for the failure to implement formal agreements with the countries that could have assisted Libya. One external factor was the pressure brought to bear by the US, and internal considerations from other political actors within the various countries (Bowen, 2006:27).²⁶¹

For example, in 1977, Moscow was asked to provide assistance for the construction of a natural uranium heavy water moderated reactor, heavy water production facility, reprocessing plant for irradiated nuclear fuel and plutonium separation, and other related facilities.

Negotiations started between Libyan and representatives of the Soviet company Atomenergoeksport in order to build a nuclear power with two 440MW reactors in the Sirte province. According to Timerbaev (2008), Libya offered $10 billion for the development of a closed nuclear fuel cycle. However, the Soviets were against nuclear proliferation and the emergence of new nuclear weapon states, consequently the Qaddafi regime’s offer was rejected. Moreover, Libya’s behaviour on the international stage was another obstacle towards finalising any further nuclear agreements due to the unpredictability of Qaddafi’s reactions. In 1980 the IAEA demanded that Libya allow international inspection of its facilities, and following Libya’s compliance in this matter, the Russians delivered a light water 10MW reactor that was using highly enriched uranium, for the Tajura Nuclear

260 This information was gathered following a fieldwork interview conducted in Libya with a Libyan official in summer 2012.

261 Hence, it was seen dangerous for the world and regional security to provide such a personage with nuclear capacities.

Research Centre (TNRC) (Timerbaev, 2008:113).²⁶² The TNRC had 15 research departments and laboratories which encompassed critical facilities with the intention of generating and producing nuclear activities (Hart and Kile, 2005:636). Between 1981 and 1983, the newly-built reactor began to operate in Tajura, but subsequently, it was reported that the nuclear programme was not in operation due to the hesitation from foreign companies to provide the needed supplies (Solingen, 2007:217).²⁶³

According to IAEA documents, Libya had taken significant steps in nuclear activities between 1983 and 1989, by conducting a small-scale uranium conversion at the Tajura Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). However, there is no evidence that through the research project, there was any use of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The training itself was provided on power systems, mass spectrometers, welding, gas handling, quality control, computerised matching techniques, and heat treatment of materials. It is understandable that such training raised international concerns and it was feared that by mastering the process of uranium conversion, Libya would be able to go further and develop nuclear weapons (Hart and Kile, 2005:640).

After that period and until 1994, a small quantity of uranium was converted. This process was considered significant and potentially to be used for military purposes. According to Bahgat (2008), in 1984 “Libya ordered a modular uranium facility from a Far Eastern country” and decided, a decade later, in July 1995 to revive its nuclear activities including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. It is believed that North Korea was that country, although not specifically mentioned by name, and that it delivered UF6 to Libya between September 2000 and February 2001 (Bahgat, 2008:130-131).

However, the material did not arrive in Libya until 1986 as the Libyan authorities concealed the equipment in several locations in order to evade international inspection. In fact, real difficulties were encountered while trying to assemble this equipment because the instruction guide was not delivered with the components which had been stored for several years without use. For almost ten years, the Libyans tried to assemble these components to create

262Roland Timerbaev (2008): On Libya, Antimissile Defense, As Well As Other Autobiographical Events, Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 14:1, 111-124

263 Several private companies from various countries such as the US, Poland, Hungary, and Switzerland provided the Tajura reactor with equipment.

centrifuges but without success (Corera, 2006:108). Unlike other nuclear aspirants such as Iran and North Korea, Libya found its nuclearisation programme to be daunting.

Additionally, a nuclear plant necessitates a significant amount of uranium, and in pursuit of this, Libya imported large quantities of yellowcake from Niger between 1978 and 1991, and engaged in uranium conversion in the late 1980s (Cirincione et al., 2005: 322).²⁶⁴ According to Hart and Kile (2005), Libya’s nuclear infrastructure was modest, yet a former Libyan representative at the IAEA stated that Libya imported depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) on various occasions in 1985, 2000, and 2001, but failed to declare it to the IAEA. The UF6 is a compound used for the uranium enrichment process, and which produces fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Uranium has less than 1% of the fissile uranium 235, while a nuclear device requires uranium enriched to at least 20% U-235. Libya also failed to declare to the agency, its activities related to concentrated uranium and uranium oxides, uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and the transfer of waste resulting from this process. Additionally, the Libyan government did not inform the IAEA about its use of uranium for radiation, its treatment, or the design of centrifuge stations.²⁶⁵ Uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) is an intermediate compound which is used for uranium conversion; it can be also converted to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment, especially in centrifuges (Cirincione et al., 2005:464).