Chapter 1 – Theoretical Framework
3. International Relations Theory
Addressing the second layer of regime effectiveness entails exploring why states adopt certain behaviours in a given issue-area. Such behaviours include the decision of states to acquire or give up certain weapons, to create regimes for this purpose, to comply with
151 Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ Vol 17 (3), (EJIL, 2006) 485.
152 ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 49, para 88.
ILC Report on Fragmentation (fn 120) 168 - 169, para 331.
154 Article 25, UN Charter: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.’
155 Pierre Marie Dupuy, ‘L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique International - Cours Général de Droit International Public’, Vol. 297, (Recueil des Cours, 2002) 243.
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disarmament obligations, to actively promote disarmament in international fora and to coerce other states to disarm. Considerations drawn from IR Theory will not only shed light on questions related to state conduct which international law cannot address by itself, but also be useful in defining the limits of what the law can achieve in a highly political context.
3.1. The Implications of Security Perceptions for Disarmament
Security is a core value of societies, both national and international. Considerations of national and international security are the primary factor influencing decisions of states related to the possession of weapons and the formation and implementation of regimes governing their elimination. States generally justify the adoption of policies which promote arms races on the grounds of the protection of national security interests.156
In contrast, disarmament suggests that the enhancement of international security through the elimination of weapons is in principle not incompatible with national interests. In fact, a close relationship between disarmament and security has been affirmed and summarised in a 1982 report by then-UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar:
‘The relationship between disarmament and international security lies at the very root of the problem of how to find ways by which States can achieve security without engaging in an arms race which merely results in greater insecurity for all.’157
The desire of states to exist in a state of security is a natural consequence of their inherent vulnerability vis-à-vis other states who also seek to protect their existence and limited resources. Hence, in international relations, security ‘means no more than safety [from threats posed by other states]: either objective safety, meaning safety which actually exists, or subjective safety, meaning safety which is felt or experienced.’158 This subjective aspect of security has important implications for disarmament.
156 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race, (Manchester University Press, 1977) 7: such policies include those legitimising the use or threat of the use of force, aimed at military domination, undermining the peaceful settlement of disputes and supporting the weapons industry;
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Relationship between Disarmament and International Security’ (UN Centre for Disarmament, 1982) 2, para 16.
157 Foreword by the Secretary-General, (fn 157) v.
158 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 2nd ed. (Macmillan, 1995) 18.
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For instance, the presence of large stockpiles of the most destructive weapons may increase the perceived level of security for some states.159 This unilateral view on security based on deterrence stands in contrast with the collective security which disarmament seeks to promote. It suggests that the possession of highly destructive weapons creates a balance of power between states which prevents them from launching military attacks against each other and that, as a result, security is enhanced.160 Other states may consider the presence of the same stockpiles as destabilising feel threatened by them.Such diverging perceptions of security can create opposing needs and expectations of states which may be difficult to reconcile and hamper cooperative disarmament.
The level of predictability of state behaviour in a given issue area is crucial for the levels of security perceived by other actors. Regimes structure state behaviour and thereby render it more transparent and predictable. For this reason, disarmament regimes have been described as ‘agent[s] of change in the international security environment in [their] own right.’161
3.2. Theories of International Regimes
Early IR scholarship on international regimes reflected a growing distinction between the behaviour of international organizations and the institutionalised collective behaviour of states.162 Regime theory,163 which grew out of this separation, is rooted in the idea that
159 See e.g. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Harvard University Press, 1980): Schelling argues that deterrence of potential attacks, by demonstrating the ability to launch an even more devastating counter-attack, is the most viable way of achieving security; Alva Myrdal, (fn 157) 8.
160 See, e.g. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, (Polity Press, 2004); George Shultz, James Goodby, The War that Must Never be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, (Hoover Institution Press, 2015); Kenneth Waltz,
‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities’ Vol 84 (3), (The American Political Science Review, 1990) 731 – 746.
161 Jean-Pascal Zanders, ‘Challenges to Disarmament Regimes: The Case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’ Vol 15 (4) (Global Society, 2001) 361.
162 Stephen Krasner, (fn 89) 185 – 205, later republished in Stephen Krasner (ed), International Regimes, (Cornell University Press, 1982); John Ruggie, (fn 88) 569: Ruggie places regimes on a scale of institutionalisation of collective behaviour which reaches from mere cognitive responses (shared intentions and expectations of states) to international regimes (mutual expectations which have been consolidated through commitments, plans and the organisation of resources) and finally, international organisations (established by treaties, governed by international law and possessing a clear material scope and membership).
163 It has been argued that there is no such thing as ‘regime theory’, but rather, multiple theories of regimes within an overarching ‘concept’ or ‘phenomenon’. See M. J. Peterson, ‘International Regimes as Concept’
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/21/international-regimes-as-concept/ (accessed 21 March 2018): he considers the phrase ‘theory of international regimes’ more appropriate, as it does not suggest the existence of a ‘distinct and reasonably unified school of analysts.’
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cooperation between states is possible and necessary in a state of anarchy.164 Common approaches to regime theory, including realism, neoliberalism and constructivism, have offered different explanations for the motivations of states to form and participate in regimes.
Realism centres on the role of power in the creation and operation of regimes. It suggests that anarchy causes states to pursue relative gains, i.e. a better position relative to other states in terms of power and security.165 Realists are interested in immediate, rather than long-term benefits which regimes may provide. States traditionally following a realist approach are therefore unlikely to participate in and comply with a regime which either undermines their superiority or unlikely to directly increase it.
Neoliberalism suggests that states seek to maximise absolute gains. While they ‘concede that cooperation is affected by power relationships’, they argue that interests and expectations are influenced by norms and international institutions.166 They regard regimes as cooperative arrangements which facilitate the exchange of information, knowledge and resources and thereby reduce uncertainty.167 In turn, this exchange optimises the achievement of desired outcomes for all participants.
Constructivists regard regimes as social constructs which, rather than by material interests of states, are shaped by knowledge, norms, identities and discourse.168 Constructivism treats these elements as part of a learning process. In other words, if a new concept or idea enters public discourse and influences the collective understanding of states in a given issue area, a regime may emerge from such a process.
Although the role of power relations cannot be neglected in the international order, the realist exclusive focus on immediate gains in superiority is not useful for the legal examination of disarmament regimes. Moreover, the realist assumption that regimes have ‘minimal
164 Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique’ Vol 17 (1), (Review of International Studies, 1991) 67; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ Vol 46 (2), (International Organisation, 1992).
165 Robert Powell, ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory’ Vol 85 (4), (American Political Science Review, 1991); Joseph Grieco, ‘The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation’ Vol 87 (3), (American Political Science Review, 1993).
166 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, (fn 109) 23.
167 Ibid
168 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (CUP, 1999) 1.
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influence on state behaviour’ contradicts the assumption of their importance underlying this thesis.169
Neoliberalist and constructivist theories offer the most valuable perspective for the purposes of describing the behaviour and motivations of states in the context of disarmament.
Although they admit that power relationships influence international cooperation, their understanding of regimes centres on norms.170 Moreover, they account for other relevant factors including the emergence of weapons taboos which lead states to adopt disarmament treaties, the influence of public discourse on progress in disarmament, the need for transparency and the exchange of information and the dynamic character of disarmament.
They best reflect the dual normative and behavioural approach to regime effectiveness followed in this thesis.