Post-Cold War Challenges for Disarmament

On the other hand, new obstacles in the way of effective disarmament constantly arise in a quickly changing international environment. For example, the dual-use dilemma each WMD technology is confronted with creates a conflict between the development of peaceful technologies and the prevention of their diversion into WMD. The clear distinction between

299 Final Document of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex, ‘Resolution on the Middle East’:

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995

300 See Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama’ (Speech, Hradcany Square, Prague, 5 April 2009).

301 Heinz Gärtner, ‘Deterrence, Disarmament and Arms Control’, Vol 51 (International Politics, 2014) 753: follow-up treaty to START, ratification of the CTBT and the conclusion of the FMCT.

302 Ibid.

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scientific or military motivations behind activities involving WMD materials is often difficult.

This interdependence between industry and the military not only increases the risk of noncompliance with disarmament obligations but also that of weapons materials falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Such activities fall outside the scope of disarmament treaties, as they address state rather than non-state behaviour. This emphasises the need to destroy such weapons completely, rather than to rely on simple reductions.

While some disarmament agreements have reached quasi-universal adherence, others still struggle to attract signatories. For example, the political systems of some countries, especially those of the Middle East, are based upon religious texts such as the Sharia. The primacy given to these texts over international legal instruments often contributes to this lack of universality of disarmament treaties. Moreover, after decades of arduous negotiations on multilateral disarmament instruments, unilateralist tendencies have developed after the events of 11 September 2011. For example, the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002 and its reluctance to ratify the 1996 CTBT can be interpreted as a new preference for fast, short-term solutions which are difficult to reach in a multilateral context. This aspect risks to undermine the authority of multilateral disarmament regimes.

Today, the remnants of the Cold War can be felt in Ukraine, as Russia’s annexation of Crimea has reignited tensions between Russia and the Western nuclear powers. The crisis has led to the suspension of US-Russian cooperation in mutual inspections of nuclear facilities and Russia’s announcement of its absence at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 indicate an interruption of stockpile reductions.³⁰³ One additional aspect linked to the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s breach of the Budapest memorandum, is of particular concern for nuclear disarmament.³⁰⁴ In fact, in this agreement the three nuclear signatory powers, the US, Russia and the UK, agreed to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine giving up the NW it inherited from the Soviet Union and joining the NPT as a NNWS.

The Memorandum had been one of the rare examples of successful voluntary nuclear disarmament.

303 Rob van Riet, ‘From Vienna to New York: Diverging Attitudes and Expectations among NPT Members Spell Trouble for the 2015 NPT Review’ (Peace and Conflict Monitor, 26 January 2015) http://www.monitor.upeace.org/printer.cfm?id_article=1077 (accessed 12 July 2015).

304 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, signed by Russia, the US and the UK on 5 December 1994 in Budapest.

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It can be argued, however, that if Ukraine had not given up its NW, Russia would not have dared to invade Crimea. Such an interpretation of the Memorandum as a mistake, poses a threat to the authority of the NPT regime as it is likely to serve as a justification for NWS not to give up their NW.³⁰⁵ For example, North Korean is continually strengthening its nuclear programme, in particular over fears of an invasion of its territory by the West. Despite the absence of reductions taking place in the near future, the alliance between NWS against North Korea will likely be reinforced, given that its relationship with long-time ally China has begun to deteriorate.³⁰⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the principal developments in the history of disarmament. It has addressed the historical events which have shaped the concept and made its achievement one of the most critical elements of international peace. Modern disarmament was shaped by the promotion of peace and globalisation, thus loosening the rigid Westphalian model of state sovereignty. Indeed, as negotiations in the field of disarmament advanced, the acceptance of disarmament as a means of ensuring peace and security and the willingness of states to be subjected to such instruments grew.

The events and developments discussed in this chapter illustrate the strong impact which geopolitical circumstances, the level of international security at a given time, as well as national interests of state actors have in the negotiation and conclusion of disarmament agreements. Furthermore, the militarily strategic value of categories of weapons are believed to strongly influence cooperation of states in disarmament efforts. Furthermore, it emphasised an important lesson drawn from the interwar disarmament experience: the understanding that imposed disarmament is rarely successful, in particular in the absence of effective verification and enforcement mechanisms and a climate of political suspicion.

A further conclusion to be drawn from this historical outline is the understanding that a general disarmament agreement is difficult or even impossible to achieve. The political and technical complexities of each weapons regime, as well as a degree of suspicion commonly

305 Rob van Riet, (fn 305).

306 Jane Perlez, ‘Chinese Annoyance with North Korea Bubbles to the Surface’, (New York Times, 20 December 2014).

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displayed by states in areas related to their armed forces, multiply the potential sources of disagreement. Consequently, disarmament continues to be pursued in more limited framework on the basis of partial disarmament measures.

Today there is a common understanding that only binding, irreversible and verifiable disarmament obligations can lead to successful disarmament.³⁰⁷ The establishment of instruments fulfilling these criteria has proven to be a long and complicated process. First, the key aspects of verification and enforcement represented a recurring theme in this analysis, which highlights not only their indispensable character for disarmament, but also their contentious nature. Today, verification and enforcement mechanisms are not equally present in all disarmament regimes, as agreement on these elements is more difficult to achieve in some regimes than in others. Secondly, the institutional support provided by the League of Nations and, subsequently, the United Nations has evolved. While disarmament was a central objective of the League, it was reduced to one means available to the UN in promoting peace amongst others. Today, the institutional capacity to coordinate, verify and enforce disarmament varies between regimes. Some disarmament treaties establish international organisations to fulfil such tasks, while others are devoid of institutions and are consequently reliant on regular meetings of states parties and support from the UN.

Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated the limitations of contemporary disarmament efforts. The formalisation of common disarmament interests in treaties aims at making the behaviour of states more predictable by increasing the political costs of breaches, rather than preventing them. However, the CWC represents hope for future disarmament efforts, as its genesis shows that political challenges can be overcome.

Finally, this historical overview has shown that some efforts to create effective international disarmament regimes have failed dramatically while others have attracted a wide membership, have been equipped with verification and enforcement mechanisms and developed a great potential to achieve full disarmament in the future.

307 UN Secretary-General Annual Report, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation (A/56/1).

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