US-Russian Bilateral Disarmament Framework

These diverging positions on the necessity to establish a legally-binding multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty contradict the idea underlying Article VI NPT which consisted in the elaboration of such an instrument as a prerequisite for the practical elimination of NW.

Although the understanding persists among the majority of NPT States Parties that ‘the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process (…) should be pursued within an agreed legal framework’,⁵¹⁴ States Parties have failed to enter this final phase through the negotiation and conclusion of a nuclear disarmament instrument.

In the absence of a multilateral disarmament framework during the Cold War, disarmament measures were promoted through bilateral arms control measures and pursued as an auxiliary objective to non-proliferation. The US and the Soviet Union addressed the need for the reduction of their vast strategic nuclear forces on a bilateral level starting with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) in 1969. As prospects for multilateral negotiations under the NPT faded with time, this bilateral disarmament framework was further developed, extended and renewed.

In total, the US and the Soviet Union/ Russia have adopted a total of eight treaties imposing limitations on the use of NW and reducing the number of warheads. Today, Soviet and US-Russian disarmament measures account for the vast majority of NW reductions to date. The US nuclear arsenal has been continuously reduced since its peak at 31,225 warheads in 1967 to a total inventory of approximately 7,000 warheads in 2016.⁵¹⁵ While the Soviet/Russian arsenal was reduced from 45,000 warheads at its peak in 1988 to 7,300 warheads in 2016.⁵¹⁶

513 Tom Sauer, ‘It’s Time to Outlaw Nuclear Weapons’, National Interest, 18 April 2016.

514 2010 RevCon Final Document, Article VI, para 82

515 Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’ (FAS, 2016): as of 1 March 2016 http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/; Statement by Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State, UNGA First Committee, New York, 12 October 2015 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/statements/12October_

USA.pdf

516 Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’ (FAS, 2016): as of 1 March 2016 http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

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Given the development over several decades of legal provisions and technical aspects including verification and enforcement mechanisms within this bilateral framework, it can be argued that ‘the road ahead for [a future multilateral disarmament] treaty will be influenced greatly by the road behind’.⁵¹⁷ In other words, it is to be expected that this bilateral foundation will be used as a template for a multilateral nuclear disarmament regime. For this reason, it is useful to examine the development of this framework and its principal characteristics.

Bilateral negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union began to intensify shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, scared leaders attempted to counter the ongoing arms race with a prohibition on nuclear testing. However, as the issue of verification stood in the way of agreement on a comprehensive test ban, a provisional solution was favoured: the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It did not provide for verification by on-site inspection which therefore relied exclusively on NTM.⁵¹⁸

The search for internationally verifiable measures continued while verification of US-Soviet arms control relied on NTM, given that OSI had been a constant obstacle in bilateral negotiations. The objective of the negotiations was to determine verification methods that were sufficiently effective without being unacceptably intrusive.⁵¹⁹ The result of this progress was ‘the emergence of a multitude of verification mechanisms varying in intrusiveness as one moved from the bilateral to the multilateral spheres.’⁵²⁰

The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) started in 1969. They produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 1973, from which the US withdrew in 2002. Its follow-on SALT II, limiting ICBM and SLBM, was signed in 1979 but was abandoned when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed in December 1987 and entered into force in 1988, imposing the verifiable elimination of all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles.⁵²¹ Its unprecedented intrusive verification system laid the ground work

517 Statement by UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, ‘The NPT – Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’ keynote address at the second PrepCom, 29 April 2003.

518 Berhanykun Andemicael, John Mathiason, (fn 269) 37.

519 Ibid, 40.

520 Timothy Pounds, ‘Proposals for On-Site Inspection’ in Lewis Dunn, Amy Gordon (eds), Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site Inspection (Lexington Books, 1990) 88-89.

521 500 – 5,500km range.

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for verification of the subsequent START. In 1989, intrusive OSI were eventually agreed upon by both sides. This was a breakthrough which enabled a rapid progress in relations between the US and the Soviet Union. Measures of mutual OSI were added to the verification techniques available for both sides.

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in 1991. START I was the first treaty to impose deep cuts in strategic NW stockpiles, by limiting the number of deployed strategic NW to 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles and proscribed the destruction of excess delivery vehicles. An intrusive verification system, based on OSI, data exchange (telemetry) and NTM (satellite imagery) was implemented to verify reductions ensured the predictability and stability of the strategic balance and provided a framework for further reductions. While reduction activities soon exceeded imposed limits, verification and transparency provisions maintained in place until the end of the treaty. START I was considered too complicated and expensive to continue and efforts were undertaken to replace it with a new treaty. START II was signed but abandoned as Russia withdrew from it in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In 2010, the START process was revived. New START was signed between the US and Russia in 2010 and entered into force in February 2011. Although it fails to address missile defence, it limited US-Russian arsenals to 1,550 warheads and 700 strategic delivery systems. These treaty limits will take effect seven years after its entry into force and will be in effect for ten years. Its verification regime was further developed from that of START I.⁵²²

Today, this bilateral framework is under strain, as the deterioration of US-Russian relations resulting from the Ukraine crisis has made a constructive dialogue difficult. As a consequence, the bilateral sphere no longer appears to be a reliable forum for nuclear disarmament.

Bilateral reductions must therefore be replaced with effective negotiations on a multilateral disarmament agreement, using key elements from bilateral framework such as verification measures.

Moreover, the construction of an effective bilateral framework for NW reductions can be attributed to similarities in the composition of US-Russian nuclear forces making their

522 OSI, exhibitions, data exchange, notifications relative to strategic offensive arms and facilities, exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data).

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arsenals a class of their own. Consequently, the alignment of warhead numbers across NWS must be pursued part of efforts to establish a multilateral disarmament regime.⁵²³ For this reason, bilateral reductions must remain in place. As the largest NW possessor states, the US and Russia remain key actors in NW activities, influencing not only the nuclear policies of other NWS but the dynamics of nuclear disarmament in general. Given their power to slow down, accelerate or block the disarmament process, they possess a particular responsibility for leadership in multilateral nuclear disarmament.⁵²⁴