Interpretivism

This is the major philosophical stance that has been identified in the literature as critical, and starkly opposing the positivist stance. Hammersley, (1993) historically traced the evolution of interpretivism, as being the outcome of a long history of criticism of the hypo-deductive logic of the positivist tradition. This was based on the disparity between the laws of science and social

reality, which therefore warranted different methodological approaches (Grey, 2014). The central argument proffered by the Interpretivist group was:

“Rich insights into this complex world are lost if such complexity is reduced entirely to a series of law-like generalisations” (Saunders et al., 2009:116).

On this premise, Crotty (1998) emphasized the focus of the interpretivist on the qualitative uniqueness of individuals’ perspectives, as opposed to the positivist perspective, which seeks to establish consistencies in data as a basis of generating laws. Interpretivism therefore, relies on the subjective meaning given to reality by the participants in a study. As such reality is conceived as being multi-faceted, from the view points of the human beings, regarded as the key social actors that define reality (Descombe, 2007). Creswell (2003), described the researcher in this vain, as striving to derive meaning from the complexity of views, as opposed to narrowing down to a few categories of ideas.

The terms ‘social construction of reality’, ‘constructivism’ and ‘constructionism’ all refer to interpretivist philosophical stance, which emphasize that reality is socially constructed or interpreted (Creswell, 2003; Blake, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009). Grey (2009:21) used the phrase “Culturally derived and historically situated” to describe the Interpretivist philosophical perspective to research. As Creswell (2003) reiterates, meaning and interpretation of subjects in such studies, are culturally and historically negotiated, through the process of interaction, and not simply imprinted on individuals.

It would however appear that, there is a diverse range of classifications in the literature on philosophical approaches, that by implication should be inclusive in the interpretivist world view. Some authors have categorised all anti-positivist philosophical stances as being Interpretivist (Saunders et al., 2009). Yet some have isolated and listed interpretivism as one of the numerous world views, alongside others such as feminism, critical theory and realism (Blake, 2007; Grey, 2009). Creswell (2003) however, grouped philosophical approaches that advocate for specific social and marginalised causes under as participatory/emancipatory world views, as distinct from those of the Interpretivist. This was rationalised, in view of the shortcomings of the interpretative approach, in addressing specific social issues about marginalised groups of people in society. In the researcher’s view however, all the other philosophical perspectives which rely on the need to emphasize the values of the researcher and the participants can be grouped under the broader perspective of interpretivism. This, in the opinion of the researcher, is because the key

distinctions noted amongst these philosophical groups, are the differences in the levels of involvement of the researcher and the participants, as well as the specifics of the subject matter being investigated. Along similar line of logic, Blake (2007) analysed the differing stances adopted by researchers within the context of socially constructed knowledge. The author described the researcher in this scenario as being an ‘insider’ and a ‘learner’, while noting the distinction in terms of the researcher’s stance as to ‘being for’, ‘being with’ and ‘partnering with or conscientizing with’ the participants. Creswell (2003), also explained the researcher’s stance as being either ‘collaborative’ or ‘understanding’ and geared towards change or theory generation. The descriptive views of the more commonly listed non-positivist philosophical stances in literature are briefly outlined:

4.3.2.1 Phenomenology

The philosophical stance of phenomenology, according to Grey (2014), is that the comprehension of social reality can only be gained through the richness of the experiences of participants in a study. Grey (2014:67) further stated that, a fundamental requirement of phenomenology, “is the laying aside of preconceptions and common-sense believes” in order for new meanings to evolve, unadulterated. Descombe (2007) used the phrase “adopting the stance of a stranger” to describe the approach of the phenomenologist. Saunders et al. (2009) also alluded to the researcher’s position as being required to figuratively “enter the world of our research subjects and seeing reality from their viewpoints” (Saunders et al. 2009:116).

Thus emphasis is placed on obtaining authentic reflections of the phenomena being studied (Descombe, 2007). This is done to a sufficient depth, relevant to capture even the slightest nuances in the phenomena. The need to explore the individual construction of personal experiences in-depth, is underscored as a key feature of phenomenology. With Descombe (2007) emphasizing the central focus, to be exploring multiple realties. Phenomenologists, according to Descombe tends “to live with and even celebrate the possibility of multiple realities (Descombe, 2007:79). Therefore, to the phenomenologist, the world exists only in the way it is experienced and interpreted from the differing perspectives of participants.

4.3.2.2 Symbolic Interactionism

Grey (2009) traced the emergence of symbolic interactionism in the 1930’s, to the discontentment of some philosophers in the conceptualization of human behaviour. It was considered necessary for research to explore the reality of human practices and lived experience.

This approach emphasises the continuous interpretation of social reality. To the symbolic interactionist, human interaction is not induced by cause-effect relationships, but is largely set in a symbolic linguistic world. Different symbols thus hold different meanings, dependent of the value system inherent in the socially contrived setting. This is in the light of human interaction which leads to a corresponding re-adjustment in the human perception of the social world around us (Saunders et al., 2009). A central theme in this philosophical approach is the derivation of meaning (Grey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Meaning is seen as being regularly revised, based on experience, and is therefore not stable (Grey, 2009). As such Grey (2009) stated that the meaning of making in the process of interpretation, is the core of human interaction. Close observation of subjects in the field setting, is typically a necessary approach to achieving this because a symbolic interactionist explains the actions of individuals as an outward manifestation of the meanings that are attached to social reality (Grey, 2009).

4.3.2.3 Feminism

The feminist approach to research is one of the philosophical schools, that Creswell (2003) discussed as being of an advocacy/participatory based stance. This approach is used to explore the wide range of issues surrounding women, policy and institutional frameworks, within the context of the oppression, which women are seen as being subjected to (Creswell, 2009). The central debate of the feminist, is that of dominance and complimentary oppression, on the parts of men and women respectively, which has shaped their knowledge of the world (Grey, 2009). Creswell (2009) summarised the generic characteristics of the feminist philosophical research, typical of most forms of advocacy research:

 Change oriented;

 Liberation from the shackles of unjust societal imposed constraints;  The objective of empowerment;

 Collaborative relationship between the researcher and the participants.

The underlying assumption of the feminist school of thought is that: the feeling of superiority amongst men is regarded as having to a significant degree, distorted their view of the world (Grey, 2009). This is opposed to women who are operating from the level of being dominated, and thus have a relatively undistorted and objective perception of reality. On this basis therefore, Grey (2009) stated that the feminist group have challenged what ideally ought to constitute knowledge, claiming that objectivity and rationality are constructed around a predominantly male

vantage point. The feminists thus advocate for a shift in this approach, to embody the deeper experience of reality enabled by the oppressed feelings and emotions of women.

4.3.2.4 Critical Theory

The philosophical stance of the critical theorist is similar to the feminist, with the core difference being the specificity of the subject of debate. Creswell, (2003) classified this research approach as one of the advocacy based philosophical positions. Grey (2009) however discussed critical philosophy as being quite distinct from other research stances. The author described it as a meta-physical process of investigation, which calls on both the researcher and participants to question their basic value system. The author described this as “false consciousness” with a requisite need for its discarding to generate a neutral mentality. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994:) critical theory is a “Virtual” reality shaped by social, economic, ethnic, political, cultural, and gender values, crystallised over time”. The critical theorist thus challenges conventional social structures and advocates for individuals in society to transcend these boundaries (Creswell, 2003). It is principally empowerment driven and focuses on revisiting currently held values and assumptions in relation to power structures in society (Grey, 2009).

4.3.3 Pragmatism/Critical Realism

Creswell and Clark, (2003) referred to pragmatism as “the third major philosophical movement”. Pragmatism as the name implies, is a philosophical position which is practical in nature. It thus relegates the philosophical debate of singular or multiple realities, in terms of epistemology and ontological arguments, to the background. John Dewey is considered the pioneer author of this philosophical movement, which criticised traditional epistemologies on the basis of the “too stark a distinction between thought, the domain of knowledge, and the world of fact to which thought purportedly referred” (in Thayer, 1952). Dewey (1890) thus queried "Is Logic a Dualistic Science?" and coined the phrases "theory of inquiry" or "experimental logic" as more amenable to the practicalities of carrying out research (in Hickman and Alexander, 1998). To the pragmatist therefore issues emanating from the dialectical epistemological, ontological debates should take a backseat to the more cogent issue of the research problem and how best to provide an understanding of it. (Creswell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009; Grey, 2014). Creswell and Clark, (2011) stressed that the focus of pragmatism is on the research questions and the consequences of the research, which should ideally be of primary importance. Whereas, Grey, (2009), stated that, the practicality of the need to provide answers to different research questions, may warrant different philosophical approaches. This is on the grounds that a philosophical approach adopted

for one research question, may be inappropriate if applied to another. The use of pragmatism as a world view therefore accommodates the use of both subjective and objective knowledge. Tashakari and Teddlie (2003), noted thirteen different authors who clearly stated the need for a philosophical stance that was all encompassing, without the need to engage in philosophical arguments. This was rationalised on the premise that pragmatism has a trajectory that is rooted in practice and thus devoid of the divergence implicit in other philosophical perspectives. Hughes and Sharrock (1997) asserted that, most modern-day realism and empiricism have adopted variants of the pragmatist philosophy, by relegating philosophical arguments to the background, rather focusing on the specifics of the problem being investigated and the relevant methods to tackle them. It was thus stated that: “There is certainly no reason to feel bound by stipulations about a unified method or a unified ontology for science, for on these arguments no such creature exists” (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997:94).

There are however authors who have expressed the need for caution in adopting pragmatism as an all embracing world view, without explicitly defining the underlying ontological and epistemological stance of the researcher, describing it as more akin to intellectual laziness. Typically, Holden and Lynch (2004:401) stated that. “if a researcher perceives ontology and epistemology to be irrelevant, then how can they ensure that their methods are really appropriate to the problem in hand? Conceivably the problem could be better investigated with a method from an alternative philosophical stance”.Moore (1905), in the wake of the rising acceptance of pragmatism inspired by John Dewey works, reviewed a compilation of studies by critics who challenged the philosophical position of pragmatism. The major issues cited were: looseness in the use of the term ‘practical purpose’; the implied subjectivity/relativity of the position; and the lack of a unifying prescriptive principle (Moore, 1905).

The theoretical application of the pragmatic world view, is thus still subject to debate in the literature. In more recent works, Greene and Caracelli (1997) argued that the use of multiple world views gives rise to irreconcilable differences in research, and rather emphasized the need for a differentiation of world views with respect to specific parts of a study. Similarly, Creswell and Clark (2011) advocated that the multiple philosophical stances used within a particular study needs to be explicitly defined within the research.

Critical realism has been argued to be a variant of the pragmatist philosophy, albeit one with a clearly defined ontological and epistemological positioning: that social reality exists not only in the mind, but in the objective world and can thus also be objectively studied (Huberman and Miles, 1985;1995). Typically, Lipscomb, (2011:1) expounds: “Pragmatism has been advanced as one means by which the Gordian knot of theoretical dispute can be cut and critical realists have, in recent years, also asserted same”. The critical realist philosophical positioning also termed ‘transcendental realism’ by Huberman and Miles, (1985), albeit controversial, is however backed by a rigorously argued intellectual justification by its proponents. The justification of the pragmatic-like philosophical positioning of the critical realist, as reinforced by its proponents: Huberman and Miles (1985); Frazer and Lacey, (1993); and Campbell (2002), is thus rationalised beyond the pragmatist mantra, ‘practicality of the research’, which has evoked major criticism from both the positivist and constructivist traditions.

Critical realism evolved from the post-positivism movement of realism, which views ‘reality’ as “whatever it is in the universe that causes the phenomena we perceive with our senses” (Frazer and Lacey, 1997:133). It was further stated that there is no objective or certain knowledge of the world, admitting to the possibility of alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon. Saunders et al. (2009) described realism as a predominantly objective positivist stance, but one which is conditioned by social reality. The authors distinguished between direct and critical realism on the basis of how the human senses perceives reality. Thus from the critical realist’s position, human knowledge of reality is a result of social conditioning, and cannot be understood independently of the social actors involved in the knowledge derivation process (Dobson, 2002). Other authors such as Groff (2004: 23) concur with this description of critical realism, but emphasise more on its empirically inclined post-positivist nature typical of all forms of realism, espousing: critical realism offers a “point of entry into epistemology and metaphysics for practicing social scientists”. Whilst Carter (2000:1) is of the view that “critical realism attempts to reconcile the threatened divorce between social theory and empirical research”. Critical realism, which is thus more common in the social sciences, entails the concomitant retention of both an empiricist ontological view and a constructivist epistemological relativism (Campbell, 2002). It recognises that diverse valid perceptions and understanding of a research phenomenon is tenable.