The ‘Vicious Cycle of Short-Funding and Delays' Narrative by Morris (1990)

The preceding empirical narratives have all being conceptualised within the context of the developed world. The only case study found, which is contextualised in a developing country, and which provided a qualitative narrative explaining cost overruns in public projects, despite a comprehensive literature search by the researcher, is a relatively older study by Morris (1990) in India, carried out 26 years ago. Nonetheless, the findings from Morris (1990) less contemporary study, is considered by the researcher, to have significant implications for this study, by virtue of its setting in a developing nation.

Morris (1990) noted that for public sector projects in India, cost and time overruns were unusually very high. Cost overruns were on average 92% while time overruns were 192%. Morris (1990) carried out a case study of public projects, and analysing project cost overrun and time overrun data, as well as individual project reports on the cases, provided by the Committee on Public Undertakings (CPU) in India, to account for the wasted `capital in infrastructure projects. It was argued that a vicious cycle of events, accounted for project cost overruns in publicly funded infrastructure projects. This argument was raised in response to an on-going debate on economic stagnation in developing countries. It was queried:

“Are the delays and cost escalation due primarily to bureaucratic styles of functioning? How far are the individual enterprises responsible? Are there genuine problems arising out of technical difficulties, inadequate experience, of learning by doing, additional costs of technological self-reliance, additional costs arising from price preference for domestic contractors and suppliers which cannot be set right by administrative reform alone? It is important to have the answers to these questions before the appropriate policy initiatives are made to push the Public Sector in the direction of greater efficiency” (Morris, 1990: 155).

The principal contentions and findings of the study by Morris (1990) were thus:

 Short funding of projects was the primary trigger for cost overruns. This was revealed from the analysis of sectorial pattern of capital outlay in annual budgets for different sectors, which provided evidence that the Indian Government was spreading thin, its financial resources, with the transportation sector accorded the lowest budget due to its priority status. The evidence showed that ratio of throw-forward, which is the equivalent of anticipated cost less accrued expenditure, was predominantly excessive. As such funds adequate for the full and timely completion of three to four projects were spread- out too thinly to accommodate up to six to seven projects. This practice thereby stretches project completion times for committed projects beyond the anticipated completion time,

a period over which inflation would also creep in. Even with significant backlog of uncompleted projects, further projects were being initiated;

 Content analysis of 94 out of the 99 available project reports revealed such phrases alluding to inadequate project preparation, planning and implementation:

"Project monitoring is absent’; ‘Planning is non-existent/weak’; ‘Much divergence between the project report and the Project as it was actually implemented’, ‘Project report not backed up by ground surveys’; ‘Estimates were based on inadequate data"(Morris, 1990: 158);

 The trend analysis in the pattern of cost overruns, revealed that the high priority sectors, such as petroleum and natural gas, displayed half the national average cost overrun. Infra-structural investments like roads and railways on the other hand mostly experienced more than 100% cost overrun, with a capital (waste) factor' in excess of 250% due to delays. Morris (1990) although acknowledging other technical factors as major underlying factors accounting for cost overruns, thus stated the political expedient tendency of public authorities in developing countries to initiate a large number of projects, only to short fund them all, except for the ones accorded a high priority;  It was further concluded that poor performance in the principal sectors of the economy

like power, coal and steel, have also triggered a chain reaction effect which has led to loss of output and to higher costs leading to delays and cost overrun elsewhere in the economy, particularly infrastructure projects.

The interesting theoretical narrative offered by Morris (1990:154), as explanatory to cost overruns in public projects is thus quoted:

“Factors internal to the public sector system and Government largely account for the delays and cost overruns… Appraisal by the Government very often is devoid of meaning when the emphasis is only on the form of the project proposal rather than on its content- a tendency quite usual in bureaucracies. Since the public enterprises particularly those in the core sector have large dealings with each other, a vicious circle of delays has been built up. The politically expedient tendency to take up large numbers of projects and short fund them all, except those with the very highest priority, is perhaps the most important factor in delays. The Government's ad hoc approach in according high priority to certain sectors- oil and natural gas, and petroleum- while perhaps overcoming the problem in these sectors have compounded the problem elsewhere, particularly in the infra-structural areas”.

Mansfield et al. (1994) also made a similar assertion as Morris (1990) within the context of highway development in Nigeria, pointing major technical shortcomings in Nigerian highway

delivery, based on questionnaire analysis. The authors described the typical scenario in Nigeria which often led to funding shortfalls: “Projects are rushed at their commencement, with political sensitivities overriding the need for detailed preparation of project plans and estimates” (Mansfield et al. 1994:256). However, this was expressed as an opinion, and was not based on any form of qualitative data collection or analysis.

The narrative provided by Morrison (1990), is further noted, as contextually very distinctive from all the other empirical narratives analysed by the researcher, although no form of supplementary primary data collection was sourced, apart from documents/archival data, was evident in the study. The dynamics of under-development and shortcomings in the technical capabilities of public agencies, plays out a lot more in Morris (1990) study, which underscores the basis of the researcher’s fundamental rationale for carrying out this research: that the institutional setting of public project delivery in the developed and developing world are very different. This study is thus framed within the lenses of the geotechnical difficulties, experienced by public highway agencies in the delivery of highway infrastructure, in view of the peculiar geologic setting of the Niger Delta region, which may trigger cost overruns, juxtaposed against the backdrop of the politico-economic setting of Nigeria as a developing nation.

3.8 Critical Literature Synthesis: Moving Beyond Abstract Postulations/Superficiality to