The PD principles for the effectiveness of aid are not applicable in normal circumstances only, but are equally relevant and critical for effective and efficient aid delivery during the emergency and disaster situations. The declaration states that “enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations, such as the tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 26 December 2004” (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p. 2). In times of natural calamities, the declaration has emphasised that “worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries ... the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results” need to be adhered to (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p. 2). Hence, the overall role of the PD is to enhance the effectiveness of aid in normal as well as in complex and emergency situations.
In Pakistan, the October 2005 Kashmir earthquake was a natural disaster of unprecedented proportion in the history of the country. According to Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (PERRA) (2009), the main provincial body set up by the government for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of earthquake-affected population, 74,000 people were killed, 70,000 injured and more than 2.8 million people became homeless in the earthquake. Due to the enormity of the disaster, the response of the international community was swift and generous. In the relief stage, more than 85 bilateral and multilateral agencies and over 100 international NGOs participated. In the reconstruction phase, nearly 200 donors and over 100 INGOs carried out about 4,000 projects in the education, health, agriculture, housing and water and sanitation (Senior Official, Management Information System (MIS), PERRA, Abbottabad, October, 2010).
On account of the engagement of such a large number of diverse actors, aid coordination and harmonisation posed a gigantic challenge. The long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction
process was plagued by similar problems which donors committed to get rid of upon signing the Paris agenda. In relation to the commitments made in Paris, the PERRA officials stated that a majority of donors rarely showed serious concern for the PD commitments, particularly concerning an effective division of labour. The lack of harmonisation and proper division of labour can be gauged from the fact that most donors focused too much on some areas, for example the education sector. A higher level official in PERRA informed me that scores of donors and INGOs were carrying out activities in education and there was a clear lack of coordination and harmonisation.
About 89 INGOs were active in the education sector and a majority of them provided training and held workshops for teachers. There was no follow up mechanism to assess the effectiveness of these training sessions concerning improvement in the quality of teaching at schools (Provincial Donor Coordinator, PERRA, Abbottabad, October, 2009).
In the earthquake area, USAID also carried out a four years (2006-2010) US $13 million project in the education sector namely Revitalising, Innovating and Strengthening Education (RISE). The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MEO) of the project told me that the focus of this programme was on three areas consisting of teachers’ training, community development with local partners, and capacity building of education management at the district level in the earthquake-hit areas (Project Officer, RISE/USAID, Islamabad, June, 2009). He said teachers from Primary, Middle and High Schools have been trained in the four selected districts affected by the 2005 earthquake, and the capacity of the district education department has been enhanced with the provision of technical assistance and computers. Similarly, he said that RISE played a key role in reviving and strengthening the Parent-Teacher Committees (PTCs), as every school had one PTC that identified the problems faced by their school and RISE provided them with a small financial grant worth PKR 45,00019.
Although the PERRA officials interviewed acknowledged the services of donors, including USAID in various areas, they had their own reservations concerning donors’ harmonisation. The Provincial Donor Coordinator of PERRA told me that the overall role of USAID was worthwhile in the reconstruction as it completed some very good works despite some failures. He said that USAID constructed schools and health units where they were required. He added that the formation of PTC was a good step as it resulted in the participation of the parents of students playing an active and direct role in the improvement of teaching and learning at schools (Provincial Donor Coordinator, PERRA, Abbottabad, October, 2009). However, the official stated that most donors were doing works according to their own plans and priorities, which resulted in the concentration of donors in certain areas at the cost of other sectors. Most importantly, the PERRA official stated that despite repeated requests from the GoP, a majority of donors did not share their financial matters with the government, particularly the cost of their specific activities
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and interventions in various areas. Consequently, this approach affected the planning of the GoP concerning the total amount of money required and funds needed for specific projects in different sectors. In the context of the education sector, the PERRA official stated that if all the donors and INGOs had coordinated their activities among them and had devised a comprehensive and holistic plan for these initiatives, in proper collaboration with the GoP, it would have led to an increased school enrolment as well as improved quality of teaching and learning at a much lower cost. This was not the case as according to the GoP officials, a number of donors were undertaking a host of projects with a little coordination and respective division of labour among themselves and with the GoP.
Lack of proper coordination and effective division of roles and responsibilities has remained a chronic issue in delivering aid, particularly in times of emergencies and disasters. According to Minear (2002, p. 20), "the continuing absence of effective coordination structures remains the soft underbelly of the humanitarian enterprise”. Based on his personal experiences in the world of humanitarian and development activities spanning a period of three decades, Minear (2002, p. 19) asserts that "coordination is easier to advocate than to achieve". As in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, aid coordination and harmonisation was a significant challenge after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. In the post-Tsunami relief, recovery and rehabilitation, according to Chia (2007, p. 27), “there were over 40 countries and 700 NGOs who contributed in various ways … [but] ... coordination among the various parties was a major challenge”. The author adds that “a framework on how to provide aid to the victims in the most expeditious way was lacking ... each country or organization tried to help in their own way. This resulted in delays, provisions piling up, and more importantly, aid not reaching victims” (Chia, 2007, p. 29). In its evaluation report on the overall response of the international donor community, Oxfam International (2005, p. 2) pointed out that “the massive influx of international aid organizations led to competition among humanitarian agencies, lack of coordination, unplanned supply of assistance and unrealistic national and international expectations”. In the same context, Huber et al. (2008, p. 17) found that “the lack of coordination within the numerous INGOs and local NGOs resulted in duplication and overlap of aid, partially inappropriate aid and not respecting local needs”. In view of all this, the delivery of humanitarian aid along the lines of the PD guidelines has remained an elusive undertaking, whether in the context of Pakistan or elsewhere.