Mutual Accountability

The mutual accountability component of the PD commits donors and recipients to embed aid relationships characterised by joint accountability mechanisms in the use of development assistance. It entails that governments receiving aid commit to strengthen the appropriate role of the parliament in formulating national development policies and/or budgets besides involving a

wide range of other stakeholders. On the donors’ part, this tenet of the PD commits them to “provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens” (2005, p. 8). The accountability section of the PD underscores that both donors and recipients are responsible and accountable not only to each other but also to their respective electorates and publics at large (OECD, 2010). Here, it is the concept of ‘management for development results’ that serves as a reference point for mutual accountability (OECD, 2008b). Within the framework of management for development results, development partners need to be accountable to each other in the realisation of development results, such as the attainment of the MDGs or other country-specific targets identified in national development strategies.

Though the concept of mutual accountability is quite striking, particularly compared to the previous aid architecture of unilateral accountability of aid recipients to donors, there are several issues that remain unanswered in the PD. The most important is that keeping in view the nature of the unequal relationship between donors and recipients, mutual accountability “still does not

include an independent donor ranking and lacks contractual elements” (Meyer & Schulz, 2008,

p. 5). Prior to the declaration, several mechanisms such as independent forums for certifying

donor performance, joint institutions for evaluating country-level performance, reviews by independent panels and the active inclusion of aid recipients in the DAC peer reviews were considered for mutual accountability (Stern et al., 2008). Besides donors and aid recipients, Meyer and Schulz (2007) point out that there would be more clarity if the entire picture of the aid chain is included in the accountability principles, which stretches from tax payers in the North to beneficiaries in the South, with all the intermediaries of ministries, agencies and implementing partners. Therefore, they argue that instead of mutual accountability, multiple accountability is a more suitable concept that needs to be deployed.

However, it is quite difficult practically to include the majority of actors in the accountability mechanisms. To do this, access to information is one of the first steps (Roberts, 2009). At the same time, Roberts asserts that the availability of information alone would not work. To make donors and recipients as well as other stakeholders accountable, relevant data needs to be analysed and understood in its proper context in relation to what has been achieved in terms of poverty alleviation. Once all such information and analysis are shared with a range of stakeholders including civil society, media and general public, then the commitment to accountability can be achieved (Roberts, 2009). However, as mentioned earlier, the PD does not mention or elaborate any operational procedures or mechanisms to assess and evaluate the performance of both donors and recipients. Mutual accountability, therefore, can only be effectively realised if there are independent bodies having the required capacity and mandate to carry out such analysis and share it with all the interested actors.

In the present situation, in an explanatory note even the OECD (2009, p. 5) has acknowledged that “there is no simple formula for building mutual accountability” and therefore there does not exist any practical example of a fully developed mutual accountability mechanism. At the same

time, it also points out that there are three key elements which should make up a mutual accountability procedure. These include: a shared development vision or agenda, a joint monitoring framework and a process characterised by regular dialogue and negotiation. Besides these, independent, efficient and strong domestic accountability systems are the means to make both donors and aid recipients transparent and accountable for achieving development results (OECD, 2009). It argues that effective accountability mechanisms, such as clear parliamentary oversight of the national development plans and their targets can create a congenial environment where donors and recipients forge meaningful partnerships based on mutual trust.

Overall, although the PD has also been criticised due to the fact that it has left some of the inherent power issues in the aid system untouched, it has also been hailed as a giant step towards more effective aid under the new aid paradigm. According to Rogerson (2005), one intrinsic asymmetry of the Paris agenda, and that of the overall aid regime is, “if recipients do not match agreed performance, donors can apply clear sanctions: however, if donors underperform, no such remedies are available to the recipient” (Rogerson, 2005, p. 549). Critics also argue that “in its present form, the PD is subject to a variety of interpretations” (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p. 25) and instead of a uniform understanding, both donors and recipients construe different principles of the PD differently. Similarly, Meyer and Schulz (2008) are of the view that the PD is too much technocratic and fails to address the political complexities of aid, as donor-recipient partnerships are not merely bureaucratic but essentially political. This aspect becomes more vivid in the context of USA aid to Pakistan, where the main motivations are the pursuit of USA foreign policy goals. Therefore, although the PD has provided the guidelines on how to utilise aid in a better way in recipient countries, it has not explored other contentious issues: why donors need to give aid, how much they need to provide and to whom, and how to achieve ownership and alignment in the face of challenging contexts characterised by institutional constraints and widespread corruption?

Despite the above criticisms, there has been a growing consensus that the PD is a critical step towards the aid effectiveness agenda of the new aid paradigm aiming at donor-recipient relationships characterised by reciprocal and more equitable partnership. The 2010 report of the OECD points towards this unique aspect of the shared nature of the commitments made in the declaration. The report argues that the most distinguishing feature of the declaration is its emphasis on the way in which improvements in donor practices go in conjunction with the strengthening of developing country systems and institutions (OECD, 2010). Booth and Evans (2006, p. 4) likewise argue that the declaration conveys a plain but essential point: “aid will be more effective if the actions and behavioural changes listed as commitments under the five headings are undertaken, and less if they are not”. It implies that for enhancing aid effectiveness, both donors and recipients need to work towards and adhere to the PD commitments and both are accountable to each other in bringing improvements in the way aid is managed.