Another repercussion of the minimal role of GoP institutions and establishment of parallel and independent project execution structures is a kind of internal brain drain. The PD has explicitly stated that donors should “avoid activities that undermine national institutional building, such as bypassing national budget processes or giving high salaries to local staff” (2005, p. 7). This is because huge differences in salary structures could lead to corruption as well as brain drain. This practice tempts government functionaries to take leave from their parent departments and work with donors in certain projects on a contract basis on higher salaries with additional perks and privileges. It was also a bit surprising for me when I interviewed several officials in different USAID projects who were actually government officers but on leave from their original jobs. Hence, installing such project implementation bodies saps the limited capacity of government institutions by attracting competent and experienced staff. A senior official in the provincial department of health in KP told me in Peshawar that foreign-funded projects cause a brain drain as staff from local departments prefer to work with donors than with GoP organisations because of the above-mentioned incentives (Senior Planning Officer, Department of Health, Peshawar, September, 2009). This statement is further elaborated in the following example.
In August 2010, a media report revealed that the appointment of the new provincial coordinator for Maternal, Neonatal Child Health (MNCH) programme, a USAID-funded project, was based purely on political affiliations (Yusufzai, 2010). Quoting other doctors who were competing for the post, the report mentioned that the new appointee was affiliated with the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which enabled him to get the lucrative job in the USAID-funded scheme. To more fully explain how doctors in government departments were using different tactics to get such positions in foreign-funded projects, it is relevant to quote an extract from this news story:
There were also reports that Dr Salar (the outgoing official) was making efforts to get a three-year extension in his service so that he could continue to hold his prized job. But he failed in his efforts at a time when his opponents and those seeking his job were threatening to approach the court if he was given an extension (Yusufzai, 2010).
This anecdote reveals various aspects of this particular USAID project. It indicates that contrary to the PD exhortation quoted earlier, donor-funded projects offer high salaries and other incentives that create a serious imbalance and disequilibrium in the prevalent job market. Therefore, such practices create additional administrative issues for GoP institutions as experienced government functionaries prefer to work with donor agencies than in their own organisations. Thus, such practices of donor agencies, in this case that of USAID, result in undermining national institution building rather than strengthening it. The appointment of an official on a political basis is also an indication that like government departments in developing countries (such as Pakistan), aid agencies are also not very fair and transparent and appoint employees on the recommendations of someone in the power corridors rather than on sheer merit, competence and ability.
Although the PD has cautioned about the prevalence of high imbalances and discrepancies in the salary structures, such practices continue to exist in Pakistan as well as elsewhere. In the context of Malawi, MacLachlan, Carr and McAuliffe (2010, p. 26) found that "aid-funded workers receive heaps more money ... roughly ten to twenty times the local salary". The authors assert that "local workers agree that local people are demotivated by the salaries that some expatriates earn" (2010, p. 74). Alongside demotivation, such inequalities between the salary structures of government employees and foreign aid workers also lead to "corruption in government institutions" (MacLachlan et al., 2010, p. 74). MacLachlan, Carr and McAuliffe (2010, p. 75) argue that "pay discrepancies, and their potential to undermine aid and development initiatives, are not confined to one particular site or sector". They cite sectors such as health, education and business from diverse regions consisting of Malawi, Uganda, China, India, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where such practices are prevalent, creating the issues mentioned above in the context of USAID in Pakistan.
The above discussion about the GoP and USAID approaches and practices indicates that the principles to which the two governments have committed to under the PD have not been fully translated into actual practice. There are various constraints from both the GoP as well USAID side. The lack of appropriate capacity of government institutions and the issue of corruption are the major obstacles which make donors, in this case USAID, hesitant regarding giving more central roles to government institutions. On the other hand, a predominant view of government officials was that the USA needs to select development works from the PSDP and PRSPs and carry out these through existing government channels. However, the findings illustrate that most USA aid is utilized through USAID contractors, giving a limited role to government institutions and departments, particularly in project design and implementation. Therefore, the issue of ownership can be questioned on the grounds that if USAID conceives and develops projects and executes them through its USA-based implementing partners, how can the GoP take ownership.
In the following section, USAID practices are examined in the light of the PD principle of alignment. Specific examples are given from USAID projects in the education sector in KP and
FATA to highlight the extent to which the commitment to alignment has been translated into action.
8.3.2 Alignment of USAID projects with the GoP
Within the PD framework, ownership and alignment are interrelated. The declaration stipulates that donors “base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures” (2005, p. 4). The procedures and systems of both donors and partners need to be aligned to make better use of development resources in achieving development outcomes. The aim is to target aid at activities which aid recipients have prioritised. In this way, it is argued that aid will be spent where it is most effective and useful. For this to happen, there is an emphasis on “a more equal partnership between developing countries and aid donors” (Gore, 2000, p. 795) and the PD stipulates that effective and inclusive partnership “will increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs” (2005, p. 1).
In the Pakistani context, it was discussed in the previous chapter that the GoP has identified and prioritised key areas for interventions. Donors, including USAID, carry out projects in those areas. The issue is to what extent they carry out those activities in line with the priorities and policies of the GoP, using country systems. Several high-ranking officials informed me during interviews that though there is an understanding between USAID and the GoP in broader areas like education, health and economic growth, issues such as the selection of a particular intervention, the geographical location and other procedures are mainly at the discretion of USAID. An official in the MoF dealing with USAID from the GoP side said:
In the case of USAID, the GoP is involved to some extent to prioritise its sectors and areas of need but these are broader areas such as education, health, energy and economic growth. How to spend aid and by whom, it is decided by USAID (Senior Official, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad, April, 2009).
This issue is further explored in the context of KP and FATA where USAID has been undertaking different projects. USAID practices are discussed in the light of the PD commitment to alignment in the education sector.