1 legislation and the opening up of mass activities.

It is clear that Ch'en Shao-yil's proposals were an implicit criticism of Mao s mistrust of the KMT and emphasis on the struggle for leadership expressed after the fall of Shanghai and TaiyUan. Curiously, Mao, according to both Chang Kuo—t'ao and Otto Braun, voted in favour of

/ 0

Ch en s report along with other leaders. There are three possible explanations of Mao's behaviour. Firstly, as C h ’e n 's opinion implied the wishes of Stalin, any dissenting vote would amount to an open defiance of the authority of Stalin, and Mao did not wish to assume such a stand. Secondly, as Ch'en's views received the support of other Party leaders, Mao would find himself isolated if he acted otherwise. Thirdly, there was at the time a danger of compromise between the Nationalist Government and Japan, as Chiang Kai-shek had indicated his approval of the peace

mediation efforts from the office of the German ambassador, O.P. Trautmann.4~^ Although a total capitulation on the part of Chiang was unlikely, a swing to the left on the part of the CCP might encourage the KMT to accept moderate terms offered by Japan, and this would mean that the CCP would be confronted with the forces of both the KMT and Japan. Under such circumstances, Ch en s call for conciliation appeared a sensible and expedient approach, and Mao thereby gave his support to Ch'en.

To Otto Braun's knowledge, Stalin had instructed Ch'en Shao-yü to establish a collective leadership in the Party without directly

attacking Mao's authority.44 This agrees with Kuo Hau-lun's informant who states that Ch'en conveyed the message that Mao's candidacy as leader of the Party had been confirmed by Stalin because he had proven his

m e ^t:le in the revolution. Yet Stalin was of the opinion that Mao's ignorance of Marxism-Leninism and his narrow empiricist approach to

solving problems were handicaps which were to be overcome with the help of Russian— trained leaders. In addition, Stalin thought that the intraparty struggle against Chang Kuo— t ao during the Long March had been excessive; and Chang Wen-t'ien was considered no longer suitable as Secretary-General because of his previous connection with a Trotskyite party cell in Moscow although he himself was not implicated. This is also consistent

with Chang Kuo-t'ao's account that Ch'en Shao-yU "arbitrarily" drew up a list of sixteen Politburo members and alternates, with Mao at the top, himself second, followed by Chou En-laij Chang Kuo-t’ao and o t h e r s ,

whilst Chang Wen-t’ien was demoted to the seventh position. In addition, C h ’en Ylln and K'ang Sheng were added to the list.^6

While conceding to M ao’s leadership position, Ch'en obviously hoped to balance Mao's predominating influence by stressing the principle of collective leadership and strengthening the presence of Russian-trained leaders in the Politburo. The retention of Chang Kuo- t'ao in an important position and the demotion of Chang Wen-1'ien - the position of Secretary—General was also abolished at the Politburo meeting — were probably calculated moves to weaken Ma o ’s influence, especially when Chang Wen-t'ien had been moving closer to Mao since the Tsunyi Conference.

(Nevertheless, Ch'en apparently did not court Chang Kuo-t'ao's support against Mao; privately, he reproved Chang for having fallen under the influence of Trotskyite subordinates during the Long M a r c h . B y transmitting Stalin's opinion of Mao's ideological weaknesses, Ch'en apparently aimed at securing the unique and important position of the upholder of the correct ideological line. Thus, both organizationally and ideologically, Ch'en attempted to constrain Mao's authority. It is only logical that Mao was both resentful and apprehensive of Ch'en's actions. We can assume that a clandestine struggle commenced between the two leaders, both for power and for dominance in the determination of policy. To succeed, Mao also had to cultivate his own image as a Marxist- Leninist theoretician.

At the Politburo Conference, a number of important changes were made in the central and regional organs, presumbably on the recommendation of Ch'en Shao-yd: (1) the reorganization of the Secretariat of the

Central Committee (which probably assumed the function of the Politburo's Standing Committee)comprised of Mao, Ch'en Shao-yd, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Chang Wen-t'ien, Chang Kuo-t'ao, C h 'in Pang-hsien, Ch'en Ydn, and K'ang Sheng; (2) the subordination to the Secretariat of the following depart­ ments under the respective directors: Li Fu-ch'un (shortly afterwards replaced by Ch'en YJun) of the Organizational Department, Ho K'o-ch'dan of the Propaganda Department, Liu Shao-ch'i of the Cadre Training Depart­ ment, Chou En-lai of the United Front Department, K'ang Sheng of the Political Security Department, and Mao (chairman) of the Central

Yang Shang-k'un as secretary (replacing Liu Shao-ch'i) and Chu Jui (an asso­ ciate of the RRS) as director of the organizational department; (4) the creation of the Central Yangtze Bureau at Hankow to direct party work in Central China, with Ch'en Shao-yll as secretary, C h ' in Pang-hsien as director of the organizational department and Yeh Chien-ying as

director of the military department; (5) the establishment of a Central Sub-bureau of Southeast China at Nanchang to direct the New Fourth Army, with Hsiang Ying as secretary, Tseng Shan as director of the military department; (6) the dispatch of a CCP delegation to Wuhan, the new Nationalist capital, headed by Ch'en Shao-yH, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai, to function as a liaison office with the KMT; (7) the founding of a new paper Hsin-hua jih-pao (New China Daily) at Hankow to propagate the Party's aims and policies; (8) the appointment of a twenty-five-man committee, with Mao as chairman and Ch'en Shao-yll as secretary, to direct preparations for the Party's Seventh National

48 Congress scheduled to be held within the shortest possible time.

In reshuffling the Central and regional Party leadership, Ch'en Shao-yll apparently won for himself a dominant position in the Party. In the Politburo, he appeared to command the majority of votes; in the regional bureaux, power was allocated entirely to people whose loyalty clearly resided with the Comintern. (The replacement of Liu Shao-ch'i by Yang Shang-k'un is an obvious example, while Hsiang Ying had since

the earlier period closely allied himself with the RRS.) To all intents and purposes, Ch'en was aiming at securing control of all the front

organizations which came into direct contact with the KMT authorities so as to put his united front orientation into full-swing. In so doing, he

made the mistake of diffusing his influence too broadly, leaving Mao in complete control at the centre through which he could consolidate his position by cultivating the support of Party activists and senior cadres, especially of the Eighth Route Army. Ch'en's own absence from Yenan also meant that his followers or potential followers were left without stable and firm leadership, a vacuum which Mao could easily

exploit by converting them to his side. (Both Ch'en YÜn and K'ang Sheng, for example, later became firm Maoist supporters.) Furthermore, Mao was able to utilize his position at the centre to postpone the convocation of the Seventh National Congress which, if convened at this stage, would probably be dominated by Ch'en Shao-yü, whose policies would also be

Lo have outmanoeuverecl Mao, his victory was built on a shaky foundation and proved only ephemeral.

Ch'en Shao-yü's return also brought forth an intensified attack on the Trotskyites. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao had earlier dis­ placed a willingness to accept the re-entry to the Party of C h ’en Tu-hsiu, whom the KMT had released from prison in September 1937, on condition that he and other associates publicly confessed their errors, renounced their affiliation with the Trotskyite group, and sincerely supported the Anti-

49

Japanese United Front. (The harshness of these conditions precluded a willingness on the part of Mao to reconcile with active Trotskyites: in October 1937 he had denounced the Trotskyites as Japanese spies and

50

agents. ) When the subject was brought up for discussion at the Politburo Conference, however, Ch'en Shao-yü vehemently opposed any dealings with Ch'en Tu-hsiu on the grounds that, first, Stalin would not countenance such a move and, second, Trotskyism, unlike the ideology of the bourgeoisie which had nothing in common with communism, would easily corrupt the

ideology of the CCP and its organization.5 ^ Ch'en's opinion prevailed, and the CCP renewed its attacks on Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Trotskyites.52

Having gained the Politburo's support for his policy of sincere cooperation with the KMT, Ch'en Shao-yü, together with Chou En-lai and Ch in Pang-hsien, set out for Hankow on a diplomatic mission to promote better relation between the two parties. Shortly after his arrival at Hankow, he and Chou En-lai were received by Chiang Kai-shek, to whom they probably pledged the CCP s sincere support for the Nationalist Government. Nevertheless,in spite of his avowed intention to bring about closer

collaboration between the two parties, Ch'en did not neglect to say in his interview with Beiden on December 25:

The C C P 's principal task at the present stage is to resist Japan and save the nation; this is why we are implementing the policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front. But this does not mean that we are giving up communism; we are Marxist disciples and we do not seek to hide the fact that our final goal is communism. We know, however, that communism cannot be achieved overnight .... It is necessary to go through certain transitional historical stages before it can be realized.

Ch'en admitted that the CCP was generally satisfied with the progress of the Government’s war effort, but stated that further political and

administrative reforms were necessary. lie denied that the CCP wished to participate in the National Government, "not only because the Nationalist Government had not invited the CCP to do so, but also because the inter­ national and domestic situations have not yet matured to that stage".j5

(Ch en s reluctance was probably based on his understanding of Lenin’s postulate that Communists would only participate in a bourgeois-

reformist government if they were allowed "complete freedom" of agitation.54) Finally, Ch en stressed the "independent existence and development of the CCP" as necessary conditions for the victory of the Anti-Japanese War and that any attempt to dissolve the Party would be contrary to the wishes and interests of the working class and the people of the whole nation.55

On December 27, Ch'en published his article "The Key to the Salvation of the Nation" which has often been cited as a classic example of Ch'en's "capitulationism" to the KMT. While the statement undoubtedly manifested a very conciliatory posture towards the KMT, I do not think, however, that it was a one-sided offer of concessions from the CCP. The purpose of his treatise, as stated at the beginning, was to rectify the

incorrect understanding among members of both parties towards the Anti- Japanese United Front so that they could adopt the proper attitude.

In his article, Ch en stated that the proper distinction between friends and enemies should be "all those who are anti-Japanese are our friends, and all those who capitulate to Japan are our enemies". (In this, he repudiated Mao's three-blocs formula since until the right-wing elements actually turned traitor they should still be regarded as "friends" of the united front.) Since "to weaken a friendly party is equal to ... aiding the enemy", both parties should assist each other to develop and expand. To disclaim the view that the CCP's united front policy was merely a "tactical manoeuvre", he stated that the CCP's new policy was a

fundamental change in strategy which entailed long-term cooperation with the "best elements" of the KMT and the "true disciples" of Sun Yat-sen for national reconstruction after the war. He described as slanderous the accusation that the Communists "will establish soviets everywhere after the war", since the CCP's aim was to establish a democratic republic composed of all forces that had participated in the Anti-Japanese War. Should the KMT leaders persevere in leading the war, they would become national heroes ; likewise, the CCP would become one of the important

either party and the two parties would cooperate even after the war. Finally, Ch'en called for broadening the scope of the united front to include other parties and organizations and for mobilization of

5 6

the masses to consolidate the united front. This article was greeted by a national Salvationist as the most "thorough exposition" on how to

57 consolidate national unity for the Resistance.

In accounting for Ch'en Shao-yd's conciliatory posture, it should be realized that C h ’en was subject to two kinds of pressure in Hankow.

On the one hand, the sense of national crisis was such that all national salvation bodies and political and literary figures were pressing for

5 8 national solidarity and genuine cooperation between the two parties. Under such circumstances, the CCP would be unwise to make any statement pertaining to factional interests. On the other hand, the Nationalist authorities were still enforcing a stringent press censorship which pro­ hibited the circulation of Communist publication on the slightest pretext.

(Severalof Ch'en's earlier articles were also blacklisted, which accounted 59 for the fact that Ch'en had to revise his writings for publication. ) In order that the CCP could disseminate its ideas, it was necessary to write with restrain and avoid provocation. This explained why not only

Ch’en, but all CCP leaders (including Mao), assumed similar conciliatory 60

tone in calling for closer KMT-CCP collaboration.

Along with the call for closer collaboration, all the statements and articles from the CCP, without exception, emphasized that the KMT had to expand mobilization of the masses to consolidate the united front and support the war. It appears that the CCP, with Ch'en Shao-yd in the

leading role, was trying to instill and inculcate a spirit of mutual colla­ boration that would prevail upon the KMT functionaries, so that they would cease opposing the CCP's activities in organizing the masses. This was made explicit in an open letter addressed to KMT members issued by the Central Committee in late January 1938. The statement reiterated the CCP's understanding of the proper attitude towards the united front along lines suggested by Ch'en Shao-yd. It offered a self-criticism by saying that there were "leftist elements" among the CCP rank-and-file who

failed to see the necessity for sincere cooperation with the KMT, but stated that the Party was doing its best to overcome such tendencies. In return, it called upon the radical elements in the KMT, who opposed the

Following the termination of the Trautmann mediation in January 1938, Chiang Kai-shek's determination to carry on the Resistance became evident. In the same month, Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai went to Loyang to confer on war strategy with Chiang Kai-shek, who was then on an inspection tour of the northern front. In Shansi, Men Ilsi-shan also entered into active cooperation with the Communists against Japan and released a number of political prisoners, such as Wang Jo-fei. On January 9, Hsin-hua jih-pao began publication in Hankow with the authorization of the Nationalist Government. (According to a non-

6 2 Communist source, it received financial aid from the Government. )

At its inauguration, Ch'en Shao-yü was reported by Israel Epstein to have said:

The national United Front of the Chinese people already exists. It would be false to deny that some friction between the various groups forming it also continues to exist . By frank discussion, our newspaper will help to remove misunderstandings and to strengthen

the unity of all parties.

As Epstein observes, the establishment of the Hsin-hua ji-h-pao was an event of great importance, for it allowed the Communists for the first time in

6 3 many years the opportunity to voice its opinion in KMT areas. On January 30, Chiang Kai-shek further approved the formation of another Communist base, the Chin-Ch'a-Chi (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei) Border Region Government. On February 1, Chou En-lai was formally appointed deputy director of the Political Department of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government, with Kuo Mo-jo placed in charge of its pro­ paganda section. (According to Kuo Mo-jo's own recollections written in 1948, he was at first reluctant to take up the position but was prevailed upon by Ch'en Shao-yil and Chou En-lai on the grounds that it would help the CCP to propagate its programme; Ch'en specifically told him that the Communists were not seeking "official posts", but only

64

"opportunities to work [through the Government]". ) These develop­ ments probably convinced Ch'en Shao-yU that his conciliatory policy had begun to bear results.

In a speech delivered at Wuhan University sometime in early 1938, Ch'en exhibited a more outspoken attitude in favour of closer collaboration. He claimed that ail doubts on the KMT's ■determination to resist Japan had proven incorrect. In the united front, he asserted, priority should be given to resistance against Japan, and it would be wrong to insist on the implementation for democracy and the improvement of people's livelihood as