33 a-vis the KMT.

It is clear that Stalin desired a solid alliance between the CCP and the KMT to forestall Japan's advance on the eastern flank of the Soviet Union. Following the conclusion of the Non-Agression Pact with the Nationalist Government on 22 August, Stalin conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek's representative Chang Ch'ung that the Soviet Union would firmly support

34

China's resistance. In the next few years, the Soviet Union extended hugh amounts of financial and military support to the Nationalist Govern-

35

ment. The fact that none of the war supplies were forwarded directly to the CCP has often been construed as evidence that Stalin had foresaken the

CCP. It should be noted, however, that direct supply of military equip- emnt to the CCP would have immediately aroused opposition to the Soviet Union from many quarters (including the Western Powers). Already anti­ communist elements had been charging the Soviet Union with conspiracy to "sovietize" China, which accounted for the repeated emphasis of CCP leaders and Communist sympathizers that the CCP had received no direct material aid from Moscow: any direct military aid to the CCP, in the words

36

of Agnes Smcdley, "would split China wide open". According to Sheng Shih-ts’ai, governor of Sinkiang, the Soviet Union did forward small quantities of supplies to the CCP through a clandestine line of communica­ tion via Sinkiang. Sheng also understood from Stalin that "during the war and after the victory, the Nationalists will be materially superior

to the Communists but victory of the Chinese Communists is ultimately „ 37

almost a certainty .

Acting under Stalin’s instructions, C h ’en Shao-yd made a fate­ ful decision on relinquishing the struggle for leadership in the united front. Part of the reason for supporting Stalin’s position may be

attributed to his Marxist internationalist stand, i.e., the idea that the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution and the security of the Motherland of socialism was essential for the success of the

revolutions elsewhere. He was probably also convinced that a consolidated united front was the prerequisite for a successful defence of the Chinese nation. Yet his strongest motive in attempting to achieve -cordial rela­

tions with the KMT, I believe, was to secure legal channels through

which the Party could expand its influence among the masses and accumulate strength. It should be recalled that Stalin, in his earlier treatise The Foundations of Leninism, made a distinction between the strategic

leadership" and the "tactical leadership", and defined the latter as subordinated to the former, to be employed at a time of revolutionary "low-tide". The aim was to enable the Communist Party to utilize "forms of struggle and organization" that would educate and mobilize the masses, so as to gain time and accumulate strength before assuming the offensive again.38 These tactics had been applied briefly in the period of the Wuhan Government following the split with Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927, when the Comintern recommended the retention of the"hegemony of the

proletariat but conceded that the proletariat was not to insist on the sole "leadership" of the revolution.3^ Ch'en Shao-yU probably thought that under his correct guidance the CCP could apply successfully the same tactics

Prior io his return, Ch’en Shao-yU had rationalized closer cooperation with the KMT in an article published in November 1937 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He expressed general satisfaction with the fact that the KMT had begun to make noticeable progress since the beginning of the war, such as the

transformation of the Nationalist Government into an all-China government with other parties recognizing its leadership in the Resistance, the subordination of all local military units to the Central Command, and the release of political prisoners (e.g., the "Seven Gentlemen" were released in late July following the revision of the National Security Law by the Nanking Government) as well as the granting of legal status to the CCP and other national salvation bodies (e.g., in November 1937 a National Salvation Youth Corps was established in Wuhan). Finally, he observed that excepting pro-Japanese and reactionary elements, a considerable number of commanders and soldiers in the Nationalist Army had realized

40 the importance of drawing the masses into the national defence.

After his return, he attempted to justify a policy of active cooperation with the KMT in his report to the Politburo Conference held from 9 to 13 December. In the published version of his report, Ch’en claimed that initial military setbacks were inevitable in view of China's military and economic weaknesses, the lack of unity between the army and

people, as well as inadequate mass mobilization. However, the most critical problem that confronted China was not the military setback, but the "vacillations within the united front,... inclinations towards disunity and mutual complaints and friction" which weakened China's strength to resist. To overcome these difficulties, Ch'en called for the following understanding of the united front: firstly, "Resist

Japan is above everything and everything must be subordinated to resist­ ance against Japan; everything is subordinated to the united front and everything must be channelled through the united front". Under these principles, the leading role of the Nationalist Government was to be recognized, and its leadership was not to be contested while cooperation was to be based on the principles of "joint programme, joint responsibility, mutual discussion and mutual assistance". Secondly, the Nationalist

Government was to be strengthened, without need of reorganizations, through the adoption of political reforms at the upper levels and the achieving of unity with the masses at the lower levels. The struggle for the improvement of the livelihood of the people and for democratic rights was not to impede the development of the united front. Thirdly, a

forces which were to be brought together under the principles of "unified command, unified armament, unified discipline, unified supplies and

unified operations". Fourthly, the mobilization and organization of the millions of masses into the united front was to be achieved through

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