FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Figure 4-8 Examples of timelines of key dates

INTERPRET INFORMATION

4-37. Interpretation is an objective mental process based on common sense, life experience, military knowledge covering both enemy and friendly forces and existing information and intelligence. This mental process involves the identification of new activity and a postulation regarding the significance of that activity. The process also results in an understanding of the activity as viewed from the enemy’s or source’s perspective.

C

A

4-38. A challenge in the intelligence operations is to interpret foreign military and political objectives, capabilities, needs, and actions without viewing the research or collected information through the American cultural lens that injects American cultural bias and preconceived ideas into our analysis. Instead, analysts need to recognize their cultural bias and attempt to mitigate its effects through cultural awareness. Cultural awareness enables the analyst to consider the perspective of the enemy, the local population, or other non-American perspective when planning research, performing analysis, and interpreting the results of analysis. Quite literally, analysts should ask: “How will the enemy perceive this

development, and therefore what is he likely to do next?” rather than “How would we (the US) perceive this development, and how would we respond?” In military lexicon, analysts need to think “red,” not “blue.”

4-39. In essence, it is important to consider, if not understand, foreign perception of the US, its armed forces, and its operations when attempting to determine the enemy’s or civil population’s objectives and probable actions. Moreover, many other countries, organizations, or potential enemy factions depend on open sources for their intelligence. Our understanding of what others perceive, therefore, needs to be derived from the same material. This approach will help avoid costly, mistaken assumptions about the enemy during mission planning and execution, and its importance is reflected by the Army’s heightened interest in raising the level of cultural awareness among today’s troops.

I

P

B

4-40. IPB is a technique for analyzing and interpreting the results of analysis in a specific operational environment, normally from the enemy’s perspective. It builds on the baseline knowledge and databases created during research and the development of GMI products such as the operational environment assessment. The technique supports the development and integration of intelligence during the MDMP. Applying the IPB technique helps the G2/S2 staff support the commander in applying and protecting his forces at critical points in time and space in the operational environment. The G2/S2 staff uses IPB to describe the operational environment in which the unit is operating and the effects of the environment on the unit’s operations. The IPB technique supports the G2/S2 staff in identifying enemy capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, probable objectives, and potential COA. IPB also addresses the civil considerations of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations.

4-41. During IPB, it is in the “Determine Threat Courses of Action” step that the analyst interprets the results of analysis to reach an objective conclusion. The results of this step which drive the MDMP are valid only if the analyst established a good foundation during the first three steps of the IPB technique. Given the characteristics of the operational environment, coupled the enemy’s capabilities, what are the enemy’s likely objectives and the COAs? The analyst develops COA models that depict the available enemy COAs. The enemy COAs that the analyst develops in this step are the products the G2/S2 staff will use to portray the enemy in the MDMP and monitor during situation development. The analyst cannot produce these COAs and effectively predict the enemy COAs, unless he⎯

z Thoroughly considers what the enemy is capable of and what he prefers to do in like situations if unconstrained by the operational environment.

z Identifies the physical limits of the AO and AOI.

z Identifies the characteristic of the operational environment that might affect the operation.

z Understands the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation.

z Identifies the opportunities and constraints the operational environment offers to enemy and friendly forces.

S

D

4-42. Situation development is a technique for producing current intelligence by interpreting the activity or conditions within a specific operational environment or about a specific subject. The technique depends upon the products developed during IPB and the continuous monitoring of activities in the unit’s area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR). The technique helps the G2/S2 staff to provide I&W; confirm enemy COAs; explain the enemy activity’s relationship to the operational environment and US operations; and identify information gaps. The current intelligence products developed through the situation development technique help the unit commander to understand the current enemy situation within the context of the operational environment. The G2/S2 staff conducts situation development during the preparation for and

4-20 FMI 2-22.9 5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4-43. The analyst interprets the results of analysis against the predicted enemy COAs, civilian actions, and friendly situation. Interpretation includes verifying the existence or nonexistence of indicators. The lack of information relating to specific indicators may signify that the COA is incorrect. The lack of information or reporting may also point to either an information gap regarding one or more indicators, or to a deception effort. If the analyst identifies either of these situations then he must consider recommending adjustments to the ISR effort. Ultimately, the G2/S2 must determine the significance of the enemy and civilian information as it relates to the following basic questions:

z Does the information confirm or deny forecasted COAs?

z Does the information confirm or deny predicted objectives?

z Does the information identify new COAs and objectives?

z Does the information answer the commander’s requirements?