In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject

Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution.

Anent the first assigned error, Spouses Martires are correct in pointing out that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.

In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the testimony of the court employee who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the marital consent of respondent's husband.

While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1) the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject property be simply assigned to Spouses Martires instead of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the loan extended by Spouses Martires to Chua, the amount of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of the consideration for the assignment of ownership over the subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim of respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to Spouses Martires.

EDITHA PADLAN v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELISIMO DINGLASAN G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

J. Peralta

Spouses Dinglasan filed an action for cancellation of title involving real property valued at Php. 4,000.00 with the RTC. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

FACTS:

Petitioner Editha Padlan purchased a parcel of land registered under the names of petitioner Spouses Elenita and Felisimo Dinglasan. However, the deed of sale was falsified through the forged signatures of Spouses Dinglasan by Maura Passion, who caused the sale. Padlan transferred the title to the property under her name. Spouses Dinglasan demanded that Padlan surrender the lots causing Spouses Dinglasan to file a case before the RTC of Bataan for the cancellation of title. The RTC found that Padlan was a buyer in good faith and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Dinglasan. Padlan filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the complaint lacks merit as the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the subject property RULING:

Petition denied.

However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by Spouses Dinglasan for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

APRIL 2013

SIXTO N. CHU v. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013

J. Peralta

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.

It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.

Facts:

Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation filed a complaint against petitioner Sixto Chu for a sum of money, replevin and damages due to the non-payment of the purchase price of a Hitachi Excavator. The RTC issued a writ of replevin against Chu’s heavy equipment. Sherriff Doroteo P. Cortes failed to serve the summons personally upon Chu and resorted to substituted service by having the summons received by the security guard Rolando Bonayon.

The RTC ruled in favor of Mach Asia. Chu filed an appeal with the CA arguing that the substituted service of summons was invalid and that the declaration of default, in proceeding with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against him were erroneous. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC arguing that due process was duly served with the substituted service and that the process server’s inadvertence or neglect should not unduly prejudice Mach Asia’s right to speedy justice.

Issue:

Whether a substituted service of summons upon a security guard is valid Ruling:

Petition denied.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons

cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.

Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that Chu would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.

Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his security guard, the requirement of due process would have nevertheless been complied with. Based on the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu; otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for the said units. Chu, for his part, would not have given his permission without being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA

G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013

J. Brion

It is necessary for the petitioning government agency or its authorized representatives to certify against forum shopping, because they, and not the OSG, are in the best position to know if another case is pending before another court. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond simply citing cases where the Court allowed the OSG to sign the certification.

Facts:

Ding Cang Hui a.k.a. Tony Lao / Tony Ling, a Chinese inmate charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was discovered to have escaped from his cell at the Makati City Jail. SJO2 Arlic Almojuela was among the officers of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) – National Capital Region Office (NCRO) who were on third shift custodial duty when Lao escaped. A BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2 Almojuela and the rest of the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate Lao’s getaway. Based on the report’s recommendation, the Intelligence and Investigation Division of the BJMP filed an administrative complaint against the abovementioned

BJMP/NCRO members and CESO IV Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, found them liable. The CA denied SJO2 Almojuela’s petition but upon a motion for reconsideration lowered the penalty imposed.

SJO2 Almojuela argues that the certificate of non-forum shopping, instead of having been signed by the CSC, was signed by the assistant solicitor general, in violation of the rule on certification against forum shopping; that the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CA’s decision because it must maintain its impartiality as a judge and disciplining authority in controversies involving public officers; and that, he had been deprived of due process during the BJMP investigation, as he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence and to present his witnesses while the prosecution was allowed to adduce its evidence under a trial-type arrangement.

Issues:

1. Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;

2. Whether the CSC’s petition for review on certiorari should be dismissed as the CSC is not the proper party to appeal the CA’s amended decision;

3. Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process when he was not allowed to present his evidence and witnesses during the BJMP investigation

Ruling:

Petition partially granted.

1. The CSC’s petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court