R No 194247, June 19, 2013 J Perlas-Bernabe

The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed complaints before the RTC, seeking to expropriate the lands of herein respondents. In their separate answers, the respondents alleged that although they had no objection to petitioner’s right to expropriation, the amount of just compensation offered was ridiculously low considering that the subject properties were already re-classified into residential lots. A writ of possession was subsequently granted in petitioner’s favor, meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues left for resolution, except for the award of damages. In opposition, petitioner argued that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions for recovery of money claims and not to expropriation cases.

Moreover, it claimed that the mandatory constitution of a panel of commissioners for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of just compensation due under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court precludes a summary judgment.

The RTC thus granted the motion for summary judgment, brushing aside petitioner’s insistence for the constitution of a panel of commissioners under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dismissing the same as a futile exercise which would only delay the proceedings. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC, prompting it to file an appeal before the CA. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss appeal, averring that an appeal from a summary judgment raises only questions of law; hence, the proper recourse to assail its propriety should be a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 as adopted by petitioner.

The CA dismissed the petitioner’s appeal for being the wrong mode to assail the RTC’s summary judgment, finding that the errors raised in the appeal essentially pertained to the propriety of the RTC’s grant of respondents’ motion for summary judgment and thus, involved only questions of law of which the CA had no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. RULING:

Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:

(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Corollary thereto, should a party raise only questions of law through an ordinary appeal taken under Rule 41, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the said appeal shall be dismissed.

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Records show that petitioner raised four (4) issues in its appeal before the CA:

First, whether or not summary judgment was properly rendered by the RTC;

Second, whether or not there is any evidence on record to support the conclusion that the subject lots had already been re-classified from agricultural to residential; and if in the affirmative, whether or not the same may be considered as "interior lots" which would necessarily affect its zonal valuation;

Third, whether or not the appointment of commissioners is indispensable in an expropriation case; and

Fourth, whether or not the properties of Cenando and Rosa Reyes overlap that of the Philippine National Bank.

At the outset, it bears to note that the second and fourth issues were not raised by petitioner in its opposition to respondents’ motion for summary judgment but only in its motion for reconsideration from the RTC’s Order dated November 27, 2007. It has been consistently held that appellate courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. Thus, while these issues may be classified as questions of fact since their resolution would require an evaluation of the evidence on record, the CA was precluded from considering the same. Consequently, only the first and third issues were left for its determination.

Unlike the second and fourth issues, the first and third issues can be properly classified as questions of law since their resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application of the law on a particular set of facts.

To elucidate, the first issue regarding the propriety of the RTC’s summary judgment involves only a question of law since one need not evaluate the evidence on record to assess if the unresolved issues in this case, i.e., the classification of the properties expropriated, its location and valuation, constitute genuine issues. This is in line with the rule that a summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. Similarly, the third issue concerning the propriety of the appointment of a panel of commissioners only requires an application of Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, without the need of examining the evidence on record. Thus, given that the issues to be resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible error was committed by the CA in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The proper recourse should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING G.R. No. 183091, June 19, 2013

J. Leonardo-de Castro

As to the credibility of witnesses, the trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. Moreover, even if there are no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, especially so if the crime is rape, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to by the courts.

FACTS:

The accused was charged under an information with the crime of rape with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The evidence showed that the victim AAA left her home early in the morning to gather gabi from a farm about 50 meters away. When the AAA did not return to after a few hours, her sister BBB went looking for her. Along the way, BBB noticed the gabi gathered by the AAA and found the accused undressed except for blood-drenched briefs. The accused was in the act of cutting minongga tree branches and was covering something with them, and suddenly ran when he noticed BBB. It was after the accusedhad gone that BBB found the headless body of AAA, while her head lay a few meters away from her body.

In his defense, the accused denied the prosecution’s allegations, contending that he had been working in his farm and it wasn’t until after noon that he went home.

The RTC, in deciding the case, noted thelack of eyewitnesses to the crime, but stated that the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt was established by the prosecution through circumstantial evidence. As such, it rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC and found BBB to be a credible witness. It said that the minor inconsistencies in her testimony and the testimony of the other witness presented were not significant enough to warrant the acquittal of the appellant. In any event, it stated that appellant’s bare denial of his guilt against the positive testimony and categorical assertions of the prosecution’s witnesses proved to be worthless since it was uncorroborated. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. RULING:

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented to point that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of rape with homicide. As we have stated before, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrator’s crime when these are credible and sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. As the Court of Appeals stated:

The Prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, and no other, had raped and killed [AAA]. The following are the circumstantial evidence, to wit:

1. [BBB] went to the mountain farm to look for [AAA] and in the process saw the accused from 10 arms- stretches away covering the victim’s body with tree branches;

2. The accused was then holding a bolo and clad only in his bloodied briefs while covering the headless body of the victim with tree branches;

3. The victim’s head was found 5 meters away from her body; 4. The victim’s body was exposed, with her undergarments missing;

5. After medical examination, the victim’s vagina tested positive for the presence of spermatozoa;

6. [AAA] also suffered 3 hack wounds, one of which was found to have been inflicted before the victim expired;

7. The accused threw the bolo he used in cutting tree branches, which, when recovered, was determined to be the bolo brought by [AAA] from her house; and

8. He left the victim’s body and ran down the mountainous terrain.

To an unprejudiced mind, the above circumstances form a solid unbroken chain of events which ties appellant to the crime beyond reasonable doubt. BBB saw appellant at the scene of the crime; he was wearing bloodied underwear; he was wielding a bolo owned by AAA, cutting branches which he used to cover something; on seeing BBB he threw the bolo away and ran; when BBB checked what the appellant was trying to hide, she discovered it to be the headless body of AAA; AAA’s undergarments had

been removed; upon medical examination spermatozoa was found in her genitalia; and AAA was hacked several times before she was beheaded.

With respect to the appellant’s contention that the witnesses presented were not credible, we reiterate the jurisprudential principle affording great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses especially if the factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying.

In People v. Dion we stated that:

Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses' credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. x x x.

Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB and appellant does not present to this Court any scintilla of evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must uphold the identical assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses did not detract from BBB's credibility as a witness.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013

IRENEO M. VERDILLO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G.R. No. 192287, June 18, 2013

J. Villarama, Jr.

A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

FACTS:

Marquez and Verdillo were both employed as dealers in the game of Craps at PAGCOR at the Casino Filipino Heritage. One night, they both alternately manned a Craps table where a Mr. Johnny Cheng was playing. The Acting Pit Supervisor Eulalia Yang noticed that on several occasions Verdillo made a “good dice” call even though not one of the dice from the player’s throw hit the table’s rubber wall. Upon checking the CCTV, the members of the Casino Management and the investigators from the Corporate Investigation Unit were convinced that several void throws were declared as “good dice” while the same was being manned by Marquez and Verdillo. As such, both were administratively charged with conspiring with Cheng in defrauding PAGCOR of an undetermined amount of money.

Both Marquez and Verdillo were thus found liable for fraudulent transactions and were dismissed from service due to “Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for conspiring with a co-dealer and a customer in defrauding the house on numerous occasions. Marquez and Verdillo filed their Motions for

Reconsideration, but both were denied by PAGCOR for lack of merit. Aggrieved, they appealed their dismissal from service to the CSC, but both appeals were dismissed for lack of merit.

Not satisfied, Marquez filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that he was not accorded his right to due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of his guilt in the administrative charge. The CA then reversed the resolutions of the CSC, holding that there was no dishonesty on his part. Meanwhile, Verdillo filed with the CA a separate petition for review, arguing that PAGCOR’s decision was not supported by the evidence on record.

Unsatisfied, PAGCOR filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the designation of the offense in an administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense if it is based on the same facts subject of the original designation. Furthermore, PAGCOR asserts that the CA erred in simply brushing aside the evidence considered by the CSC, stressing that the factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling on the reviewing authority. On the other hand, Marquez maintains that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings of the CSC.

For his part, Verdillo also filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari. He argues that PAGCOR failed to present substantial evidence to justify his dismissal from service. He contends that his sworn statement cannot be considered as substantial evidence to support the offense of violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as there was no admission on his part that he violated house rules. Thus, he prays for his reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits as well as back wages.

ISSUE:

Whether Marquez and Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service to justify their dismissal from service.

RULING:

It is worthy to state that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.

This rule, however, is not ironclad. We have consistently recognized several exceptional circumstances where we disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review the findings of facts of the lower court such as when the findings of fact are conflicting or when the CA manifestly overlooked