The testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals. In People v. Lapasaran, we elaborated on the importance of the credible testimony of police officers in the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs through the following:

Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misappreciation of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA VICTA v. B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC./LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION v. B.E. SAN DIEGO,

INC.

G.R. No. 165863/G.R. No. 165875. April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza

To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice. Facts:

Petitioners, Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong, Spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, and Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) filed a petition to reopen a case docketed as G.R. No. 105027 decided by the Supreme Court with respondent B.E. San Diego, Inc. as one of the parties. Chua, et al. attached to their petition several documents among which are 1) flow charts tracing the subdivision and partition of Cuenca’s land into the present parcels of land purchased by petitioners from the heirs of Cuenca himself; the partitions were made with approval of the court; 2) a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio Talaba are actually adjacent to each other; and 3) a certification and sketch from the Land Registration Authority that the lot described in the alleged OCT No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits upon and encroaches on the National Highway (Aguinaldo Highway). The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition ruling that the documents were not exactly "newly discovered

evidence" because all of them could have been previously obtained and presented at the hearing before the lower court.

Issue:

Whether the evidence adduced in the petition to reopen are newly discovered evidence Ruling:

Petition denied.

The Court sustains the ruling of the CA that the alleged new documents submitted by Chua, et al. cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. The documents attached by Chua, et al. in their petition to re-open were the following: 1] Certified true copies of notices of hearing pertaining to Juan’s application for registration and confirmation of title; 2] Certification by the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, that Barrios Niog and Talaba are adjacent; and 3) certification from the LRA regarding the encroachment of San Diego’s property. These are not newly discovered and they cannot affect the Court’s ruling in its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA on this matter:

A common characteristic shared by all the foregoing documents is that they are not exactly "newly discovered evidence" as plaintiffs’ claim they are. By their nature, all of them could have been previously obtained and presented by plaintiffs at the hearings before the lower court. For plaintiffs’ failure to present these documents there is no one else to blame but themselves. It appears that they did not exert their best efforts to get hold of evidence which was already available, or at the very least, obtainable, to buttress their claim. To allow the presentation of evidence on a piece-meal basis, thereby needlessly causing a delay in the resolution of the case would be anathema to the purpose of delivering justice.

ROGELIO DANTIS v. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR. G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013

J. Mendoza

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt.

Facts:

Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. Dantis inherited the property through an extrajudicial partition of Emilio Dantis’ estate. Maghinang, Jr. presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, Rogelio’s grandfather and father of Emilio Dantis. It alleged that Emilio agreed to sell 352 sq.m. to Ignacio. Julio admitted that the affidavit was signed by Emilio. The receipt he presented was merely a photocopy. Julio was only 11 years old. The RTC ruled in favor of Rogelio. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that Exhibit "4" was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr.

Rogelio submits that Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "4" are devoid of evidentiary value and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit "4" is inadmissible in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof had not been established.

Issue:

Whether the affidavit of Ignacio and the photocopy of the receipt are admissible Ruling:

Petition granted.

To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved.

The claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit "4" in 1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952.

It is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment of 100.00 in₱ connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the contents of Exhibit "4" were similar to those of Annex "A" of Julio, Jr.’s Answer, dated June 9, 2002. Annex "A," however, was typewritten and the name of the recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and participation in the alleged sale was never explained.

Apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or read Exhibit "4," much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked assertion.

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013

J. Leonen

Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Facts:

Export Industry Bank (EIB) filed a collection suit against petitioners, Eagleridge Development (EDC) Corporation, Marcelo Naval, and Crispin Oben with the RTC of Makati City. The EIB, through a Deed of Assignment, transferred EDC’s outstanding loan obligations to EDC, to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), which included a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) between EDC and Cameron. Cameron substituted EIB. EDC filed a Motion for the Production/Inspection of the LSPA but was denied by the RTC for failing to show “good cause” for the production of the LSPA. The CA dismissed EDC’s petition for Oben’s lack of Verification and Certification Against Forum-Shopping and Failure to Attach a Copy of the Complaint.

Issues:

1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on technicality, i.e. on a defective verification and certification against forum shopping and the attachment to the petition of a mere machine copy of the complaint

2. Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or inspection of the LSPA

Ruling:

1. The Court agrees with EDC, that the appellate court erred in ruling that Oben's