Priority of equalising liberty

Regarding the principles of liberty and equality, it is common sense to consider them as rivals. From the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world was divided by two economical models: capitalism and socialism. The free market and the planned economy symbolise their extremes. Roughly speaking, free market supporters consider individual

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liberty of entrepreneurship as the fundamental value to be preserved within a society. In this model, the government must have minimum interference in people‟s lives allowing them to exercise their free will. Defenders of the planned economy, also presented in a simplified way, sustain that the correct social organisation must be founded on the promotion of equality of material resources among citizens and that the government should have a strong and centralised role in this process. However, the former can say that they are also concerned with equality, since the free market guarantees that the free will of all is equally respected, while the latter can say that they truly promote liberty through guaranteeing to people the minimal material conditions to be free. In between these two extremes, it is possible to identify several models that try to balance some redistribution of wealth and opportunities to people, also allowing free enterprise, as discussed in 4.2.

However, is the integration of equality and liberty a matter of gradation? Sen does not think so. According to him, it is possible to solve this dispute between equality and liberty by realising that they are not opposite principles, but rather inter-related ones. Sen claims that:

strictly speaking, posing the problem in terms of [the contrast between liberty and equality] reflects a „category mistake‟. They are not alternatives. Liberty is among the possible fields of application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty (1992, p. 22-3).

Moreover, Dworkin claims that, at least for those committed to the values of contemporary Western societies, there is an evident priority of equality over liberty (2000, p.128). An intuition based on historical orientation of moral and civic values makes Sen also claims that “every normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to demand equality of something” (1992, p.12), a rephrased way to mention his famous idea of “equality of what” (1980). According to him, “[t]he absence of such equality would make a theory arbitrarily discriminative and hard to defend” (1992, p.17). Regarding this, Sen adds:

[T]he need to justify disparate advantages of different individuals in things that matter […] frequently takes the form of showing the integral connection of that inequality with equality in some other important – allegedly more important – space. (1992, p.18-9)

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As explored in 2.4, “[u]ntil the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature – i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right and its assumption of an equality of natural order among all human beings” (GOSEPATH, 2007).

Several theories of justice are anchored in different ideas of distribution of distinct specific goods. The most simplistic thesis claims that everyone should have the same income. The famous communist motto quoted by Marx, “[f]rom each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (1891, p.11), goes in this direction, though takes into account the proportionality of people‟s needs. On the other extreme, there is a theory that supports that only civil and political liberties should be equally guaranteed by the state. According to libertarians, such as Nozick (1974), there is no reason for limiting legal and civic liberties, but any attempt to redistribute goods is against people‟s natural right over their property. In between these two extremes, substantive equality of opportunities that tries eliminating (or at least reducing considerably) natural and social differences is proposed. The liberal egalitarian tradition (Rawls, 1971; 1993; Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 2000; Sen, 2009a; Nussbaum, 2011, and so on) presents different formulations to this.

From this analysis, it seems that all theories already presented, from different perspectives, are concerned with guaranteeing equal liberty for all. Why should equal income be guaranteed if not to allow people equal liberty to do what they want? Why should more be given to the most needy if not for the same reason? Why should property be protected if not to guarantee the equal liberty of people to do what they want with their goods? Why should equal opportunities be promoted if not for giving to all people equal liberty to decide their own destinies? Why should equal political participation be assured if not to give all the same voice (equal liberty) in public affairs?

Thus, different theories are compatible with the historical analysis presented in 2.4 that there is a consensus amongst Western individuals that “liberty” must be the “good” equally distributed in society25. The importance given by people to liberty, however, can be questioned. Dostoyevsky (1880) reflects on this through the fable of The Great Inquisitor. This passage of The Brothers Karamazov describes a hypothetical meeting between an

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This claim is strong. Transcendental liberty, the type of liberty that should be equally distributed, is better defined in 3.9.

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inquisitor of the Catholic Church and Christ in the fifteenth century. In this meeting, the inquisitor accuses Christ and God of making human beings desire liberty without being able to deal with it. Thus, the inquisitor defends that the Church‟s “brainwashing” is good for humankind, that clergymen are the real humankind saviours. In his words:

Oh, never, never will [human beings] feed themselves without us! No science will give them bread while yet they are free, but the end of it will be that they will bring us their freedom and place it at our feet and say to us: „Enslave us if you will, but feed us.‟ At last they themselves will understand that freedom and earthly bread in sufficiency for all are unthinkable together, for never, never will they be able to share between themselves! (2007[1880], p.277)

This description puts a choice between liberty and food. However, when Rawls talks about justice, he considers that such a choice does not exist. According to him, a theory of justice only makes sense under circumstances of “moderate scarcity” in which “[n]atural and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down” (1999[1971], p. 110).

However, though this extreme situation is discarded and liberty is taken as the good to be equally guaranteed, this concept is very complex and allows different understandings. Thus, it is not simple to define in which direction a society should go in order to promote an equal distribution of liberty. The following sections advance on this point.