The role of reason

It is suggested above that natural characteristics and cultural practices have influence over individuals‟ behaviour. Even so, their rational capacity also has influence over this. Regarding this, differently from Haidt (4.1), Bloom says that “innate preferences do not define us: we are rational, as well” (2016, p.8). According to him, for example, “[w]e often favour those who are adorable more than those who are ugly. This is a fact about our minds worth working. But we can also recognize that this is the wrong way to make moral decisions” (2016, p.229). In the same way, Bloom claims that:

our moral circle has expanded over history: Our attitudes about the rights of women, homosexuals, and racial minorities have all shifted towards inclusiveness. […]

But this is not because our hearts have opened up over the course of history. We are not more empathic than our great-grandparents. […] [O]ur concern for others reflects more abstract appreciation that regardless of our feelings, their lives have the same value as the lives of those we love. (2016, p.239)

Thus, without disagreeing that emotions have impact on people‟s notions of justice, Bloom suggests that reason also has an impact on how people understand justice.

In this regard, it is important to say that, according to Bloom, reason does not mean self- interest. In his view, it is rationality that makes individuals capable to adapt themselves, to learn from what is developed in their cultures. Rationality, however, goes in a different direction to self-interest only if associated with compassion:

Evolution […] [gave] rise to sentiments such as compassion for those who suffer, anger at cheaters and free riders, and gratitude to those who are kind. These are inspired solutions, evolved over millennia, to the problems that faced us as humans living in small groups. As

109 individuals who now live in a much different world, we can build from this, stepping away from our own specific circumstances and developing and endorsing moral principles of broad applicability. Such principles reflect values that, as rational and reflective beings, we are willing to sign on to. This deserves to be called wisdom. (2013, p.156-7)

It is the possession of rationality and compassion that grounds Rawls‟ claim that most people are not only rational, but also reasonable: in his view, when people reflect about justice, they agree that they have to go further than self-interest and have to respect some duties towards the others (3.4). This is associated with the idea of social responsibility, a widespread Western value as defended in 2.4.

This reflection on the idea of reasonability orients the reflection towards the impacts of empathy and compassion over individuals‟ sense of social responsibility. Empathy is a central concept for Smith‟s “theory of moral feelings”, though he used to call it “sympathy”45_{. Bloom, following Smith‟s understanding, defines empathy as “the act of}

coming to experience the world as you think someone else does” (2016, p.16), something similar to the popular phrase “putting oneself in other people‟s shoes”. Empathy has been presented by many as the type of feeling that orients social responsibility (De Wall, 2010; Baron-Cohen, 2012). This is a “common sense” idea and, for example, Baron-Cohen says that evil is the deficiency of empathy.

Bloom, however, considers that empathy does not make the world a better place. Actually, he presents data proving that high empathy does not increase good behaviour and does not reduce aggressive behaviour (2016, p.83-4), and that empathy works as a spotlight narrowing people‟s minds (2016, p.87). One interesting example is that, if individuals feel more concretely the difficulties of a certain person, they tend to wish that that specific situation is solved, rather than defend a more abstract idea of justice.

Despite this, Bloom is not against cognitive empathy, the capacity to understand other people‟s feelings, something that, in his view, is an amoral skill, similar to intelligence (2016, p.37). However, this does not mean that Bloom considers that only reason makes people being fair. His “alternative to emotional empathy includes compassion for others, so any

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Actually, Smith goes further and includes the notion of impartiality in his understanding of sympathy, something different from the current understanding of empathy. This idea is further explored.

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rational decision-making process would take happiness and thriving and suffering into account” (2016, p.138). Bloom borrows the differentiation between empathy and compassion from Buddhism, which considers that “sentimental compassion” causes exhaustion, while “great compassion”, “more distant and reserved, and can be sustained indefinitely” (2016, p.138).

Obviously, it can be said that what Bloom does is much more to mix empathy with reason than denying the former skill. The result of this mix would be compassion, something that moves people to act towards others, but wisely. Chapter 8 explores deeply this debate, and suggests knowledge, skills and values that individuals should possess in order to improve justice. Additionally, in 5.3, this point is further developed through the analysis of the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan regarding people‟s “correct” moral development through their lives.

Before exploring individuals‟ moral development, it is interesting to explore how the notions of reason, compassion, impartiality, and equality of opportunity are linked. The reflection presented above defends the idea that the natural process of protecting genes and some elements of what different cultures transmit across generations make it difficult for people to be impartial in their ordinary practices. However, people‟s rational capacity added to the feeling of compassion towards strangers orient them to understand that, in the social sphere, they have to be impartial and that it is fair to defend state impartial attitudes. The moral development of individuals seems to go in this direction as Kohlberg further claims.

As discussed in 4.2, the idea of equality of opportunities seems to represent people‟s notion of impartiality/fairness. And, though different peoples understand luck in distinct ways, it is consensual that equalising opportunities is related to reducing the role of luck in disputes for jobs, good earnings, etc. Several empirical studies investigate which factors ordinary people consider acceptable and unacceptable with these regards. Through developing ideas proposed by Freiman and Nichols (2011), Goya-Tocchetto shows that ordinary people “tend to find social advantages and disadvantages to be much more problematic than genetic advantages and disadvantages” (2016, p.171), that is, they tend to consider unfair differences in earnings based on social luck, but accept differences based on natural luck. Following a similar reasoning, Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) also appeal to empirical data, and advance in one point. While they find that ordinary people think that differences in resources should be

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compensated, they consider that, if different earnings are caused by distinct choices made by individuals, this should not be compensated. In other words, if two people put the same effort to get a good job, but have different educational resources, the one that studied in the worst school should be compensated; on the other hand, if two people put the same effort, but one choses to do something that the society considers less important and is willing to pay less, this person does not deserve to be compensated. Moreover, Gaertner and Schokkaert identified that most ordinary people consider that bad luck should not be fully compensated: “Even in the case of genetic defects, less than 30% of the respondents go for complete equality of the personal contributions. Much more common is what the authors call „intermediate compensation‟” (2012, p.104).

Though these data show some approximation between philosophical ideas defended in chapter 4 and ordinary people‟s ideas on redistribution of goods, they also present some incongruence. This comparison is fundamental to the idea of reflective equilibrium that sustains this whole thesis and is recovered in the conclusion.