Top-down changes

Independently of whether Freyre‟s, Holanda‟s, Faoro‟s or Souza‟s narrative is the most “correct” way to describe how Brazil was built, it is a matter of fact that Brazilian people never achieved a proper revolution. Differently from, for example, the US, UK and France, or even neighbouring countries in South America, the six most important changes of Brazilian political regimes – Independence (1822), Republic (1889), the 1930s Revolution (1930), New State (1937), Military‟s coup d‟état (1964), and Re-democratization (1985) – happened without participation from the general public, strong riots, or large numbers of deaths. These processes were always top-down (Carvalho, 2002, p.26; 95-6; 106; 144; 173)53.

53

It is not being said that there were or are not popular mobilisations in Brazilian history. In the past, there were several unsuccessful attempts to change the regime in local and national levels. At the end of military dictatorship, strong but peaceful demonstrations ask for direct elections for president. At the same time,

128

It is, then, possible to identify in Brazilian social dynamics what Cardoso, through expanding Freyre‟s idea of “harmony of contraries” and appealing to Hegelian categories, calls a “contradiction without dialectic – without properly producing a synthesis” (2013, p.111). This process of harmonization probably made Brazilian minorities less conscious of their situation and their rights. Thus, they were less likely to make a claim for significant cultural, political and economic changes. As also mentioned above, in the US, the lack of this harmonisation of contraries, even though creating a strong segregation, at least allowed black/poor communities to be aware about their situation and fight for their rights. On the other hand, in Brazil, these “harmonisation” of cultures produced usual political passivity and the lack of spirit of indignation in minorities – with few exceptions as 2013 mass mobilizations.

Taking Faoro‟s analysis, it is possible to suggest that, in Brazil, centralised power in the bureaucratic establishment is related to the Brazilian people‟s passivity. The history of centralisation of power made Brazilian citizens always wait for changes from the top. At the same time, the fact that Brazilian people are not attached to their national institutions results in their lack of feeling of belonging to these institutions, something that opens space for the same groups keep occupying the bureaucratic establishment. Thus, it seems that centralisation reinforces passiveness and vice-versa.

Actually, a comparison of the development of civil, political and social rights between Brazil and the UK reinforces this understanding, and gives some other clues regarding why Brazilian people have been so passive about the neglecting of their rights. Carvalho, based on Marshall ideas (2.5), defends that the sense of citizenship developed in the UK had a “logical” chronology: first, during the eighteenth century, civil rights were established, then, subsequently, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political and social rights were promoted. Carvalho also says that this order can be broken, and that “[i]n theory, [social rights] can exist without civil rights and certainly without political rights. But in the absence of civil and political rights, its content and range tend to be arbitrary” (2002, p.10-1).

different sectors of society started to fight for their rights. Landless Movement (MST), certainly the largest social movement in Latin America, started protesting for agrarian reform, and trade unions organised several strikes.

129

Reflecting specifically about Brazil, Carvalho identifies this non-logical development by saying that, in this country, social rights came before civic and politic rights. From this perception, he suggests that it generates lots of problems in the process of incorporating the rights of Brazilian people.

The main problem, as mentioned above, is that the social advances were promoted in general in a top-down way. Through highlighting this point, Carvalho calls attention to the fact that it was exactly during the period between 1930 and 1945, a very authoritarian moment of Brazilian history in which civil and political rights were denied, that social rights, such as laws protecting workers rights, were more developed (2002, p.110-26). Of course, this situation was possible because these social policies were implemented by the dictator of that time, Getúlio Vargas. From 1945, a democratic period was instigated and inspired by the victory of Allies in the Second World War. Civil and political rights were increased, but not social ones.

However, the Brazilian government remained strongly centralised in the executive power. As evidence, parliamentarism was proposed and rejected through a plebiscite in 1963 and 1993. In Carvalho‟s words:

This orientation towards the Executive reinforces the long Portuguese or Iberian tradition: the patrimonialism. State is always seen as the all-powerful, at worst hypothesis, as the repressor and tax collector; at best, as a paternalistic dispenser of jobs and favours (2002, p.221)

Carvalho, thus, agrees with Faoro‟s point about patrimonialism and adds that this is reinforced by people‟s search for a “political messiah”, which promotes “valuation of the Executive and the devaluation of the Legislative” (2002, p.221-2). Cardoso calls this system as “imperial presidentialism”, which remains until the current time (2013, p.130).

Thus, following the same pattern, during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), civil and political rights were lost, but some other social ones, such as more laws protecting workers, were conquered. However, as mentioned before, again, these social advances always happened based on roughly arbitrary decisions by the president. It was only after the re- democratisation, in 1985, that people came to be listened to, and really started participating in the process of deciding their own destinies. Reflecting on the history of Brazilian

130

constitutions, Villa endorses this point by saying that Brazilian people fought 200 years against the arbitrary state, and that, only from 1988 (with the last Constitution), full democracy was reached (2011, p.9-10). It is worth mentioning that in the other two “democratic times”, the 1930 and 1960 elections, respectively only 7% and 18% of people voted, while, in 1986, 47% did (Carvalho, 2002, p.146; p.167).

This discussion is directly related to the debate about the decision-making dimension of justice (4.4). In these regards, almost all reasonable ideas on what is a good democratic system proposed in that debate are far from being achieved in Brazil. This country has a type of democracy that, at the same time, gives little voice to citizens and to specialists. Only a bureaucratic establishment formed by a cast of politicians and certain representatives of private capital ends up by determining the directions of the country.