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R No 162230, April 28, 2010,DEL CASTILLO, J.

In document Consti-1-Case-Digests-1st-sem.docx (Page 122-124)

FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT COL ALEXANDER F BALUTAN v LT./GEN GENEROSO S SENGA

G. R No 162230, April 28, 2010,DEL CASTILLO, J.

The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.

Facts:

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claimed that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issue:

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

Ruling:

NO. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS v. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, CORTES, J.

The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

Facts:

Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines. But Mrs. Aquino has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The petitioners contended that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Petitioners likewise advanced the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they asserted: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.

Issue:

Whether the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:

YES. The Constitution provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

JUDICIARY

FERNANDO LOPEZ v. GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966, CONCEPCION, C.J.

Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections. Petitioner Fernando Lopez was proclaimed Vice President of the Philippines. Respondent filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office.

Petitioner Lopez instituted in the SC the present action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is “unconstitutional,” and that, “all proceedings taken by it are a nullity.”

Issue:

Whether the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has judicial power to hear and decide the election contest.

Ruling:

YES. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress

has power to do.

Pursuant to the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,” subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG

In document Consti-1-Case-Digests-1st-sem.docx (Page 122-124)

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