R No 129742, September 16, 1998, REGALADO, J.

Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases as it violates the proscription of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.

Facts:

Teresita Fabian and Nestor Agustin, then incumbent District Engineer, had a relationship. When Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and employed acts of harassment. Fabian filed an administrative case against Agustin. Ombudsman Desierto found Agustin guilty of grave misconduct. Agustin moved for reconsideration, and he was exonerated from administrative charges. Fabian then appealed to the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in accordance with Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). She argued that said provision is not violative of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution. She claimed that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution authorizes the Court to review on appeal or certiorari these final judgment or orders as the law or the Rules of Court

may provide, said Section 27 does not increase the Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which the Court already has jurisdiction. Issue:

Whether Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is valid. Ruling:

NO. The Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 even if questions of fact are involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. Also, Rule 45 specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the CA, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, the Court held that Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.

A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

Facts:

Joy Cabiles, an overseas worker, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sameer Overseas Placement Agency. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint but the NLRC declared that she was illegally dismissed. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary, pursuant to Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). Said provision provides that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." However, in Serrano v. GallantMaritime

Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., the Court ruled that the clause "or for three

(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Despite being declared unconstitutional, the clause was reinstated in RA No. 10022 in 2010, amending RA No. 8042.

Thus, it creates confusion on the part of the NLRC and the CA with regard to the execution of the judgment.

Issue:

Whether the clause declared as unconstitutional be cured by reenactment or reincorporation.

Ruling:

NO. When a law is passed, the Court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional. However, this case shows a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. In this case, the parties failed to prove that the situation has so changed so as to cause the reversal of the binding precedent.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.

A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

Facts:

Joy Cabiles, an overseas worker, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sameer Overseas Placement Agency. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint but the NLRC declared that she was illegally dismissed. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary, pursuant to Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). Said provision provides that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for

every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." However, in Serrano v. Gallant

Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., the Court ruled that the clause "or

for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Despite being declared unconstitutional, the clause was reinstated in RA No. 10022 in 2010, amending RA No. 8042. Thus, it creates confusion on the part of the NLRC and the CA with regard to the execution of the judgment.

Issue:

Whether the clause declared as unconstitutional be cured by reenactment or reincorporation.

Ruling:

NO. When a law is passed, the Court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional. However, this case shows a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. In this case, the parties failed to prove that the situation has so changed so as to cause the reversal of the binding precedent.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.

The Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.

Facts:

Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). After the 1986

EDSA Revolution, FPA stopped the imposition of the levy. Fertiphil then demanded from Planters Product, Inc. (PPI) a refund of the amounts it paid under the LOI, but the latter refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection against FPA and PPI and also questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil, and was affirmed by the CA, as the lis mota of the complaint was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. PPI insisted that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling the constitutionality of the LOI, as it cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection and that it is the very lis mota of the case. Issue:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. Ruling:

YES. It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive order, under Sec. 5 (2)(a), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal actions or in ordinary actions. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

In this case, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised in the complaint for collection filed with the RTC. The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the principle of unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION