The Red Army

The major role of the Red Army in the control of the partisan movement has already been discussed. In comparison to the Party, which played a pervasive but ill-defined part in controlling the partisans, and the NKVD, whose role was very significant but covert, the authority of the Red Army was precise and direct. It could order the partisans in its zone of operations to carry out tasks of a military nature and could insist on the execution of these orders. As a rule, the Red Army formations appear to have adhered to the chain of command established by the creation of the Front Staffs and their subordinate partisan headquarters, but, as noted previously, in the early stages of the partisan movement many important bands were controlled directly by Red Army commands. Even at later stages of the war this sometimes occurred when a Red Army unit came in close proximity to a partisan band. [For examples, see Chap. VIII, Sect. II, B, 2.] Apparently the prestige and authority enjoyed by the Red Army were sufficient in most cases to induce band commanders to follow its orders without hesitation. In the final stages of the German withdrawal from Soviet territory, especially in the West Ukraine, such instances of direct subordination of partisan units to Red Army commands increased; sometimes the partisan bands cooperated directly in important Red Army tactical operations, such as the crossing of rivers. Cases are also known in which bands were directly incorporated, at least temporarily, into Red Army formations.

In addition to these more general types of authority, the Red Army at many times possessed a special means of checking and controlling the partisan bands. From the very beginning of the war Red Army commands frequently dispatched into the rear of the enemy special commando-type units which occasionally ranged hundreds of miles into the occupied area. The role of such units in re-forming the partisan movement in the winter of 1941-42 has already been described.

In later years, their importance was less, but they continued to carry out special tasks such as obtaining information and destroying important installations. These tasks brought them into direct contact with the partisans and sometimes into competition with them, since such a force might be assigned to carry out a mission in which the partisans had failed. They acted as a source of information for the Red Army on the real activities of the partisan movement and at the same time reduced the dependence of the military on the partisans.

I. SUMMARY

In one way the preceding description of means of control helps to clarify the manner in which the partisan movement was directed. We have seen that the Soviet regime was not dependent on any single system of control, but had at its disposal numerous alternative chains of command and methods for impressing the partisans with its authority. If one method or channel proved

ineffective, an alternative one was available. At the same time, however, the existence of these diverse methods, and especially of the several chains of command, reinforces the impression gained in the examination of types of orders: namely, that here was no clear-cut allocation of responsibility.

Apparently the average partisan band commander was never certain from whom his decisive orders would come. Nominally he was subordinate to a specific intermediate command level of

the partisan structure. However, a higher level of this structure might at any time issue

superseding orders directly to the band commander. Moreover, under certain circumstances, he might receive orders directly from the Red Army. The existence of this multiple command channel was only the beginning of his perplexity. He was also subject to the advice of the Party organization, which on certain occasions might affect operational matters. It was undoubtedly risky to disregard this advice, unless he was very sure of his own Party status. Moreover, the ubiquitous "OO" section, with its considerable independence of the partisan chain of command, exercised a constant surveillance over the band commander, and could scarcely fail to influence his actions. In some cases, he was permanently assigned the liaison officer of the partisan staff to which he was subject—a person whose observations could not be wholly ignored. And his band might at any time be visited by an inspection officer from this staff, or a high partisan or Party official. Finally, the band commander might himself be called suddenly to Soviet territory to report to the highest officials of the Party and the partisan movement.

In the scope of this chapter one can only indicate the complicated nature of this control system and the resulting perplexity of its objects, and perhaps hint at the reasons behind it. To a considerable extent, this system was a more or less accidental growth, resulting from the complex and diverse origins of the partisan movement. To some extent, the varied functions of the partisans—military, political, propaganda—required that they be directed by different

agencies. Moreover, like all totalitarian systems, the Soviet regime required numerous competing elements, each checking and reporting on the other. One may suggest, however, that another related factor was present. By failing to delineate clear-cut areas of responsibility, by depriving the individual partisan officer of the security attendant upon the occupancy of a definite niche in a recognized hierarchy, the system denied him the feeling that he was secure so long as he acted in accordance with definite orders from a designated superior. As a result he was thrown on his own and became a more pliable and helpless instrument in the hands of the regime.

Many band commanders, of course, were not directly subject to all of the pressures listed above.

As a rule, orders from headquarters other than the partisan operative group and the Red Army unit which was concerned with the band were infrequent enough not to form a major

preoccupation of the commander. In most cases it was possible, rather than actual, interference by conflicting authorities which made for insecurity among command personnel. As previously noted, if the commander was a man of bold and decisive character, he could disregard the advice of the Party organization and the NKVD officer in his band, and if successful would not be called to account. Probably "family arrangements" such as those frequent in other phases of Soviet organization were sometimes made between representatives of the various chains of command in one band. Such arrangements might more or less tacitly have provided that the

"OO" section chief, the commander, the commissar, and the Party would settle all disagreements among themselves, without reporting to their respective headquarters outside the band. All of these circumstances tended to mitigate in practice the ambiguity of command responsibility;

however, at crucial times lack of definite patterns of responsibility must have made the partisan commander's position unenviable.

§IV. Conclusion

The foregoing discussion on means of control presented a review of many major aspects of the partisan organization and command. The broader political implications of the partisan movement have been treated in a wider context in the introductory chapter. Therefore, instead of

summarizing such aspects of the movement here, it seems best to present a brief analysis of the rationale which lay behind the systems of organization used in the partisan movement, and the implications which these systems may have for the future.

There were two basically different systems of partisan organization. The territorial, described above in Section II, provided for relatively small partisan detachments (fifty to one hundred men) in each administrative subdivision of the occupied USSR. This system was to have been erected on the framework of the Party and NKVD territorial administrations, and all their command personnel as well as many of the rank and file would have been drawn from among their trusted members. The units would occasionally have conducted hit-and-run attacks against small enemy forces and would have terrorized collaborators, but would have rigorously avoided major engagements. Permanent camps, primarily supply depots, would have been maintained in isolated districts but the partisans would not have attempted to control any definite area. The emphasis would have been on stealth and surprise. In some cases, it was apparently hoped that partisan members could resume their normal occupations of ostensibly peaceful workers after the completion of each operation. The points of command above the bands were to have been

underground Party committees, which would usually have been located in cities. Their members would have perhaps hidden in concealed quarters or perhaps have acted under the cover of normal occupations.

The way in which this scheme collapsed has already been described, and there is no need to review it here. It should be emphasized, however, that its success depended on several factors which were absent during the first months of German occupation in the USSR.

1. Preparation. Such a system needed a great deal of planning and preparation before the arrival of the enemy. Camps and supply depots had to be carefully constructed and completely

camouflaged. Precise and accurately defined systems, including alternative methods, of communication had to be established between the bands and the underground centers. In particular, powerful hidden radio transmitters and secret landing fields were necessary. The personnel of the detachments had to be selected and trained with extreme care. This was

necessary not only to ensure the partisans' loyalty and technical proficiency in disruptive tactics, but to acquaint them with the purposes of their activity and to make certain that they would continue to mount vigorous attacks even if the result was the decimation of their units. In fact all of these prerequisites were lacking, or at least very scarce. Planning at a high level had taken place before the war, but the persons who were to carry out the plans had never even been informed of the possibility of partisan warfare. A brief period of feverish and haphazard training and preparation took place after the war began, but the attention of responsible authorities was too divided and the time too short to achieve major results. Finally, the unexpected rapidity of the Red Army retreat produced a wave of panic which swept up many of the partisan cadres, while the chaos of the retreat disrupted physical preparations.

2. Support of the population. This territorial plan of partisan warfare, relying on concealment and stealth, presupposes the active support of a large majority of the population in the occupied area.

The bulk of the population remaining in most of the territories occupied by the Germans was by no means strongly pro-Soviet. From the Soviet standpoint, it was at best passive, unwilling to cooperate with either old or new master until the victory of one was apparent; at worst, important elements of the population revealed the composition and hide-outs of the partisan bands to the Germans and cooperated in wiping them out by force.

In those areas where the territorial partisan movement enjoyed a measure of success, i.e., the North Caucasus and especially the Crimea, such success was due to the time available for

preparation, the ability to profit from previous experience, and probably the presence of a greater proportion of Party and NKVD officials. Even in these areas, however, the territorial system survived only by abandoning several of its prescribed features, in particular the plan for a network of small groups in each district and the reliance on stealth. Indeed, changes were

absolutely essential in these areas, partly because the contrast between favorable and unfavorable

partisan terrain is sharpest there, and partly because a large element of the population consisted of Moslems bitterly hostile to the Soviet regime. That the Soviet authorities continued to use the territorial system at a late date under these adverse conditions indicates, however, that they favored it. Where feasible, the system was extremely useful to the regime, for it retained firm control of the partisan movement in the hands of the elements which were most reliable and most capable of maintaining the subordination and loyalty of the remaining population of the occupied areas. Under ideal circumstances it could accomplish more with less expenditure of resources than any other type of partisan movement, for it required no large additional increment of cadres to ensure loyalty. Moreover, since they avoided large-scale engagements, partisan detachments needed no extensive supply of arms and munitions.

The almost universal failure of the territorial system meant that another type of organization had to be relied on. The system, if it can be so called, described in Section III was as much the product of circumstances as the result of conscious planning. To be sure, the later partisan movement was not, as some authors have claimed, a "spontaneous popular uprising." It was rather the result of the efforts of thousands of supporters of the Soviet regime who, through the fortunes of war, found themselves in occupied territory, or who were sent in purposely to organize resistance to the occupier. Only gradually did the higher authorities of the Soviet regime introduce order into the haphazard growth of this type of organization. The control system superimposed on the partisan bands did indeed succeed in maintaining an extremely high degree of overt loyalty to the regime. It also guaranteed that the bands endeavored to execute missions of military or political importance. It did not, however, introduce a sufficient degree of uniformity and efficiency to transform the partisan bands into units capable of conducting military operations comparable to those executed by Red Army formations of similar size.

Moreover, the resulting partisan organization could operate effectively only under certain favorable conditions, and not throughout the occupied territory during the entire period of occupation.

In order to understand why the partisan movement took the organizational form it did after the winter of 1941-42, it is necessary to examine very briefly the nature of the war on the eastern front. In a sense, the German attack on the USSR was a tour de force of astonishing magnitude.

Considering how incredibly brutal and stupid the German policies in the occupied area were, it is amazing that for two-and-one-half years after the defeats during the winter of 1941-42, the Wehrmacht continued to occupy substantial portions of the Soviet Union. From early 1942 on, the Soviet forces were considered to have superiority in the air; they had a large and increasingly superior artillery force; and from the very beginning of the war, they possessed a wide numerical margin in manpower. Nevertheless, the better organization, leadership, discipline, and military qualities of the lower ranks of the Wehrmacht enabled the Germans to hold out until 1944.

Rarely, if ever, has an invading force maintained itself on enemy territory for so long a period of time, when it was so enormously inferior in manpower and military equipment. Occupation under such circumstances involves very severe risks and disadvantages. It was the business of the Soviet partisans to maximize these risks and enhance these disadvantages.

German inferiority in technical equipment gave the partisan bands enormous advantages. There was little to fear from German airpower since it was too scarce to be assigned to antipartisan operations frequently; on the other hand, the bands received matériel and personnel of

incalculable value through almost unimpeded air transport. Lack of armor and fire power on the part of German and auxiliary outfits made it possible for the partisan unit of brigade size, even though of dubious military quality, to fight at least a delaying action by supplying a screen of fire from its numerous automatic weapons. Since the Germans lacked equipment and air support, only large, carefully prepared offensives could overcome the major partisan concentrations.

These offensives were necessarily infrequent; as a result the partisans could completely control

large areas for months at a time. Lack of manpower restricted the Germans to major towns and roads in those regions where the partisans were really active, and left the countryside almost at the mercy of the Red forces.

These conditions made feasible the creation of large brigades. Under favorable conditions, such units could fight German forces of considerable strength, were generally well able to dispose of collaborator outfits, and could present an imposing appearance to the population. Such forces, multiplied many times, and coordinated by headquarters both within and outside the occupied territories, were gradually able to transform most of the northern part of these territories into a sort of twilight zone, which was neither German domain nor fully regained by the Soviets. As the Germans weakened, the area of partisan control was extended, and more and more of the population in the "occupied" areas were made to feel that they were already reincorporated in the Soviet system.

Large bands of this type, relying on the possession of fairly definite base areas and subsisting on food supplies drawn from a population controlled by force, had definite limitations. Since the Germans lacked air-power and armor, the partisans could from time to time conduct sweeping raids into open country, such as the famous raids of Kovpak and Naumov in the Ukraine. They could not engage in continuous activity in such open regions, however, for, as long as the Germans had the strength to react forcefully, they could send in sufficient regular troops to wipe out the poorly trained and undisciplined partisans who were then caught far from the shelter of marsh and forest. Since the large band was the only generally successful form evolved by the Soviets during the Second World War, the richer half of the occupied territories, the Ukrainian plain, remained relatively free of partisans until almost the end of the occupation.

CHAPTER III Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement