TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PARTISAN PRINTED PROPAGANDA 1. 1941

Preparations made before the arrival of the Germans were inadequate for most partisan units, though by 1942 they were equipped for the publication of printed materials. The speed of the German advance, disorganization during the Soviet retreat, in some instances lack of planning and foresight, and above all, the fact that many partisan detachments which emerged were not the product of specific Soviet planning before the occupation, all contributed to the paucity and in most cases absence of printing facilities.

This fact, as well as the difficult straits in which the inchoate partisan movement found itself during its first months of existence, contributed to the drastic restriction of printing activities. In general, partisan psychological warfare at that time consisted principally of word-of-mouth exhortations and rumors; Soviet-side propaganda to the population on occupied soil, restricted as it was, was quantitatively and qualitatively far more significant than that of the partisans.

Moreover, the partisans were handicapped in the selection of themes that were both permissible in terms of Soviet myths and slogans and effective in persuading the indigenous population.

Acting as small bodies, isolated from most of the people and from the Soviet command, the partisans concentrated much of their verbal propaganda on their own members rather than on neutral or hostile civilians.

If such was the over-all picture, there were nonetheless significant exceptions even during the early months of the occupation. Admitting that in 1941 most partisan groups had no printing facilities, Soviet sources reproduced the text of miscellaneous appeals put out by partisans in small numbers of handwritten copies—the prevalent medium during this first stage. The first

"newspapers" were issued in this fashion as one-page handwritten sheets in perhaps eight or ten

copies. Crude both in appearance and content and usually limited to a few simple slogans and exhortations to steadfastness, they were surreptitiously left in neighboring villages or with friendly individuals. Their effective range was exceedingly limited.

[Tsanava, I, 222-23, II, 924; M. Abramov, ed., Bolshevistskiye gazety v tylu vraga (Leningrad:

Leningradskoye Gazelno-Zhurnalnoye Izdatelstvo, 1946), p. 5; Shever-dalkin, p. 4.]

Yet they served the purpose of making the existence and, at least nominal, resistance of the partisans known to a few outsiders, and gave the partisans themselves the illusion of being engaged in essential, dangerous, patriotic work.

A few units possessed typewriters, often decrepit, on which leaflets were also reproduced. How propaganda work was then conducted is described in two Soviet sources:

Polygraphic means [a partisan propaganda officer wrote] were quite limited. We had one typewriter. I had learned to type, and I had to spend whole nights at the typewriter copying the dispatches of the Soviet Information Bureau [received by radio]. We wrote leaflets by hand. We had very little paper; we wrote on cardboard, on thin wooden boards, on glass, and we typed even on cloth and birch rind [sic]. In the morning our boys would distribute the leaflets in the villages, railroad stations, and even in Bryansk.

[V. Andreyev, Narodnaya voina (zapiski partizana) (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 212. See also Tsanava, II, 924.]

Though perhaps overdramatized, another account reports in a similar vein: "Usually in breaks between combat operations the otryad commissar would gather five to ten partisans who had a good hand, and would dictate to them the prepared text of a leaflet. In this manner the text would be reproduced in the desired number of copies."

[Tsanava, I, 223.]

Only rarely was more satisfactory equipment available. A few units had brought along a

"shapirograph," a Soviet model of a rudimentary hectograph machine capable of producing a few dozen copies of a prepared text. Where it was available, it served as the "printing press"; even as late as December 1942 the publication of partisan "newspapers" was begun on such machines.

More exceptional was the availability of a regular printing press. Here and there a rayon

committee's staff had disassembled a small press and taken parts of it with them into the woods or had hidden them with local residents. Where the partisans were particularly adventurous and possessed the requisite contacts, equipment was stolen from German-controlled printing shops.

In the city of Minsk, the Communist underground workers (exposed and executed by the Germans early in 1942) used type stolen from the German operated "Proryv" printing presses.

The "Iskra" detachment filched type and some equipment from an abandoned Soviet printing shop in Lida (in northwestern Belorussia). Later it found in the woods type from a Red Army divisional printing press abandoned during one of the encirclements early in the war and hidden by stragglers. In the same manner, the first tipografiya of the Fyo-dorov unit was established with type stolen from the German-held district center.

The primitive nature of the material thus produced, as well as the loyal unanimity of partisan agitprop officers, is mirrored in the fact that the most frequent single texts employed were Stalin's famous wartime speech of 3 July 1941 and, later, his address of 7 November 1941. Both German and Soviet materials confirm that copies were surreptitiously circulated to demonstrate to the unbelieving peasants that "Soviet power" and "Party and Government" were still in

existence and fighting. Some versions were copied by the partisans from issues of Pravda dropped by Soviet planes; others were produced from newspapers obtained before the occupation; still others were copies of copies, with all the errors in spelling and at times in contents that this process entailed.

However devoted the efforts of a few determined men, in 1941 the technical appearance, frequency of issue, distribution, and effectiveness of partisan printed media were negligible.

2. Equipment

As the war continued, the partisans' printing equipment improved. Though handwritten appeals and leaflets reproduced by shapirograph and typewriter continued to appear, regular printed materials increased in number and importance.

There were three major types of presses employed by the partisans. The first was the improvised press, which might consist of parts stolen, found, or dropped from the Soviet side. At times, it required considerable resourcefulness to get such a press into working condition. After hiding one press during a German attack, a partisan unit near Polisto Lake found that all the parts could not be reassembled, and ink had to be applied with a shoe brush for lack of other tools. One of the Leningrad brigades attached a hammer to its press when the crank handle broke off. From 1942 on the situation improved; as in other forms of partisan activity, the decisive help came from the Soviet side. With the increased membership in partisan units, the establishment of radio and air contact with the Red Army command or higher partisan headquarters, and the general formalization of partisan institutions and controls, greater importance was attached to

propaganda work. The inadequacy of equipment was amply apparent and was promptly reported to higher staffs. By mid-1942 Soviet industry had started producing a special portable printing press for partisan use. This so-called "Liliput" press, weighing between sixteen and twenty kilograms, had a supply of type sufficient to set one-sixteenth of the Soviet printer's list (i.e., one small sheet up to 20 by 30 centimeters in size) and a press of equal dimensions; the whole set could be strapped to a partisan's back and carried along.

[Abramov, p. 7. A detailed description is contained in Nachrichten, Nr. 4, 10 September 1943, pp. 5, 11-14.]

In time, thanks to the number of sets flown in by the Soviet Air Force or transported across the lines, the Liliput became the standard model in most units. Another type of press, in existence in the Red Army at the outbreak of war and known by the name of "Boston," also made its

appearance. Much heavier in weight, it was also more sturdy, produced more copies, and printed leaflets and newspapers of larger size (up to 30 by 40 centimeters).

[Andreyev, p. 56. According to Abramov, the 2d Leningrad Brigade started printing its paper, Narodnyi Mstitel [People's Avenger], in February 1942 on a Boston press after a few cases of type had been dropped from the Soviet side. While the Liliput printed about 250-500 copies, the Boston could easily produce 2,500 copies.]

In some cases, larger partisan brigades were apparently supplied with Bostons through the Soviet Air Force, which in general was instrumental in enabling the partisans to engage in larger-scale printing.

[According to the official Soviet version, Stalin in "his immeasurable love for the population on occupied soil, thirsting as it was for reliable news," ordered the production and delivery of printing sets in considerable numbers. (Tsanava, II, 925.)]

In theory, at least, every partisan brigade was to have at least one Liliput press; so was each underground Party raikom (often identical with the press of a brigade). Party obkomy and some of the larger partisan complexes were to have Bostons. By late 1943 most of the regular partisan brigades had at least a Liliput at their disposal. Indeed, the Germans concluded, probably

correctly, that from about August 1943 on, propaganda conducted by partisans gained in importance as compared with printed materials disseminated from the Soviet side of the front.

Likewise, many partisan units and Party underground committees, especially on the rayon level, began systematically to publish their own papers only in the late summer or fall of 1943. Even then, however, many appeared irregularly.

At the same time, the output from the Soviet side, apparently produced for the most part at the Front level, continued to be of primary importance. The newspapers of the Orel obkom,

Partizanskaya Pravda, and of the Smolensk obkom, Rabochii Put, were both technically superior to most partisan papers, contained considerable information on life behind the Soviet lines and on international affairs, and used illustrations and various mats and fonts. The imprint (on the Orel paper, NA 031) suggests strongly that the copies were produced at a Soviet-side printing plant. Even more important in quantity were the leaflets dropped by Soviet planes on occupied soil; the absence of statistical data makes quantitative evaluation impossible.

Special mention should be made of the comparatively strong multiplication and scattering of publishing units.

[The actual spread of partisan printing facilities, as well as the occasional clandestine use of urban printing plants nominally under German control, must not be confused with the device employed by the partisans in listing, as places of publication, locations thoroughly held by the Germans. Thus one partisan leaflet, for instance, appeared with the imprint of a Novozybkov printing shop, while it was actually produced on a portable press in the woods nearby. Other leaflets made use of Slynka and Klimov in similar fashion, just as newspapers produced on the Soviet side of the front and dropped on occupied soil at times carried the names of German-held towns as places of origin.]

The resulting disadvantages of small circulation and inferior quality, often also of poor liaison with Soviet-side propaganda units and difficulty of control, were at least partially offset by three advantages:

1. Proximity to the target, resulting in less waste of printed media through their being lost or remaining unread; at the same time, greater ease of distribution because of familiarity with local conditions and personnel, and a better chance of overcoming German restrictions on movement.

2. A more equitable distribution of the technical burden among various units; also great self-glorification for the editors in being spokesmen for the Soviet authorities.

3. Most important, an adaptation of contents to local conditions. This latter point is repeatedly stressed in German and Soviet accounts. While some of its aspects will be treated below [e.g.

Sect. IV, A, 1, a, and Sect. V, A, B], it deserves stress at this point because it was a recognized reason for the widespread scattering of partisan propaganda centers. "The editors of the

underground papers organized their work," an official Soviet account asserts, not without reason,

"so as to take into account local conditions."

[Tsanava, II, 80.]

The Germans, on the other hand, were constrained to admit that the rigid central direction of their own psychological warfare occasioned a perpetual lag in the utilization of current events and new themes, something the partisans could successfully overcome while still complying with broad Soviet propaganda directives.

[OKH/GenStdH/FHO (lib/Prop), "Prop.-Unterlagen, Truppenmeldungen vom l.-31.12.43, IV 'Propaganda in die Zivilbevoelkerung," n.d., p. 5 (GMDS H 3/474)]

As a result, German atrocities were promptly reported; partisan propaganda gained in effectiveness by giving local names and places, by appealing to specific individuals to help prevent food and cattle deliveries to the Germans, and by eulogizing the accomplishments of individuals known to local residents.

3. Supply Difficulties

The partisans had frequent difficulties in obtaining essential printing supplies. The typical editor during the period before the delivery of Liliputs by the Soviets "would have a bag full of type, sometimes collected letter by letter, and a primitive printing press." According to a Soviet admission, "to issue a paper or leaflet, the editor had to adjust his notes and articles to the number of letters he had on hand, and to write so that there would be enough a's and o's to last through the article."

[Sheverdalkin, p. 8.]

Another editor stated that he had to set one column at a time and then break up the type for the next column. Printing took place, in this instance, in a small hut.

[Andreyev, p. 331.]

In other instances, special mud-huts or bunkers were built to accommodate the press. During German attacks, the printing equipment, if it could not be easily carried along, would be concealed in holes dug in the ground or in the swamps.

Printer's ink was in short supply much of the time. Some quantities were flown in from the Soviet side; others were stolen from German-managed plants. In the winter, ink had to be heated before it could be used. But the greatest problem was the paper shortage. All partisans were ordered to get whatever paper they could and to requisition it along with food, whether it be wrapping paper, notebooks, or other sorts. The partisans would pay huge sums to agents who stole paper from German stocks. The bulk of the newsprint for those units which had regular contact with the Soviet side came by air. "But it was impossible to carry five to six poods [One pood is about thirty-six pounds]when the otryad was on the move," a Soviet analyst comments.

"Thus the paper had to be collected among the population," a difficult and most unsatisfactory undertaking. The paper shortage contributed to the reduction in size, to the frequently far from impressive appearance, and to the poor legibility of the leaflets and newspapers produced by the partisans. It would appear that the transport of newsprint, while occurring systematically, did not have top priority in Soviet air supply to the partisans.

4. Personnel

Various sources indicate that the editors of partisan papers and leaflets could be regular Party members, commissars or deputy commissars, former journalists, and minor officials, but frequently also men who had had no previous experience in psychological warfare, particularly

not in underground printing. There were only a few Civil War veterans with such experience (and perhaps men who had engaged in underground work abroad); on the technical level especially nonprofessional personnel was employed; for instance, a tank officer worked as a printer.

The standard staff of a partisan (or underground Party) printing unit consisted of the following:

(1) Boston type press: 1 editor, 1 proofreader, 2 staff writers, 6 printers (who also wrote articles and features and distributed the paper); (2) Liliput type press: 1 man, who did all printing, setting, and writing, under the direction of a raikom secretary or partisan unit commissar.

[Nachrichten, Nr. 4, September 10, 1943, p. 5. In a unit in the Bryansk forest, the editor of the two-page Partizanskaya Pravda, Korotkov, had two assistants as staff writers, and two girl partisans as typesetters. (Andreyev, p. 330.)]

Often the same personnel was used for other political and propaganda purposes, although a good deal of nonprinted psychological warfare (such as lectures, "agitation" meetings, etc.) was conducted by partisans assigned to these tasks exclusively. The greatest demand on personnel without special skills was to distribute the papers. Here everybody would be enrolled—local women, children, partisans on raids, lecturers, and others.

5. Sources of Information

Partisan leaflets, and particularly newspapers, drew on a variety of sources for their information.

These may be broadly divided into Soviet sources and local sources.

The regular Soviet radio broadcasts were frequently monitored by partisans, and their dispatches were reproduced (particularly those slowly dictated after midnight). It was primarily in this manner that the partisans learned the latest war communiqués and world news. Other overt sources included Soviet newspapers, which, as indicated, were brought into occupied territory in considerable numbers and with striking regularity from mid-1942 on. Finally, partisans also copied the texts and themes from Soviet propaganda material which they received either for distribution or reproduction on occupied soil, or which they happened to find.

In addition, however, there were Soviet agitprop directives of a classified nature. Instructions were occasionally dropped from planes or brought in by individuals flown into partisan-held areas, though during the first year or so of partisan activity there is no evidence of any systematic flow of instructions. Radio messages aimed specifically at the partisans (whether in code or clear cannot be determined) also periodically contained instructions on psychological warfare. Since only one German summary of such propaganda directives by radio is available, it is quoted here to indicate the tenor and scope:

Agitation

Agitation among the population in the occupied areas, if correctly conducted, is extremely valuable. Communist posters, such as the well-known "Let Us Crush the Fascist Monster,"

leave a particularly deep impression in the occupied territory. They give evidence of the strength of Soviet power. Also, the illegal newspapers in Belorussia, Sovetskaya Belarus and Partizanskoye Slovo, are effective. The importance of the printed word in the occupied area should not be underestimated.

One partisan division in Belorussia has made available 23 agitators for propaganda among the population. In spite of the strictest surveillance by the occupiers they have held

indoctrination assemblies and have made speeches in 15 Belorussian communities occupied by the Fascists. The theme was "The Defeat of the Germans Before Moscow in December 1941." The impending change in the course of the war through the establishment of a second front in Europe constitutes an appropriate theme for mass indoctrination (Massenaufklaerung).

Reconstruction of the Party Organization

Each city, each district must have its illegal Party organization and Young Communist League.

Elements Friendly to the Germans

In some areas of Belorussia the partisan leaders have succeeded in winning the confidence of the Germans and in getting their people placed as policemen, mayors, and kolkhoz administrators. Under certain circumstances, those trusted men render good service.

[PzAOK 3, Ic/AO (Abw. I und III), "Awehrnachrichtenblatt Nr. 8; Sendung eines russ. Senders fuer Partisanen," I August 1942 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 25784/43)]

Likewise, the so-called Stalin directive of December 1942 [see Sect. IV, A, and n. 64] falls into the rubric of basic Soviet instructions for partisan propagandists.

The partisans used their own ideas and experiences for psychological warfare. Editors, commissars, and politruks, heads of political sections, secretaries of underground Party and Komsomol units, as well as commanders of partisan otryads contributed themes, slogans, and texts. News items to be exploited in verbal propaganda could be suggested by any band member

The partisans used their own ideas and experiences for psychological warfare. Editors, commissars, and politruks, heads of political sections, secretaries of underground Party and Komsomol units, as well as commanders of partisan otryads contributed themes, slogans, and texts. News items to be exploited in verbal propaganda could be suggested by any band member