THE INTERMEDIATE PARTISAN COMMAND STRUCTURE

As has been indicated, the principal control agencies of the partisan movement for over-all planning of operations, for liaison with the Party, Red Army, and other organs of the Soviet regime, and for general supervision of partisan activties, were the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement and the Front Staffs and territorial staffs directly subordinate to it— in all about ten staffs. The immediate, day-to-day conduct of partisan activities and the control of the lower levels of partisan personnel were concentrated in the hands of the brigades or similar units. It is evident, however, that the small number of high4evel partisan staffs could not effectively direct the operation of perhaps 200 to 300 brigades without using some intermediate command level. In part this intermediate command was provided by the operative groups at the army or division level. Such control agencies were established at only a limited number of Red Army commands, however, and the supervision they exercised over bands in proximity to the front line was confined primarily to military operational questions. In order to coordinate effectively the

activities of the brigades, an intermediate command echelon within the German-occupied regions was essential.

As a matter of fact, such partisan command centers in the occupied territories were formed even before the creation of the Central Staff and its subordinate staffs. Possibly the first major centers of this sort were set up by the Red Army in the late winter of 1941-42. One major region in which the Red Army took direct command of the partisan movement was the

Yelnya-Dorogobuzh district of Smolensk Oblast. This area was the scene of a major Red Army effort to isolate the German troops stalled before Moscow by sending in large units of regular ground and airborne troops. These troops failed to achieve their objectives, however, and as a result were themselves cut off from the main Soviet armies. They were not immediately destroyed by the Germans and for several months maintained a pocket of resistance. In command was Major General Belov, who had been commander of the First Cavalry Corps, and was now put in charge of all units in the pocket. Belov stimulated a number of local partisan groups to develop rapidly into units of considerable size. The resulting partisan forces, which were called "regiments,"

averaged over 1,000 men and were consequently much stronger than most other partisan bands of this early period. While there were considerable variations in the internal organization of the regiments, apparently as a result of the superimposition of military organization upon groups of very diverse origins, they more closely resembled regular military formations than did other partisan bands, even at a much later period. Each regiment had a staff detachment of

considerable size and was divided into a number of battalions ranging from 300 to 800 men each.

These in turn were divided into companies, the companies into platoons, and the platoons into squads. At the regimental and battalion levels, at least, the major officers were the commander, the commissar, and the chief of staff; politruks were assigned to the companies. The regiments and the battalions had supply, reconnaissance, and "OO" sections.

Altogether there were about ten partisan regiments in the Yelnya area by April 1942. Apparently by this time Belov and his staff were finding their task of directly controlling the activities of these regiments, in addition, of course, to commanding the regular Red Army units, to be burdensome. As a result, an intermediate command echelon was instituted, and, in accordance with the general tendency of Army commanders to adopt regular military organization and

nomenclature for the partisan movement, was called a "division." There were two divisions, one controlling five regiments, the other three, while one or more regiments remained directly subject to Red Army corps headquarters. Little is known concerning the actual functioning or internal organization of these divisions. One at least was commanded by a regular army colonel from Belov's staff. Apparently they acted in a manner analogous to that of army divisional headquarters, although certainly exercising less continuous supervision over their regiments.

[For details of the partisan organization in this area, see Chap. VII, Sect. I, B and C]

The Yelnya type of military command structure was destroyed, along with most of the partisans in the area, late in the spring of 1942. It was not altogether unique in the partisan movement, however. Farther south, although also under the direction of the West Front, the Red Army played an equally active role in organizing and reinforcing the partisan groups, which for a time were in direct contact with the Soviet forces through the large Kirov gap. Here, too, "regiments"

were set up, frequently under the command of regular Red Army officers, and similar in size (1,000 to 1,500 men) and internal organization (battalions) to those in the Yelnya area. [See Chap. VIII, Sect. II, A.] It is uncertain, however, whether an intermediate command structure corresponding to the Yelnya "division" was set up, although some German reports for early 1943 state that the brigades in the area were later combined into partisan divisions. In mid-1942, however, when army control was closest, the regiments which formed the basic partisan

organization apparently operated directly under command of a nearby Red Army division. [See Chap. VIII, Sect. II, B.]

More typical was the intermediate command structure which developed in the southern part of the Bryansk forest. This center remained one of the most important intermediate commands, and in a general way it was similar to those operating farther north. Some time during the late winter of 1941-42 a group of partisan officers, headed by D. V. Yemlyutin, a high NKVD official of Orel Oblast, and A. D. Bondarenko, a Party secretary of one of the occupied Orel rayons, formed a headquarters in Smelizh, near the edge of Orel Oblast. These leaders probably had some

authorization from the Soviet regime, although contact with the Soviet side of the front was intermittent until late spring. Within a few months Yemlyutin (who became commander of the new center, while Bondarenko became commissar) was directing 10,000 partisans, divided into about thirty bands, of which perhaps ten were of brigade size. In August, Yemlyutin,

Bondarenko, and the major band commanders were flown to Moscow. After a conference with leading officials of the Party and the partisan movement, Yemlyutin was officially confirmed as director of the partisan center in the forests of southwestern Orel Oblast. His headquarters was designated as the "United Partisan Detachments of the Western Rayons of Orel Oblast," but was usually known as an "operative group."

[Andreyev, p. 316; see also this book, Chap. VIII, Sect. II, A.]

Figure 3.—Operative group in the rear of the enemy. Source: OKH/GenStdH/FHO, Nachrichten ueber den Bandenkrieg Nr. 3, 28 July 1943, Anlage 9 (GMDS, H 3/738), with minor alterations.

Little is known about the internal organization and activities of the Yemlyutin operative group.

[For a German version of the organization of a typical operative group, see Fig. 3.] By 1943 there was a staff of specialists of some size, including in particular a considerable force to service the airfield, which formed the principal base for receiving supplies from the Soviet forces; communications personnel, who maintained regular radio contact with the Soviet

authorities; and generally a partisan force of almost brigade size to provide close-in protection for the headquarters. The operative group, as previously noted, was for a long time under the direction of the Orel Staff of the Partisan Movement and did not come under the direct control of a Front Staff (the Bryansk Front Staff), an arrangement that was customary until early 1943 for partisan forces so close to the front lines. Under ordinary circumstances, the following were apparently the chief duties of Yemlyutin and his staff:

1. Passing on major operational orders to the subordinate bands. In particular these included orders for coordinated attacks on the German railroads, which were of crucial importance in the Bryansk area.

2. Receiving and dispatching to the bands men and supplies, as well as messages and information, which could best be received by the powerful radio station and well-established airfield of the headquarters.

3. Exercising general supervision over the bands, making sure that they were active against the enemy, and guarding against any tendency to thwart the wishes of the regime.

It is not certain whether the operative group was authorized to appoint or dismiss band officers.

In addition to these ordinary duties, the operative group appears to have assumed many more operational command functions in times of crisis when major German offensives were under way against the partisans. The southern Bryansk forest formed in effect a huge armed camp, impenetrable by any ordinary German force, from which the partisan bands sallied forth for raids and to which they could normally retire in complete security. However, when a major action against the forest base was under way, most of the bands retreated to prepared defensive positions within a fairly restricted radius. Under these circumstances, it became necessary and feasible for the Yemlyutin operative group to assume active direction of the entire force.

In many respects the Yemlyutin operative group was similar to other intermediate control centers which, unlike the Yelnya and Kirov groups, were not directly formed by the military commands.

Such nonmilitary partisan centers were active principally in Belorussia, Kalinin Oblast, and Leningrad Oblast. In Belorussia there was an intermediate command known as an "operative center," which roughly corresponded to an oblast (it is to be remembered that the oblasts in Belorussia were much smaller than those in the Ukraine or the RSFSR). These commands evidently operated in a fashion roughly similar to Yemlyutin's, but differed in two important respects. Most of them—especially those in Minsk and Mogilev Oblasts—appear to have worked in very close conjunction with the underground Party committees, with the personnel of the operative center and the committee frequently overlapping.

[Though Yemlyutin and Bondarenko were officials of Orel Oblast, the fact that they were available to direct the southern Bryansk partisans was partly accidental; in central Belorussia the relationship of Party to partisan was evidently part of an over-all plan.]

The role of the Party in directing these operative centers was doubtless enhanced by the fact that they were directed by the Belorussian Staff, a territorial partisan echelon, while the Orel Staff, although in a sense a territorial organization, worked in close conjunction with a Front

command. In addition to its high degree of Party control, the Belorussian intermediate command organization was distinguished by a two-step structure. Between the band and the operative centers were operative groups, which controlled comparatively small areas, one or a few rayons.

The operative groups also worked in close conjunction with the Party organizations, in their case the rayon committees. Apparently the high concentration of partisans in Belorussia (in 1943

probably well over half of all the partisans in the occupied USSR, and far more than half in 1944) and the influence of the Party organization were the key factors in the erection of the two-step system.

The intermediate partisan command structure in Kalinin and Smolensk Oblasts does not seem to have been outstandingly different from that in Belorussia. In Leningrad Oblast, on the other hand, a distinguishing characteristic was the confusing use of the term "brigade" to designate the operative group, while individual bands of ordinary brigade size were called "regiments." There were about ten brigades of this type, and no other intermediate command level on the German side of the lines existed. Since each of the three Soviet Fronts in the Leningrad areas

corresponded in size to an army, the partisan commands at these Fronts were similar to operative groups at other army headquarters. [See subsection D, above.]

As a result, each operative group at the three Fronts controlled only a relatively small number of bands. It is not surprising, therefore, that a one-step intermediate command structure on the German side of the lines was adequate.

Numerous variations and peculiarities in the intermediate command structures could be listed. As in the brigades and other organizational forms of the partisan movement, diversity rather than uniformity was characteristic. Nevertheless, in all the major areas of partisan activity, such an intermediate level of control was developed shortly after the partisan movement became significant. It is apparent, therefore, that such a center filled a real need in the partisan

organization. It served to coordinate the activities of brigades too numerous to be commanded directly by the Front or territorial staff. Especially through its superior technical facilities—

radios and airfields—it directed and supported the brigades in a fashion which could not have been achieved by a headquarters located outside the occupied territory. In view of the rapid development of these centers and the manifest advantages which they possessed, it seems likely that the high command of the partisan movement ordered their establishment in areas where they had not sprung up spontaneously, although there is no direct evidence to support this

supposition.