Reflection-Reflexion-Model

In the previous sections, I introduced two popular generalized dual-processing models: The cognitive-experiential self-model, which draws its evidence from studies reporting the high explanatory power of the rational-experiential inventory and constructive-thinking inventory (see Section 2.1.1), and the system 1 system 2 model of Kahneman and Tversky, which draws its evidence from laboratory studies on decision-making under uncertainty. Another model, provides further evidence from a third methodological perspective: The reflection-reflexion model, based on neurological studies of human judgement and decision-making (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Lieberman, 2003).

Other dual-processing theories like the reflection-reflexion model assume that humans make decisions based on several judgemental processes organized into two systems, but link these different systems to specific areas in the human brain. Lieberman conceived the reflection- reflexion model to target the shortcoming of existing dual-processing theories, which always differ between automatization and control, which he assumes to be a "shopworn concept" (Lieberman, 2003, p.4). He expands the previously discussed models and findings, and con- tributes to existing dual-processing research, because previous models have not considered the neural bases of decision-making (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). In particular, his model explains more deeply when the systems are activated by discussing the consequences of the permanent activation of the X-system. Lieberman underlines these assumptions of neural rep- resentations of the two systems in the human brain:

„We will describe the phenomenological features, cognitive operations, and neural substrates of two systems that we call the X-system (for the X in reflexive) and the C-system (for the C in reflective). These systems are instantiated in different parts of the brain, carry out different kinds of inferential operations, and are associated with different experiences" (Lieberman, 2003, p.4).

Lieberman’s dual-processing model, differentiates between an X-system, which can be com- pared to system 1 processes (automatic/intuitive) of other dual-processing theories, and a C- System that can be compared to the type of system 2 processes (conscious or deliberative). The X-system is a parallel processing system. Processed patterns are matched to patterns from knowledge. These patterns are used as links. This linkage results in a continuous stream of consciousness, or what humans perceive as the "world outside" (Lieberman, 2003). X-system’s components are characterized as faster in processing than the C-system, but slower in adop- tion. Its processing is faster because its structure allows parallel processing. The processed thoughts and knowledge are unconscious, what Lieberman terms "implicit semantic associa- tions". If the X-system has a problem or if a specific situation occurs, an alert is triggered and the C-system gets activated.

The C-system is responsible for deliberative judgement and decision-making. It works serially, uses symbolic logic, and it can react only on input from the X-system. Also Lieberman assumes

that the X-System is phylogenetically older. The C-system is highly adaptive, but slow in processing. This processing style is perceived as an "internal linguistic monologue" (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Due to the costly or resource-consuming processing style, it is easily at its maximum capacity. As a consequence, it is activated only when it is necessary, or from an evolutionary perspective, it is sparingly used to save energy.

Table 4:Overview of the key characteristics of the two systems and their related brain areas, based on the reflection-reflexion model.

X-System C-System

Orbitofrontal cortex Lateral prefrontal cortex Basal ganglia Medial temporal lobe Amygdala Posterior parietal cortex

Lateral temporal cortex Rostral anterior cingulate cortex Dorsal anterior cingulate Medial prefrontal cortex

Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex

In the reflection-reflexion model, distinct brain areas (see Table 4) are linked to the two sys- tems of judgement and decision-making. The brain areas linked to the C-systems are the medial temporal lobe, posterior parietal cortex, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral prefrontal, medial prefrontal, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). In general, these brain areas have been linked to analytical thinking and decision-making in related magnetic resonance imaging studies. For instance, the lateral prefrontal cortex has been associated with reasoning and logic (Noveck, Goel, & Smith, 2004), and with mathemat- ical problem-solving (Prabhakaran, Rypma, & Gabrieli, 2001), and related cognitive processes (Prabhakaran et al., 2001, p.90).

The brain areas related to the X-system are the amygdala, basal ganglia, ventromedial pre- frontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral temporal cortex (Satpute & Lieber- man, 2006). These brain areas are related to emotional and unconscious processing. For in- stance, neuro-science studies have linked the amygdala to reward and emotional cognition (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998). Lieberman and Satpute discuss that these properties of the amygdala could trigger the C-system based on personal traits (based on genetics or expe- riences) due to a reaction of fear (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).

Independent of judgement and decision-making, the X-system streams continuous thoughts based on pattern matching in the lateral temporal cortex based on the information and knowl- edge in the C-system. In the reflection-reflexion model both systems are responsible for in- formation processing, but compared to other dual-processing models, it is assumed that they do not directly interact (see Figure 9). Instead the X-system can activate the C-system via an alert stimulus; the C-system then tries to make a decision analytically or to solve the problems

of the X-system. The C-system tries to solve this conflict, which can be influenced by cogni- tive load and motivation (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). In doing so the C-system provides new information to the X-system to solve the conflict.

Figure 9: The two systems with their related brain areas based on Satpute and Lieberman (2006).

Because the two systems are in different brain areas, they can be activated at the same time. In particular, their working in parallel might cause processing conflicts that must be solved by finding a compromise between the different stimuli by processing them deliberatively. Lieber- man and Satpute have argued that the C-system is activated only if the X-system alerts it (2006). However, the C-system can set activations in the knowledge base of the X-system. This kind of marker becomes activated under specific conditions allowing the C-system to control the X-system indirectly, even when it is not active.

As illustrated in Figure 9, the reflection-reflexion model follows the same structures as previous dual-processing theories. However, it is an outstanding characteristic of this model that it explicitly links the cognitive with the neural. The identification of specific brain areas linked to biased or rational decision-making could help to get a better understanding of suboptimal decision-making. As a consequence, this could help to identify biases at the moment they occur. The discussed areas are mainly linked based on theory, and an empirical proof for some of the relationships is still pending. However, Liberman and Satpute argue that "it is unlikely that this model has seen the end of its evolution. It should be taken as a working model rather than a finished product" (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006, p.88).

Table 5: Overview of the key characteristics of the reflection-reflexion model. Component Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory

Decision-making Decisions made by X-system based on information from the C- system, which is activated by alert triggers

System 1 Parallel-processing, fast operating, slow learning, cognition based on pattern matching, susceptible to associative biases System 2 Serial processing, slow operating, limited by cognitive abilities,

fast learning, susceptible to distraction

Table 5 – Continued from previous page

Measures Neural correlates (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006), see Table 4