Relationship Between Inspectors and Representatives

The MLC inspection regime makes some general provisions for linking representation with inspections where inspection reports are to be sent to the master and a copy shall be placed on the ship’s notice board for the attention of seafarers or be sent to their representatives upon request (MLC, Standard A5.1.4. para 12: 81). This provision was previously in Convention 178. With the introduction of the DMLC and the Maritime Labour Certificate, provisions were also included in the MLC for copies of these to be placed on the ship’s notice board for the attention of seafarers, and made available to inspectors, seafarers’ representatives and other relevant organizations (MLC, Standard A5.1.3. para 12: 78). Additionally, inspections and verifications carried out subsequent to issuing the Maritime Labour Certificate and any significant deficiencies found shall be recorded and copies made available to seafarers, flag State inspectors and other relevant persons/organizations, including shipowners’ and seafarers’ representatives (MLC, Standard A5.1.3. para 11: 78).

The UK also has requirements for a relationship between inspectors and seafarers or their representatives. Although the COSWP does not have this provision (perhaps as it is mainly targeted at seafarers), Merchant Shipping Notice (MSN) 1848 (2017: 4)54 _{indicates that inspectors should send reports of their} inspections to the ship’s master and a copy is to be posted on the notice board for seafarers’ information, and a copy may also be sent to the seafarers’ organization. However, the reciprocal provisions are not in place for seafarers or their representatives to interact with inspectors as in some land-based provisions, where representatives may accompany inspectors during inspections or where representatives have the right to contact the inspectorate (Hutter, 1993). Such

54 _{MSNs are official notices sent out by the UK to advise the shipping industry as to how the UK}

contact with external authorities has been individualized through the MLC complaints mechanism.

Details of the role of representatives are found in the non-mandatory guidelines and ILO Codes. These are limited provisions for representatives’ roles, particularly when compared to some land-based provisions (Chapter 5). Much of the duties that would be assigned to representatives in land-based enterprises, have mostly been assigned to the safety officer and some to a lesser extent to the OHS committee in the MLC framework. In the UK’s COSWP, these duties are assigned mostly to the safety officer (Section 7.2.1).

In practice, the inspectors interviewed reported that the written report is sent to the master of the ship, via the owner, and a copy is to be posted in the crew area, however there is no way to verify that this is done. In terms of engaging with representatives, there is no systematic practice. Furthermore, as the inspectors repeatedly pointed out, on smaller vessels, this is more difficult as each member of the crew is considered to be a representative, so the system does not work well. Without any relationship with a crew representative, inspectors explained that during inspections, members of the crew are questioned when they are encountered. However, this is challenging as they find problems with seafarers being willing to speak:

We tend to find that very few seafarers will speak out directly to us. It will normally come through another route. In 100% of cases it is always about wages and repatriation not health and safety. Naturally if it is UK seafarers there is a more open conversation as they know our organisation is honest and fair. To foreign seafarers we may be considered Police-like and best not say anything… In Eastern Europe you don’t say anything against the State. So you go on board the ship and say “what’s the food like on here?” “Oh it’s great, great.” When as a matter of fact it’s rubbish. Unfortunately the industry is small and no one wants to stand out of line for fear of recrimination. So as inspectors we need to be careful about how we approach these matters to avoid targeting individuals. (KI-10 – senior inspector).

The work environment, particularly on small ships, does not allow for seafarers to be privately approached. This experience refers to both foreign ships in UK waters and on UK-registered ships. Issues of seafarers’ precariousness that inhibit “speaking” out become relevant in efforts at enforcing standards. Others have found that some inspectors are careful in how they gather information from seafarers so that they are not compromised, while seafarers who wish to bring situations to the attention of inspectors are also wary (eg. Bloor et. al. 2005). In this study, the inspectors’ reports corroborate each other on some seafarers’ reluctance to engage with State officials. As one explained, “I could just leave a ship and they say everything is great and then the welfare centre phones me up to say something is wrong” (KI-13). He continued:

Well, they’re afraid of us you know. I suppose they just see us as police you know, and I suppose they’re quite afraid of being victimized. No matter how they tell us everything is ok…they’re just afraid of stepping out you know so we will hear about it in a reverse way…(KI-13).

The inspectors noted that there was more openness with British nationals on UK ships, and explained that culture may account for differences in seafarers’ willingness to speak:

…culture yes is an issue. I think for example, if we were on a ferry, you know a local ferry, and if it was a total UK crew, we guarantee we would have quite a number of people who would be quite engaging with us about safety and issues, because there is a culture of openness on board, you know the UK society, that’s maybe not there in other societies…I suppose there is a clashing of cultures…not clashing, I think there is some subservience between cultures on multinational crew ships (KI-13). Nevertheless, there are instances where British nationals are also reluctant to speak, as seen from this account by the union official:

So there is a mix, some seafarers you will find out are not afraid to speak their minds, but a lot of them are cautious just in terms of being noticed as a trouble maker. Particularly among our young members we have young

cadets who would be afraid as their career is starting they would be afraid to cause any trouble and junior officers climbing their way up, the more senior you are the more likely you are to raise an issue directly with the company. (KI-15).

This finding is not unlike discussions in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) where those lower in rank are less likely to get involved, although they may be more vulnerable to health and safety risks due to their social positions on board (Bhattacharya, 2012a; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006). Workers’ social, material and personal resources are important determinants of their level of vulnerability to work stressors and therefore their health (Scott-Marshall, 2010: 316-319). The traditional hierarchical structure is an important factor influencing work relations on board ships and seafarers’ willingness to lodge a complaint. The senior inspector noted:

…there is still the perception that the master is God and we’ve had issues with complaints, a lot of seafarers don’t complain even though there are provisions within the MLC for complaints, they are frightened to complain because the repercussions that may occur, and there is evidence to suggest that’s happening. (KI-10).

This is a factor recognized in the industry and one example was given of how a particular UK company sought to address the issue to mitigate the master’s influence on the crew’s willingness to participate in OHS meetings:

One company we go with believe the captain shouldn’t be the chairman of the safety committee because the captain is the leader, so if the leader sat in the room will anybody challenge the leader? So a lot of the captains…the captain sometimes is almost like a dictator on board, so if the captain is there nobody is going to speak up because the captain enforces the policy so when the captain is present…there is no free speech. (KI-13).

Under the UK system, this was a deviation from the policy where the captain is to chair the OHS committee meetings. This deviation is considered a non-conformity in the language of inspection. It is particularly associated with

audit systems to indicate where practices deviate from procedures. In this example, the shipowners’ deviation from the UK’s policy for constituting the safety committee was recorded as a non-conformity, but as was explained, an exemption was later granted for the company to modify the requirements in this way. This example might have been an opportunity for the policy makers to revisit the regulations in recognition that the theory and practice may not align. At this level, the research finds more perpetuation of customary practices rather than active engagement for continuous improvement with how representation might be crafted to benefit the shipboard work environment.