Uncontroversial

To further understand the rationale for representation in the MLC the architects were asked about its apparent neglect during the negotiations. As has been revealed to this point, representation was not considered critical, but the notion that it was uncontroversial is noteworthy:

To tell you frankly, it was not considered to be a very, very critical area of the convention, not because it’s not important, in the spirit of the ILO this is essential to improving conditions of work, on a day to day basis on board ship, if you are to improve conditions of work, it is a question of the crew finding out what’s wrong to improve the situation, but It was not considered a critical area because agreement on those things was not difficult, it was not controversial. Not controversial because it is already an acquired system in the ILO that there must be worker representation. (KI-8- ILO interviewee).

A seafarers’ group member also reported that the provision was unanimously accepted: “Everyone accepted the provision…” (KI-7). The main arguments emerging was that it was not controversial and given the limited time it was not discussed. It was explained that more controversial issues, such as social security, took time. As put by a shipowners’ group member (KI-4), since “…nobody questioned the concept of having trade union representatives, it was a given,” there was no need to discuss this matter. This is surprising given that research evidence elsewhere found representation to be political and controversial (Chapter 2). The definition and issues of the rights involved, and the existence of direct and collective representation simultaneously, and the role of representatives and the extent of their powers, are some of the complexities of representation, which seem to have eluded the architects’ awareness.

Another finding supporting the analysis that representation is controversial is the confidence placed in the ISM system by the shipowners’ group. The ISM approach to participation is direct, where workers individually represent their interest, rather than through representation. Yet, as one participant from the shipowners’ group sees it, provisions were already in place and so there was

no need for a discussion on representation in the MLC. For this participant, the MLC was a step backward and the “good shipowners” were already operating at higher standards and therefore the “situation” (meaning the ISM arrangements) was adequate:

As far as I’m concerned there was no need. I don’t think there’s a problem with that, and therefore there was not much to be gained from a discussion. The situation we’ve got at present was deemed adequate. There was no need for improvement in this respect. (KI-9).

Yet, there was a difference with the seafarers’ group that thought the ISM was inadequate. A respondent from that group pointed out: “The ISM does not institutionalize seafarers’ representation but we [the ITF] have” (KI-7). During the development of the MLC, conflicts arose in discussing the ISM and its suitability for ensuring workers’ rights are upheld (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2.). Participation as understood by the shipowners’ group, is having safety committees and consultation of seafarers as per the ISM system, that is, direct participation rather than representation.

Whether the instrument [the ISM] is being used, whether there is a committee on board is another issue, but there are provisions already in place, which allow… which actually insist on shipboard management to consult seafarers, for seafarers to have a voice, whether it works or not is another issue. But provisions are already in place (KI-9).

Consultation in situations of direct participation has emerged at several stages throughout this study with the conclusion that typically it does not work. In theory, consultation was introduced to ensure non-unionized workers had a “say” in health and safety. In practice, a unitary understanding of consultation exists where managerial top-down approaches are deemed to be consultative (Chapter 2). Others have commented on the neglect in the ISM system to include workers. Bhattacharya (2009) for example, argued that allowing seafarers to participate under the ISM system is more of a presumption based on good management practices than an institutionalized practice for including seafarers.

Where OHS committees exist, the literature shows that social conditions on board inhibit participation in committee meetings (Bhattacharya, 2012a; Bailey, 2006). Committee meetings can be dominated by the captain leaving no opportunity for seafarers to participate (Bhattacharya, 2009). Further, the ISM does not include seafarers’ participation (or representation) among its functional requirements. Seafarers’ representatives may have been included as part of risk assessment, but the ISM does not specifically provide for seafarers’ participation or representation.

The seafarers’ group in contrast, frames representation within a more pluralist understanding of industrial relations at sea and would rather have union involvement on ships. However, it appears to be a challenge to gain shipowners’ commitment to representation on board. A seafarers’ group member explained:

It is the ITF’s view that safety reps should be preferably elected and be union reps; if not the union should be consulted. The safety reps should have the same protection as union reps and should be allowed to contact the unions concerned without fear of prosecution. (KI-1).

These findings underscore the argument that representation is controversial, particularly as a shipowners’ group member explained that they would not have accepted any union-type representation. This explanation is more consistent with the expected behaviours of shipowners when the wider context of employers’ attitudes to representation on OHSM is considered. The respondent reported:

…There might be a misunderstanding over the term "seafarers’ representatives". Although not often expressed publicly, shipowners are very determined to avoid a situation arising on board where a crew member might appear before the Master and claim to represent the crew before making a demand i.e. a shop steward or union convenor. They will in the main accept a shore-based union official making demands on behalf of their employees - provided the employees are members of that union - but they will resist a union-type structure emerging among the crew of a ship. Shipboard Safety Representatives are not generally regarded by

employers as representatives of the crew in a union sense so their role is considered to be a practical rather than a political device. (KI-2- shipowners’ group).

The documentary evidence supports this testimony in not having any record of representation being discussed, showing instead the acceptance of the provisions without objections. This study revealed that while representation might have been unanimously accepted, there are underlying issues such as a distinction between the shipowners’ and seafarers’ groups as to the meaning of representation. These differences might have benefitted from a discussion and perhaps resulted in a more suitable model.

Another explanation for the scant attention paid to representation during the negotiations is that the provisions do not place too much obligation on shipowners:

I am sure there was not much discussion because it was not controversial, the contents are pretty straightforward it doesn’t bring a lot of obligation on shipowners as that’s is why it was easily accepted. (KI-8- ILO interviewee).

On the contrary, representation has a number of statutory obligations for employers, particularly in the context of facilitating the operation of the practice (Walters and Nichols, 2007). The employer should provide resources for representatives to fulfil their roles, provide training, they have obligations to consult, give information and to listen to representatives (Chapter 2). These details are however in the guidelines and might rightly be interpreted as not placing much obligation on shipowners. Of greater concern is that this response gives cause to reflect on the intended purpose of representation in the MLC.

Representation as the architects reported, turned out to be ambiguous and is in need of clarification within the MLC framework. The findings clearly illustrate that the architects do not share a common understanding of representation and that it is controversial, contrary to their testimonies. As the provisions were not

discussed, these contradictions did not arise in the negotiations, however they are more likely to be apparent at the shipboard level (Chapter 8).