· The ongoing review of the continuing appropriateness of the models in use shall be conducted within the Pillar 2 framework The framework for supervisory cooperation should follow the steps outlined above.
3. Supervisor’s assessment of the application concerning the minimum requirements of the CRD – Credit Risk
3.1. Permanent Partial use and rollout
3.3.1. Assignment to exposure classes
3.3.1.3. Securitisation exposure class
3.3.1.3.1. Definition of securitisation exposure class
190. Article 86(1)(f) of the CRD identifies securitisation positions as one of the exposure classes of the IRB approach. The provisions for calculating risk weighted exposure amounts for the securitisation positions exposure class are set out in Articles 94 to 101 of the CRD and Annex IX, Part 4, Paragraphs 1 to 5 (general provisions) and 36 to 74 (IRB approach) of the CRD. The IRB approach for securitisation positions provides for a Ratings Based Approach and a Supervisory Formula Method (Kirb), the Internal Assessment Approach (IAA) and the fallback approach for eligible liquidity facilities, for which neither the Ratings based approach, nor the IAA nor the Supervisory Formula Method are appropriate to determine a risk weight.
191. A 'securitisation position' is defined in Article 4(40) of the CRD as an exposure to a securitisation, which Article 4(36) defines as a transaction or scheme whereby the credit risk associated with an exposure or pool of exposures is tranched, having the following characteristics: (a) payments in the transaction or scheme depend on the performance of the exposure or pool of exposures; (b) the subordination of tranches determines the distribution of losses during the ongoing life of the transaction or scheme.
192. Thus the securitisation exposure class is characterised by three key elements:
a) 'Tranching' of credit risk. Tranching is central to the nature of a securitisation. In order to fall within the scope of the securitisation framework, the risk transfer should occur through a structure in which the underlying credit risk of the exposures should be sliced and repackaged into at least two tranches at the inception of the transaction reflecting different degrees of credit risk. Any firstloss positions have to be counted as tranches, regardless of whether they are carried on the books as assets. For example, residual payment claims resulting from a refundable purchase discount that may or
may not be accounted for initially as 'loss on sale' have to be counted as tranches. Using the terminology of the Basel II framework, a securitisation is a structure in which the cash flow from an underlying pool of credit risk exposures is used to service at least two different stratified risk positions or tranches reflecting different degrees of credit risk.
b) Payments to the investors depend on the performance of the underlying credit risk exposures ('credit link' or 'limited recourse'). This element differentiates securitisations from structures in which the payments are derived from an unconditional obligation of the originating entity, where the 'underlying' exposures serve only to collateralise the borrower’s unconditional payment obligation rather than as a means of determining the extent of the obligation.
c) Subordination determines the distribution of losses over the entire lifetime of the transaction. Subordination differentiates securitisation from structures funded with ordinary senior/subordinated debt instruments, for which the priority of rights is set only in the liquidation process. (I.e., senior and subordinated debt both default at the same time, and only the liquidation proceeds are distributed unevenly, while with securitisations, the default of individual tranches might occur at different points in time over the lifetime of the transaction.)
193. Due to the complex nature of securitisations, the preceding criteria may not resolve all boundary issues. In general, classification as a securitisation should be linked to the economic substance of the transaction rather than to its legal form. If uncertainty remains as to whether or not a transaction is to be considered a securitisation, institutions should consult their national supervisors. In the current state of the securitisation market, a few boundary cases have been identified by institutions, some of which are elaborated upon in more detail in Annex III of these guidelines.
3.3.1.3.2. 'Significant risk transfer'
194. Securitisation positions can be exposures that an institution holds as an investor, a sponsor or exposures that it holds as an originator. In the latter case the rules for calculating the riskweighted exposure amounts are described in Article 95 of the CRD. According to Article 95(1) of the CRD, where significant credit risk associated with securitised exposures has been transferred from the originator credit institution in accordance with the terms of Annex IX, Part 2, that credit institution may:
(a) in the case of a traditional securitisation, exclude from its calculation of riskweighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, the exposures which it has securitised;
(b) in the case of a synthetic securitisation, calculate riskweighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, in
respect of the securitised exposures in accordance with Annex IX, part 2.
195. According to Article 95(2) of the CRD, where significant credit risk has been transferred from the originator institution, that institution shall calculate the riskweighted exposure amounts prescribed in Annex IX for the positions that it may hold in the securitisation. Where the originator credit institution fails to transfer significant credit risk in accordance with Article 95(1), it need not calculate riskweighted exposure amounts for any positions it may have in the securitisation in question, but the originator will have to calculate riskweighted exposure amounts for the securitised assets according to the rules for the respective exposure class.
196. The requirement for significance of risk transfer has to be clearly separated from the requirement for effective risk transfer. The latter refers primarily to the legal validity and enforceability of the contractual arrangements of the transaction and to the absence of contractual arrangements undermining the risk transfer, and differentiates between 'traditional' and 'synthetic' securitisations. The requirement for significant risk transfer applies to both kinds of securitisation transactions (although it may have to take into account aspects specific to one kind of securitisation transaction, such as the volume of reserve account to be built up from excess spread, trapped at SPV level, and carried as an asset by the originating institution in traditional securitisation transactions).
197. Annex IX, Part 2 of the CRD provides the qualitative criteria that have to be fulfilled by a securitisation transaction. However, even if a transaction can meet the securitisation definition established in the CRD, it may not be granted the securitisation treatment in Article 95(1) of the CRD if the originator institution has not transferred a significant amount of risk to third parties. Assessing the significance of this transfer could involve other criteria than the ones refered to in Annex IX, Part 2. 198. Accounting derecognition of the securitised credit risk exposures is neither a prerequisite for nor evidence of the effectiveness or significance of credit risk transfer for regulatory purposes. Quantitative evaluation remains necessary.
199. Supervisors will verify that a significant portion of the credit risk of the pool has been transferred to at least one independent third party at inception and on an ongoing basis. It is difficult at this stage to provide quantitative thresholds for the amount or percentage of credit risk retained, because of the highly specific nature of these transactions. Most supervisors will therefore use a casebycase approach.
However, a quantitative threshold could be based on the percentage of losses (EL plus UL) retained by the originator in the form of a firstloss tranche (or equivalent). Since the originator typically retains (at least economically) the expected losses that are estimated to occur over the expected lifetime of the transaction, supervisors would expect at least a significant transfer of the unexpected loss. Some supervisors could pay special attention to the transfer of mezzanine tranches (defined, for example, by external ratings) with significant probabilities of loss, while the retention of supersenior tranches with extremely
low probabilities of default would not in itself jeopardise compliance with the significant risk transfer requirement.
The criteria for expected and unexpected loss transfer could be summarised by the regulatory requirements for these tranches (i.e. Kirb), or – for institutions applying internal economic capital models – on the requirement that those tranches, accounting for most of the institution's internal (economic) capital requirement for the overall structure (for more sophisticated institutions), need to be transferred. For less sophisticated institutions that do not use economic capital models, significant risk transfer could be measured by the portion of RiskWeighted Exposure Amounts (or any other suitable measurement) represented by retained mezzanine tranches in relation to all mezzanine tranches (this portion should be small).
200. Even if a securitisation structure is not recognised as a securitisation for the originator (for example, because the risk transfer is not significant), the transferred pieces will be treated as securitisation on the investor’s side.
3.3.1.4. Equity exposure class