2.4. WELLBEING 92
2.4.3. Subjective Wellbeing 96
The objective social indicators approach to the determination of well‐being, does not necessarily reflect people’s experience of well‐being or their perception of the quality of their life (Diener & Suh, 1997). Subjective well‐being examines the ways in which people assess their sense of personal wellbeing and how they evaluate their lives (Diener, Suh, & Oishi, 1997, p. 210). The construct incorporates life satisfaction, mental state, mood and affect. Subjective well‐being encompasses a broad category of phenomena (Diener, Eunkook, Suh, & Smith, 1999) and includes emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction. As Diener and Suh (1997) note, the underlying assumption of subjective wellbeing research is that wellbeing can be defined by people’s conscious experience. Subjective wellbeing comprises three interrelated components: life satisfaction, the cognitive sense of satisfaction with life and pleasant affect and unpleasant effect, pleasant and unpleasant moods and emotions (Arthaud‐Day, Rode, Mooney, & Near, 2005; E. Diener & E. Suh, 1997). Ryan and Deci (2001), argue that there are two strands of subjective wellbeing research: a ‘hedonic’ strand encompassing the work of Kahneman, Diener, Cummins et al
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focusing on happiness and wellbeing and a ‘eudemonic’ strand focusing on the realisation of a person’s ‘true potential’. This difference does not appear to be generally accepted in the literature and has not been examined.
The principal theories of subjective wellbeing are set‐point theories which argue individuals have a consistent level of wellbeing, usually positive, which is only defeated by sustained extraordinary circumstances (Cummins, 2003; Cummins, Gullone, & Lau, 2002; Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; E. Diener & E. Suh, 1997). Adaptation or habituation is central to these theories (Triandis, 2000). Brickman, for example, found evidence to suggest people who receive a windfall (for example a lottery win) were not significantly happier than a control group, whilst people with spinal cord injuries were not as unhappy as might be expected, suggesting a measure of adaptation in both instances (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff‐Bulman, 1978). There is also evidence that the ongoing ability to adapt to continuing conditions is an important factor in subjective well‐being (Loewenstein & Frederick, 1999).
Early research into subjective well‐being revealed external factors (for example age, gender, income, education), have at best only a moderate influence on self‐reported happiness. Personality appears to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of subjective well‐being (Diener & Lucas, 1999; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Extraversion appears to influence positive affect (Costa & McCrae, 1980) as does optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Research also suggests personality may interact with situations and the environment to influence subjective well‐being. Shields, Wheatley‐Price and Wooden (2009), analysing the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel data, found a small but significant influence (1.5‐2.0%) on individual life satisfaction, whereas individual characteristics explained over 15% of the variance.
Diener, Suh, Lucus and Smith (1999), in a survey of the literature noted the most common method of assessing subjective wellbeing is the single‐occasion self‐report scale. There are a range of scales seeking to measure subjective well‐being. Cummins has identified over 100 instruments which attempt to measure quality of life in some form (Cummins, 1996, 1998). Several major scales are discussed.
Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffen (1985) and Pavot, Diener, Colvin and Sandvik (1991) developed an early five item scale which focused on the cognitive element life satisfaction and
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adopted a global top‐down approach grounded in Schwarz’s universal values model (Schwartz, 1994). The scale does not measure domain components of satisfaction. Diener and colleagues (Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener et al., 1995; E. Diener & E. Suh, 1997; Diener et al., 1999) subsequently developed the Quality of Life Index to measure a range of universal social variables which can indicate subjective wellbeing. The Index encompasses 45 values clustered to measure four categories of phenomena: pleasant affect (for example joy, elation, and happiness), unpleasant affect (for example guilt and shame, sadness, anxiety, and stress), and Life satisfaction (for example satisfaction with current life, desire to change life) and domain satisfactions (for example work, family and health). Estes (1997) has also constructed a broad based ‘social progress’ index.
The alternative approach is to develop a ‘bottom up’ set of domains or facets of life satisfaction (Campbell, 1976; Wills, 2009). The World Health Organisation has undertaken significant work to develop a domain based quality of life scale capable of being deployed in a broad range of health related contexts (World Health Organization, 1997, 1998). Rutter, Camfield and Donaldson (2007), in a discussion of the relationship between capability and quality of life, adopt a domain based approach, examining inter alia social relationships, religious and spiritual beliefs, political participation and income and propose a curvilinear (diminishing utility) relationship between increasing inputs (goods or commodities required for domain quality) and overall quality of life. The World Health Organization defines Quality of Life as an ‘individual’s perception of their position in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns. It is a broad concept affected by a person's physical health, psychological state, level of independence, social relationships, personal beliefs and their relationship to salient features of their environment (World Health Organization, 1997). The WHOQOL‐100 scale, which is summarised in Table 15, comprises 100 items (a brief version of the scale (WHOQOL‐BREF) measures only the domains). The WHOQOL scale is broadly applicable in health related contexts and has been widely adopted:
Table 15: WHOQOL Domains and Items
Domain Item
Physical health Energy and fatigue
Pain and discomfort
Sleep and rest
Psychological Bodily image and appearance
Negative feelings
Positive feelings
Self‐esteem
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Level of Independence Mobility
Activities of daily living
Dependence on medicinal substances and medical aids
Work Capacity
Social relationships Personal relationships
Social support
Sexual activity
Environment Financial resources
Freedom, physical safety and security
Health and social care: accessibility and quality
Home environment
Opportunities for acquiring new information and skills
Participation in and opportunities for recreation/leisure
Physical environment (pollution/noise/ traffic/climate)
Transport
Spirituality/Religion/Personal
beliefs
Religion /Spirituality/Personal beliefs (Source: World Health Organization (1997)
Kreitler and Kreitler (2006) have endeavoured to broaden the WHOQOL approach and have developed a multi‐dimensional quality of life scale. Niebor, Lindenberg, Boomsma and Bruggen (2005), similarly, have developed a socially focused subjective wellbeing scale.
Cummins and colleagues (Cummins, 2003; International Wellbeing Group, 2006), have developed the Personal Well‐being Index (PWI) to measure personal well‐being across eight life domains: standard of living, health, achievement in life, relationships, safety, community connectedness, future security and spirituality. The scale has been validated in a broad range of cross‐cultural contexts and has been successfully translated into several languages (Gullone & Cummins, 2002; Lau, Cummins, & McPherson, 2005). The PWI uses an 11 point (0‐10) end defined scale. Cummins and Gullone (2000) have argued an 11 point scale is more sensitive to change than a 5 point scale. In the context of instruments requiring translation, Cummins and Gullone argue the labeling used on each choice point of a Likert scale introduces error variance due to the broad range of relationships people make between numeric values and labels. The International Wellbeing group which uses the scale has representation in 51 countries and spans a wide range of cultural and economic contexts. The (translated) scale has been successfully deployed in a range of environments, for example: Algeria (Tiliouine, Cummins, & Davern, 2006), the Tibetan Plateau (Webb, 2009), Hong Kong (Lau et al., 2005), Australia (Cummins, Eckersley, Pallant, Van Vugt, & Misajon, 2003; Cummins, Woerner, & Chester, 2009) and Chinese Canadians and British Canadians (Spiers & Walker, 2009). Importantly, the scale has been found to be valid in both developed and developing country contexts (Wills, 2009).
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The reliance on cross‐section design has limited tests of causality. However, Diener, Suh and Oishi (1997), in a review of the subjective wellbeing literature, note that self‐reported subjective wellbeing scales tend to correlate with each other, and converge with subjective wellbeing reported by other methods. Measures of subjective wellbeing also show moderate to high temporal reliability. Schwarz and Stack (1999), note that subjective wellbeing values can change depending on the scale used, the order of items, the time‐frame of the questions and current mood at the time of measurement. Conversely, Eid and Diener (2004) have found that in normal testing situations the stable component of life satisfaction overshadowed mood. Recent research by Headley (2010), using the German Socio‐Economic Panel Survey and comparing definitions of set‐point, found that, over twenty a year period, between 14% and 30% of panel members recorded large and apparently permanent changes in their set‐points. As Headley points out, these changes have occurred in peace‐time during a period in which there was no serious economic downturn. Recent publications by Easterlin (2005; 2006) support Headley’s argument. Ruta, Camfield and Donaldson (2007), propose a set of destabilizing variables which exert a negative effect of the homeostatic mechanism: loss of human relationships, chronic pain and depressive illness. Headly concludes set‐point theory gives a satisfactory account of why most people’s level of subjective wellbeing does not change, but it does not adequately account for why the level of subjective wellbeing for a minority of people does record large positive or negative shifts. Vitterso, Biswas‐Diener and Diener (2005), using a Rasch model, examined apparent response similarity between two cross‐cultural populations based on mean difference and found evidence of significant within sample differences. The authors conclude care must be exercised when undertaking cross cultural comparisons.