This project has multiple implications for policy decisions regarding when and how to negotiate with factionalized oppositions. While these implications will require more research to develop thoroughly, it is possible to discuss a few of them on a tentative basis.
First, the model suggests that, rather than hurting states chances for reconciliation of civil conflicts, there may be times when states can benefit from the divisions within insurgencies. Specifically, when factions are somewhat divided in their goals and preferences, this lowers each faction’s utility for continuing conflict. In such cases, the government may be able to dissuade a faction from continuing to fight by making it an offer of concessions which it will prefer to the utility of fighting (given that divergence in preferences among the opposition factions has made fighting less attractive than if the factions were perfectly aligned in their preferences). Once the government has made a deal with one opposition faction, the other faction no longer has the option of continuing the status quo (conflict between the state and both factions). If the faction excluded from negotiations is aware that the government will retract the concessions if it observes continuing violence, then the excluded faction may acquiesce to the peace agreement rather than continue to fight on its own, even if its preferences are not perfectly aligned with those of the faction that has received the concessions. This is because, in such cases, if the excluded faction acquiesces to the deal it will receive some value for the concessions - even though that value will not be as high as the value of the concessions to the included faction. On the other hand, if the excluded faction continues fighting, it will bare the costs of conflict, will lose any utility for
the concessions, and will be less likely to win anything for itself since the faction that accepted the offer will be disarmed.
Second, this project suggests that, where factions of an insurgency have very different preferences, it may be difficult to reach a broader peaceful resolution of the conflict without mechanisms to ensure that the interests of each faction is protected once the factions have disarmed. In this way, it may be that barriers to intra-group conflict resolution mirror those to conflicts between states and insurgents. Walter (2002) found that commitment problems in civil conflicts meant that these conflicts could not often be resolved without the presence of third-party intervenors - it may be that the same is true for conflicts between opposition factions. If so, then this may be a more difficult problem to solve within factions than it is between an armed opposition and a state. Where intervenors are required to protect the interests of factions from each other, the state will not be able to act as a credible guarantor of any agreement as the factions will not trust the state. However, the presence of an outside intervenor will require the agreement of the target state to avoid violations of sovereignty.
Third, as Hypothesis 3 indicates, states that hope to achieve peace at the lowest cost are advised to negotiate with the more powerful faction. While it might seem that the loyalty of weaker factions could be bought at a lower price, weaker factions will be less effective at constraining violence from their stronger rivals. Furthermore, the rivals will not acquiesce to peace unless they expect to gain as much from the terms of the peace as they could expect to gain from continuing to fight. This means that, unless the factions have perfectly similar policy preferences, the government would need to make greater concessions to the weaker faction in order for these concessions to persuade the more powerful faction to acquiesce. Therefore, states that seek an end to civil conflict with all opposition factions should negotiate with the strongest faction.
Fourth, Hypotheses 1 and 2 indicate that states can predict when they are most likely to be able to get signed agreements with an insurgent faction and when such agreements should be most likely to produce a broader peace. In the model, the degree of policy similarity between factions is exogenous and is not in any way influenced by the state. However, even in the model, it is assumed that the policy similarity of the factions is measured relative to the factions’ similarity to the state, which is normalized to zero. This in turn suggests that states do have some ability to influence the similarity between factions. Though it is outside the context of the model, it may be that states can manipulate factional divisions through the issues that they chose to make salient through their own policies, through the nature of any concessions they may make, or through rhetoric. By increasing the salience of the issues that divide the factions or by using state resources to advantage one faction and its agenda to the detriment of another, states may be able to increase (or decrease) the divisions between factions. This possible implication is sufficiently far outside the scope of the present project that it will demand further research before it can be asserted with any real confidence. However, it is not immediately clear how one would approach operationalizing such things as increased salience of a given issue or state attempts at increasing the salience of an issue.
Finally, this project suggests that it is time for both policy makers and researchers to begin looking beyond the overly simplistic terminology of extremist and moderate terrorists or insurgents. If it is true that violence aimed at spoiling peace talks and agreements is the result of a commitment problem - of a difference in the substance of factional preferences rather than the intensity with which those preferences are held, the costs of conflict, or any preference for violence - then attributing such violence to immutable characteristics of the factions that use the violence creates an incorrect impression that those factions which have used violence to disrupt negotiations cannot be negotiated with successfully. This risks cutting off possible routes to a peaceful
resolution of conflict when the costliness of civil conflict necessitates the consideration of all available routes to resolution.