The New Left Party: The Framework Programme

As the debates and disputes continued among the memberships of the respective parties, strong public interest was focused on the new Left alliance. In the Bundestag election the Left gained an extremely respectable 8.7% of the second vote; more than the PDS had ever achieved, and most probably more than the share either party could have hoped to gain individually. As a result, the Left won 54 seats in the Bundestag (ahead of the liberal FDP), and over half the Left deputies were based in the western states (Olsen, 2007, p.210). One of first challenges was to find a legal solution to the union of the PDS and WASG.

The safest route in legal terms was to execute a merger (Verschmeltzung) on a similar basis to that between two companies. This solution required the smaller entity (in this case the WASG) to dissolve and merge with the larger entity (the PDS). The advantage of the merger, as opposed to the foundation of a completely new party, was that it safeguarded against subsequent legal disputes, for example concerning party assets, the eligibility of state subsidies and the legal status of the PDS-affiliated Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Both parties had to change their legal status to associations (Vereine) for the merger process to proceed (Neu, 2007a, p.8). The organisations held parallel conferences to discuss and approve the common articles of association, including the programme framework, statute, rules of arbitration and finance as well as the merger contract itself. A qualified majority of three quarters was required at each congress before approval for the merger of the PDS and WASG to form the Left Party was gained in a referendum of both memberships (ibid.).

The framework programme was a brief document that outlined the basic political values and aims of the Left Party. A full programme followed two years later in 2007. Although the framework functioned as a basic orientation, it was the product of the long and difficult process of negotiations and therefore, despite its brevity, provides some useful insights into the influences that shaped the cooperation and into the longer-term direction of the Left Party. The following paragraphs highlight the Left Party’s position

on the core themes of eastern interests, socialism and peace, as stated in the programme framework.

Eastern Interests

Like the PDS programmes that preceded it, the framework emphasised the necessity of addressing the interests of the eastern states. However, the influence of the WASG was also evident, as the section title referred explicitly to a new beginning for ‘East Germany and structurally weak areas of West Germany’ (DIE LINKE, 2007). The text reiterated the opportunities that had been lost with the GDR, including the education system, comprehensive childcare and economic gender equality, and criticised the destruction of easterners’ economic, social and cultural potential as a result of unification; it claimed that the achievements and experiences of citizens of the GDR had been dismissed, rather than regarded as an enrichment of the Federal Republic.

Instead, the framework argued that the East had become a region dependent on transfer payments, while the constant race to the bottom to create conditions attractive for business had resulted in massive inequality at the expense not only of the eastern states but also the structurally weak areas in the West (ibid).

The framework called for regional policy to take into account the development potential of each individual region and for a cooperative approach to tackle the problems associated with structurally/economically weak, rural and peripheral areas. The most concrete policy, though, once again focused on eastern interests, and the demand for the pay and pensions of eastern citizens to be equal with those in the West (ibid).

Socialism and Social Justice

The framework’s statement on the ‘Social, democratic and peaceful reforms for overcoming capitalism’ featured a reference to Marx. It declared that the Left Party aimed to overcome all forms of ownership and power in which ‘man is an abject, enslaved, abandoned and contemptible being’; notably, these were the same goals the SPD had cited at the time of its formation (ibid.). The specific positions reflected policies that had appeared in PDS programmes, but also demonstrated the trade-unionist roots of the WASG as well as the circumstances that had led to the two parties’

cooperation. There was to be a shorter working week with no reduction in pay;

employment patterns such as job-sharing would enable men and women to achieve a balance between their working and private lives. The framework also called for the introduction of a minimum wage, a strengthening of employee rights and measures to prevent the exploitation of internships. Corporation tax and the top rate of income tax

would be raised. Unsurprisingly, there was special focus on the Hartz welfare and employment market reforms. Here, the demand was unequivocal: the abolition of Hartz IV. Instead, the Left Party aimed to introduce guaranteed social security provision and a system to ensure that jobseekers were only offered roles commensurate with their qualifications and experience, and remuneration in line with industry standard rates.

Furthermore, the Left Party intended to maintain essential services in the public sector, such as education, health, social care, transport and utilities (ibid.).

The programme also focused its attentions on ‘ending the neoliberal Zeitgeist’ (ibid.).

Here, the Left Party envisaged a ‘new collective movement’ (Sammelbewegung — echoing the early PDS strategy for becoming established in the western states) that combined parliamentary work and extra-parliamentary activism. There was also an explicit reference to governmental responsibility. On the one hand, the party defended participation in government as a means of political action and influence. However, the programme also set out some general conditions to be met: first, any Left Party participation in government had to improve the situation of disadvantaged people and increase political codetermination; secondly, a coalition should have a clear left-wing character and lead to genuine political change. These rather ambiguous statements were then made more concrete in the third condition, namely that the terms of government participation would have to comply with the Left Party’s programme.

Specifically, this meant no privatisation of essential public services and no cuts to jobs or social services. The programme also demanded an end to the sell-off of social housing — contrary to the policy practised by the Berlin state coalition (ibid.).

Antimilitarism and Peace

Once again, the framework’s basic position was an evolution of PDS policy. Unchanged was the rejection of any German military involvement abroad. As this chapter has explained, the PDS — or at least some of its more pragmatic, office-seeking members

— had wavered over the question of UN-mandated military interventions. But the framework programme was quite clear: the Left Party categorically ruled out support for such action, a position it said was ‘based on experience’ (ibid.).

Also like the PDS, the Left Party was clear in its call to dissolve NATO and for an end to the military capacity of Germany and the EU. It was opposed to the development of a bipolar world centred on the USA and Europe. Instead, the military capacity in both Germany and the EU was to be non-aggressive and non-interventionist, with no development, sale or stockpiling of weapons. Finally, the programme also tackled some

more recent developments and committed itself to banning the use of German bases to support military action abroad or for the purpose of renditions (ibid.).

Having set out the Left Party framework programme, the document acknowledged that there were several unanswered questions and policies in need of further development.

Among the list of questions highlighted for future discussion included the opportunities and instruments available for the democratisation of the economy and the extent to which (and how) the ownership of the means of production should be socialised. The document also asked if it was sufficient to provide social security based on need, or whether it was time to consider creating an unconditional basic income as the right of all citizens. Other themes included the feasibility of full employment, challenges to public ownership and more detailed conditions of government participation; also identified as a future point of discussion was the role of class interests and the class conflict. The broad range of questions and themes to explore illustrate the diversity of traditions and interests that were by now gathered in the Left Party (ibid.).

Summary

Looking back at the PDS from the final months of the GDR right up to the emergence of the WASG, the party repeatedly appeared to be in danger of confirming the predictions of its demise. This chapter has outlined the principal factors: despite the efforts and resources invested in establishing an organisational and electoral base in the East, the strategy of Westausdehnung did not yield convincing results. Potential cooperation partners in the form of existing left-wing groups in the western states regarded the former GDR party of state socialism as too authoritarian, too rigid and simply too ‘eastern’. In the East, the party enjoyed considerable support among former functionaries and, later, eastern Germans disillusioned with the realties of unification, but these groups did not provide the PDS with a sustainable electoral base.

Organisational and electoral strength in the eastern states paved the way for the PDS to gain experience of government responsibility, but the compromise required was unacceptable to the party’s left and particularly to the western party organisations. The party leadership, meanwhile, favoured government participation in the eastern states yet also remained committed to the strategy of western development; periods of minimal vertical coordination did not help to quell the tension in the party at regional level.

The chapter has also identified and outlined the PDS’s three main policy areas: the representation of eastern interests, social justice and peace. Disputes frequently took place over the compatibility of principles and pragmatism; on the whole, though, the party remained consistent in its demand for a better deal for the East, its criticism of capitalism and opposition to militarism. But even when the Agenda 2010 and Hartz reforms were implemented, the PDS seemed incapable of harnessing the mood of opposition and challenging the SPD as a socialist party; on the other hand, it is just as doubtful whether the WASG could have mobilised support over the long term.

Adopting a more retrospective and holistic view, it can be argued that the experience of the PDS in the western states was not exclusively one of failure. Before unification introduced the PDS to the western states, the existing West German left too had been unable to develop into a credible political force. The struggle of the PDS to overcome this structural weakness, as well as its own inadequacies and contradictions, produced the motivation and opportunity for the party to cooperate with the WASG and then, as Die Linke, to transform the German democratic socialist left. But the question that follows is why the Left was successful in 2005 and, moreover, what explains the newly merged party’s ability to establish an electoral base in the western states. To answer these questions, the research now considers the strengths of two theoretical approaches. The next two chapters set out each theory in detail and identify key aspects to be applied to the case of the Left Party in a selected western federal state, Bremen.