The positivist and the constructivist debate in codependency

The construct of codependency has been studied within two distinct paradigms: positivism/ post-positivism and constructivism, therefore subject to much controversy.

The positivistic paradigm contends that objective accounts of the real world can be examined. It asserts that reality is objective, absolute and measurable. The position operates within the ontological stance of naïve realism, whereby researchers propose that human perceptions represent accurate reflections of the world as it is – ‘a single reality’ (Guba and Lincoln 1998).

Assuming that methods for examining such accounts can be imperfect, the post- positivism paradigm takes a more flexible stance, and holds that only a particular objective account of the world can be produced (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). In this case, the ontological position of critical realism is adopted whereby reality is argued to be only imperfectly captured.

In both positions the researcher adopts a dualist and objectivist epistemology (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). These positions place great emphasis on the internal validity, external validity and reliability of the measures involved in the research process. The objectivity sought in this line of research aims to attain research findings that can be replicated and generalised (Hicks, 2000).

Within this paradigm, as shown in the previous chapter, the contested construct of codependency has been subject to research scrutiny, carried out by different research communities (Marks et al, 2011). Attempts have been made to delineate its components, in terms of predictive and outcome variables (e.g. Harkness, 2001; Fuller and Warner, 2000), to create theories (e.g. Fischer, 1991), definitions (e.g. Dear et al 2004), models (e.g. Potter-Efron & Potter-Efron, 1989) and measurements of codependency (e.g. Dear and Roberts, 2005). However, in spite of these objective attempts, authors have not reached an agreement about what constitutes its components; as Marks et al (2011) state: ‘investigations are still needed to resolve the controversies surrounding the codependency model and advancing its understanding’ (p.1). Therefore it is pertinent to suggest that objective research methods have not been entirely effective in capturing the extent and complexity of this controversial experience.

Indeed, the positivist paradigm has been criticized for posing limitations on what can be explored in terms of human experience (Langdridge, 2007, Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). For example, it has been argued that not all human perceptions are objective experiences, and not all individuals share common perceptions (Carr, 2001). Furthermore, contemporary views on social change and diversification, pose challenges on the use of pure objective methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Wetherell, 2008). This critique is pertinent to this research as it supports the use of a myriad of different perspectives and contexts in research, hoping to address the diverse and subjective elements of human lifeworlds (Richardson, 2000).

Schwandt (1998) suggests that supporters of the constructivist paradigm aim at understanding complex lived experiences from the perspective of those who experience it. The paradigm also accepts that knowledge is constructed by all those involved in the research process. The paradigm assumes a relativist ontological position and operates within an interpretativist and subjectivist epistemology (Lincoln and Guba, 1998). Schwandt (1998) traces the theoretical foundations of constructivism to philosophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Gergen; thus highlighting the complexity of the paradigm. However any attempt to offer a compact and consensual definition of constructivism would directly contradict the basic relativist principle in which the paradigm operates (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985). This paradigm appears to be a more adequate position to address the complexity and subjectivity of the lived experience of codependency.

The constructivist paradigm was considered to be a more fitting position for this research study, which aimed to capture the lived experiences of individuals who considered themselves to be codependents. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) suggest that research built within the constructivist paradigm operates within ‘local, specific and constructed realities’ aiming at ‘co-constructed findings’ (p.193). The relativist position adopted in this study assumed that those involved in the research process (the researcher, the participants, the team of supervisors and research advisors) had multiple perspectives of codependency. Within this view, the experience of codependency was understood to be co-constructed, and re-constructed by those involved in the research process.

In this study, the participants took the position of the ‘knower’, carrying knowledge of codependency which was subjective to their lived experiences, interpretations and the context in which they were immersed. The term ‘contextualism’ suggested by

Madhill et al (2000) was useful to describe this situated aspect of their experience. The term contextual-constructivism (Smith et al, 2009) is adopted as a convenient terminology to portray the integration of both positions in this research study.

During the research process, at times, I struggled with how best to make reference to codependency without implying that it was a fixed, objectively defined concept. I have included an extract from my reflexive journal to illustrate my ‘tension’ with this issue.

Reflective Account (August 2012)

‘As I read the two articles from Woolgar and Pawluch (1996) and Augoustinos and Walker (1995), I became aware of the ontological discrepancy resulting from adopting a relativist position, which understands codependency as an experiential construction, and writing and speaking about this concept with a degree of objectiveness and realism. After thinking and considering this tension for many months, I concluded that for rhetorical and practical reasons, the term ‘codependency’ needs to be mentioned or treated as understood by the participants, as something ‘sub-real’. Although I am not attributing reality to the construct, I am accepting that people may see it as real as part of their lifeworlds. As I read more about the IPA methodology (Smith et al 2009, Larkin et al, 2006, 2011), I understood that the authors within this body of research agree with me, and met the same tensions in their research. For example, in their 2006 paper, Larkin et al deal with these tensions. They explain that what is real may not be determined by us, but the exact meaning of reality they state: ‘…in the context of human life, it is evidently we who decide what is allowed to count as real and what is not’ (p.107). Therefore, in this research, I can use the codependency language, with a degree of sub-realism as a convenient way of summarising the experience portrayed by the participant.