IntroCivMilNS3025-2015

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Introduction to Civil-Military Relations NS3025

April-June 2015 Prof. Arturo C. Sotomayor

Office hours: T-Tr 12:00-1:00 PM (or by appointment) Phone: 656-2798

Course Description

This course analyzes the major themes and debates in the study of civil-military relations in new and established democracies. The central problem underlying all analyses of civil-military relations involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal

desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. On the other hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power; that is the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it. A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory and a consistent pattern in human history. Yet another concern is that the armed forces will influence the political

leadership to engage in wars and conflicts that are contrary to a society’s interest. And, finally, there is a concern over the simple matter of obedience. As Peter Feaver (an author we will read this quarter) argues: “Even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters, or will it sue considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interest?”1

Consequently, this course will focus on identifying the proper balance between the armed forces and the civilian political leadership. We will discuss questions such as: What is the proper degree of military influence over defense and foreign policy? To what extent is military policy responsive to broader social and cultural values? What distinguishes consolidated democracies with strong civilian control from more recent democratizing states with weak civilian control? How is civilian control achieved? What erodes civilian supremacy? Why are coups organized and how can civilians prevent them?

The course combines empirical information with theory and concepts for analysis. Methodologically, we will rely heavily on the comparative method by comparing and contrasting democratic regimes with democratizing and non-democratic polities. To introduce you to the major issues in the study of civil-military relations, the course will have five separate units. Most of these units could be courses in themselves, so we will only scratch the surface of the existing literature.

1. Foundations: States, Nations, and Soldiers 2. Explaining Military Intervention and Coups

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3. Who is in Control? Democratic Forms of Civilian Control 4. Non-Democratic Forms of Civilian Control

5. Contemporary Debates in US Civil-Military Relations

As a subject of inquiry, civil-military relations is one of the truly interdisciplinary fields of study in the social sciences. It combines insights from sociology, history, and political science. In fact, many classical texts (including Plato’s The Republic and Machiavelli’s

The Prince) touch upon issues that we now think of as civil-military relations. Most of the topics that we will discuss in this course are traditionally thought of as either

comparative politics or international relations, but we will also touch upon themes from American politics and public policy. Nevertheless, it should be stressed out that this course is essentially about politics more than about military science or warfare. The focus will be on the relations between civilians and the military, especially with regards to the decision-making process.

Course Goals and Objectives

At the end of the course, students should be able:

1. To understand and apply key concepts pertaining to the civil-military relations literature.

2. To assess, contrast and compare how different forms of political regimes exercise varying forms of civilian control.

3. To understand, contrast, and criticize different approaches to civil-military relations; all while identifying critical causal variables and connecting key points.

4. To understand that civilian control is not a goal or end point, but a process. Course Requirements:

Class attendance is mandatory. Students must complete the assigned readings prior to the class and prepare to engage actively in discussions. Final grades will be determined by class participation (40%), a film review (40%), and a reading report (20%). Poor attendance can result in lowering your final grade.

Class Participation (40% of grade):

You are required to have completed the readings and to participate in discussions.

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Movie review (40%)

Our class includes one film screening (see below for a description for the suggested films. A 5-page (maximum) movie review is due on May 7. Students are not being asked to review the film based on cinematography, picture, drama or directorship, but instead they should focus on examining the film through a civil-military relations lens. Students are thus encouraged to use and refer to concepts, theories and arguments analyzed in class. Issues that can be discussed in the review include: what are the main topics and concepts addressed by the film? How are civil-military issues addressed by the film? What topics are controversial in the film from a civil-military relations perspective? Note: Grade will be based on originality, analysis, organization, syntax and good spelling. Remember, this is an analytical essay, not your standard movie review. Short reading reports (20%)

There are a number of reading suggestions indicated in the syllabus. Students will have to write one reading report on one of these readings. A report is a 5-page (maximum) essay summarizing the main argument developed in the reading. The student should be able to identify the following: the research puzzle or question being analyzed, the main

argument, the key concepts and their definitions, the empirical evidence presented to demonstrated the argument, and a summary of findings.

Grade will be determined based on: the analysis, content, syntax, spelling, and proper writing.

How I Grade

I do not have any checklist of items I am looking for in answers. I am reading for the overall control you have over the subject matter of the question. I may develop a list of characteristics of "A" answers after grading the questions to communicate to the class when I hand the exam back. But this list is post-hoc rather than a rule I use to measure answers. I will give you an answer guide upon returning graded exams.

What Grades Mean

A. Outstanding in all ways. Shows “knowledge” of the literature required to answer the question and how to wield that literature in developing an answer. Answer is

comprehensive.

A- Answer that shows knowledge of the subject matter of the question. Also

demonstrates an ability to use the literature related to the question. Can generate insight over and above what may have been talked about explicitly in class.

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B Some hint of familiarity with the material of the course including literature and concepts. A better answer than someone would provide who had never had the course. B- The answer is weak, probably shows some familiarity with the literature, but it is out of scope, the argument is inconsistent, and the evidence is flawed. The essay may have structural problems, ranging from poor grammar to inability to articulate a hypothesis. C Barely passed or made a minimum effort to poorly answer the question. The student might have relied on just one author or may not have identified all identified arguments. The essay is weak, poorly written, and the argument is inconsistent or plainly wrong. Numbers and Letters

I prefer to grade using letters. Typically I will use the full A-F scale including + and – (with the exception of A+, the highest possible grade in my class is A). The definition of each grade is above. On examinations I will sometimes use points. Typically, such exams will be 100 points. Grades will be assigned according to the following scale:

Grading Scale for Exams

A 100-95 B- 79-75 F Anything equal or below 50

A- 94 - 90 C+ 74-70

B+ 89-85 C 69-60

B 84-80 C- 59-51

Zero tolerance policy for plagiarism

Plagiarism will not be tolerated under any circumstance. What is plagiarism? To steal and pass off the ideas or words of another as one's own; to use another's production without crediting the source; to commit literary theft or to present as new and original an idea or product derived from an existing source. In other words, plagiarism is an act of fraud. It involves both stealing someone else's work and lying about it afterward. What are the consequences of getting caught? In my class, an act of plagiarism is reprimanded with an automatic failing grade in the course. Other NPS sanctions may apply. Please, always properly cite the source of information you use in your take-home exams.

Readings

The course will rely on a number of books and articles. You are not required to purchase any book, although five main titles will be used in our class:

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Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968

Thomas C. Bruneau, and Scott D. Tollefson (eds.), Who Guards the Guardians:

Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Austin: University of Texas University Press, 2006 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 2003.

Steven Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.

Many of the journal articles are available through E-Library, directly from the library’s website. Articles and book chapters that are not available through E-Library will be available on Sakai.

You will notice that this syllabus includes suggested readings. These are not mandatory and thus not subject to examination. However, if you are interested in the topic and would want to learn more, then you are welcome to read the suggested bibliography.

Reading schedule

I. Foundations: States, Nations, and Soldiers

April 2: Introduction

Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1999): 211-241. (Available through E-Library)

This meeting is primarily administrative, and a chance to get acquainted. April 7: Foundations: Democracy, Consolidation and Civilian Control

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is… And is Not,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 75-88. (Available through E-Library) Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “International Democracy Promotion and Its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” in Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas (eds.),

Global Politics of Defense Reform, New York: Palgrave, 2008, pp. 49-67.

Richard H. Khon, “How Democracies Control the Military,” in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, 4(1997): 140-153. (Available through E-Library)

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Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1990, pp. 67-95.

Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 77-83.

April 14: Military Service and Citizenship

Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 117-133, 166-189.

April 21: Military Professionalism: Huntington’s Paradigm

Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Belknap/Harvard, 1957, pp. 7-18, 80-97.

Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies,” in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds.),

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Suggested bibliography:

James Bulk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1(Fall 2002): pp. 7-29. (Available through E-Library)

April 23: Military Professionalism: Janowitz’s Paradigm

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, New York: Free Press, 1971, pp. 417-442. April 28: Critiques to Military Professionalism

Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 16-53.

Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision”, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4(Spring 2011): 87-125. (Available through Library Ejournals).

Richard K. Betts, Michael Desch, and Peter D. Feaver, “”Civilians, Soldiers, and the Iraq Surge Decision”, “Correspondence”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3(Winter 2011/2012): 179-199. ((Available through Library Ejournals).

May 5: Civilian Control and the Principal-Agent Debate

Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 2003, pp. 54-95.

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Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 2003, pp. 234-282.

May 7: Institutionalism and Civilian Control Movie review report is due

Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (eds.), Who Guards the Guardians:

Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Austin: University of Texas University Press, 2006, pp. 34-70.

Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, Jr., “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (eds.), Who Guards the

Guardians: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Austin: University of Texas University Press, 2006, pp. 71-98.

May 12: Institutionalism and its Limits

David S. Pion-Berlin, “Political management of the military in Latin America,” in

Military Review, Vol. 85, No. 1(January-February 2005): 19-31. (Available through E-Library)

May 14: Civilian Control through Interservice Rivalry: Pros and Cons

Samuel Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, 1(March 1961): 40-52. (Available through E-Library)

James R. Locher, II, “Has it worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act – Department of Defense Re-Organization, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_54/ai_83295124/pg_2?tag=content;col1

. (Also available through E-Library)

Aaron Belkin, United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility (New York: SUNY Press, 2004), Chapter 2, pp. 17-34. Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A

Comparative Perspective, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 2005), pp. 156-205.

May 19: Mission and Civilian Control

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(Choose one of the 3 readings below: Argentina, Spain, Poland/Czech Republic) Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 181-215. Norden, Deborah L, “Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina’s UN Missions, in

International Peacekeeping, No. 2(1995): 330-349. (Available through E-Library)

Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe”, in International Organization, Vol. 59, 3(Fall 2005): 973-1012. (Available through E-Library)

Suggested bibliography:

Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Austin: University of Texas University Press, 2006, pp, pp. 122-142.

May 21: Can Mission Reform Re-Orient the Armed Forces? Lessons from UN Peacekeeping

David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision-makers or Dicision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America,” in Armed Forces and Societies, Vol. 26, No. 3(Spring 2000): 413-436. (Available through E-Library)

Arturo C. Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the UN (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), Chapter 3, pp. 68-98.

IV. Non-Democratic Forms of Civilian Control

May 26: Civilian Control in Hegemonic Party Systems

Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 1-41.

(Choose one of the readings below and submit a 5-page reading report: Communist Europe, China or Mexico)

Timothy J. Colton, “The Party-Military Connection,” in Dale R. Herpsring and Ivan Volgyes, (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Westview, 1978): pp. 53-73.

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Andrew Scobell, “China’s Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,”

Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 31, 2(Winter 2005): 227-244. (Available through E-Library).

William Ehwarieme, “The Military Factor in Nigeria’s Democratic Stability, 1999-2009,”

Armed Forces and Society 37, 3(2011): 494-511.(Available through E-Library). May 28: Military Politics in Developing Nations: Turkey, Algeria and Egypt Final exam distributed

Steven Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp. 1-31. Choose one of three cases from chapter 3, 4 and 5 of Cook’s Ruling But Not Governing: Algeria, Egypt and Turkey.

Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprising, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 39, No. 1(January 2013): 28-52. (Available through Library Ejournals).

V. Contemporary Debates in US Civil-Military Relations June 2: Private Militaries: Pros and Cons

Choose one of these three readings and submit a 5-page reading report:

James Cockayne, “Make or buys? Principal-agent theory and the regulation of private military companies,” in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 196-216.

Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 1-39.

P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 191-229.

June 4: Is there a civil-military crisis in the U.S.?

Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General: The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that changed history, Rolling Stone, July 8-22, 2010, available at <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622>

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Matthew Moten, “A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension,” in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds.), American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 42-71.

June 9: Drones and accountability: Is civilian control at stake?

Benjamin R. Farley, “Drones and Democracy: Missing Out on Accountability?”, ExpressO Available at: http://works.bepress.com/benjamin_farley/3

Peter W. Singer, “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?”, Op-ed, New York Times, January 21, 2012.