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Techno Security's Guide to Securing SCADA

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Foreword

xxiii

Chapter 1 Physical Security: SCADA and the Critical

Infrastructure's Biggest Vulnerability

1

Introduction 2

Key Control 3

Check All Locks for Proper Operation 4

A Little More about Locks and Lock Picking 5

The Elephant Burial Ground 12

Dumpster Diving Still Works 18

Employee Badges 20

Shredder Technology Has Changed 22

Keep an'Eye on Corporate or Agency Phonebooks 23

Tailgating 24

Building Operations—Cleaning Crew Awareness 25

Spot-Checking Those Drop Ceilings 28

Checking for Key Stroke Readers 28

Checking Those Phone Closets 31

Removing a Few Door Signs 32

Review Video Security Logs 32

Motion-Sensing Lights 33

Let's Go to Lunch 34

Fun in Manholes 37

Internal Auditors Are Your Friends 40

Always Be Slightly Suspicious 40

Getting Every Employee Involved 41

Summary 42

Solutions Fast Track 42

Frequently Asked Questions (and Special Interviews) 45

Chapter 2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

61

Introduction 62

Just What Is SCADA? 62

SCADA Systems and Components 65

Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) 65

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) 65

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Discrete Control 65

Continuous Control 65

Human Machine Interface (HMI) 66

Distributed Control Systems (DCS) 66

Hybrid Controllers 67

Event Loggers 67

Common SCADA Architectures 68

SCADA Communications Protocols 70

How Serious Are the Security Issues of SCADA? 71

Determining the Risks in Your SCADA System 75

Risk Mitigation for SCADA 76

Firewall Considerations for SCADA 78

Negative and Positive Security Models in Firewalls 79

Multi-Network Connectivity 79

Reactive and Proactive Solutions 80

Firewall Inspection Methods 82

Static Packet Filter 82

The Stateful Packet Filter 83

The Circuit-Level Gateway 84

Application-Level Gateway (Proxy) 85

Intrusion Prevention Gateway 87

Deep Packet Inspection 88

Unified Threat Management (UTM) 89

Summary 90

Solutions Fast Track 90

Frequently Asked Questions 93

Chapter 3 SCADA Security Assessment Methodology

95

Introduction 96

Why Do Assessments on SCADA Systems? 96

Assessments Are the Right Thing to Do 97

Assessments Are Required 97

Information Protection Requirements 97

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guidance 98 North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Critical

Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Standards 99

Water Infrastructure Security Enhancement (WISE) 99

The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 99

An Approach to SCADA Information Security Assessments 100

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Vetting the Assessment Request 102

Gaining Buy-In from Management and Technical Personnel 102

Management Buy-In 103

Technical Staff Buy-In 103

Researching the Organization 104

Researching Regulatory and Policy Requirements 105

Determining if this Is a Baseline Assessment or a Repeat Assessment 106

Making a Go/No-Go Decision 106

Pre-Assessment Activities 106

Determining the Organizational Mission 107

Identifying Critical Information 107

Example: Information Criticality 108

Business Description 108

Mission Statement 108

Critical Information for OOPS 109

Identifying Impacts 109

Example Continued: OOPS Impact 110

The Information Criticality Matrix 110

Using the Impact Definitions Ill

Organizational Criticality Ill

Example Continued: OOPS OICM 112

Identifying Critical Systems/Networks 113

OOPS Example Continued 113

Defining Security Objectives 116

Determining Logical and Physical Boundaries 117

Physical Boundaries 117

.Logical Boundaries 117

Determining the Rules of Engagement, Customer Concerns,

and Customer Constraints 117

The Rules of Engagement 118

Levels of Invasiveness 118

Testing Machine Addressing 118

Time Frames for Scanning and Interviews 119

Notification Procedures 119

Scanning Tools and Exclusions 119

Customer Concerns 119

Customer Constraints 120

Legal Authorization 120

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Components of the Assessment Plan 120

On-Site Assessment Activities 122

Conducting the Organizational Assessment 122

Documentation Review 123

Interviews 123

System Demonstrations 124

Observation 124

Conducting the Technical Assessment 124

Enumeration Activities 125

Vulnerability Identification Activities 125

Tools 127

Communication 127

Post Assessment Activities 127

Conducting Analysis 127

Final Report Creation 128

Resources 129

Summary 130

Solutions Fast Track 131

Frequently Asked Questions- 134

Chapter 4 Developing an Effective Security Awareness Program

137

Introduction 138

Why an Information Security Awareness Program Is Important 140 We Fail to Recruit Our Employees into the Company's

Security Program 141

We Need to Take the Issue Seriously 142

How to Design an Effective Information Security Awareness Program 143

Seven Times, Seven Different Ways 146

Show Me the Money! 148

Two Important Keys to Implementing an Effective Program 150

To Print or Not to Print 152

Online Training Programs 154

Your In-House Web Site 154

How to Implement an Information Security Awareness Program 155

What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate 157

Communicate, Communicate, Communicate! 157

Other Touch Points 157

Manager's Quick Reference Guide 158

Let's Talk about Alliances 159

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Legal 159

Privacy 159

Compliance 160

Training and Communications 160

Personnel 160

Information Security Consultants 161

How Do You Keep Your Program a Successful Component of Your

Company's Mindset? 162

How to Measure Your Program 163

Summary 167

Solutions Fast Track 167

Chapter 5 Working with Law Enforcement on SCADA Incidents

171

Introduction 172

SCADA System Overview 172

Secure Network Management 175

Securing Wide Area Network Perimeter 175

Controlling Access 176

Performing Network Backup and Recovery 176

Transmitting Legacy Non-Routable Protocol Securely 176

Dial-Up Access to the Remote Terminal Units (RTU) 178

Vendor Support: Dial-Up Modem/VPN Access 178

IT Controlled Communication Gear 178

Corporate VPNs 179

Database Links 179

Poorly Configured Firewalls 180

Business Partner Links 180

Managing Security Events 181

Conduct Routine Assessments 182

Examples of Common Attack Techniques 182

Man-In-The-Middle Attacks (MITM) 182

Key-Logger Software 183

Summary 184

Solutions Fast Track 185

Frequently Asked Questions 187

Chapter 6 Locked but Not Secure: An Overview of

Conventional and High Security Locks

189

Introduction 191

Conventional Pin Tumbler Locks 192

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A Review: The Essentials of Pin Tumbler Lock Design 196

Security Enhancements for Conventional Locks 197

Anti-Bumping Pins 197

Security Pins 198

Keyways and Related Designs 199

Bitting Design 199

Design of the Key 200

Standards for Conventional and High Security Locks 201

Transforming a Conventional Cylinder to High Security 202

Deficiencies in the UL 437 Standard 204

Failure to Specify Real World Testing 204

Pick and Impressioning Resistance 205

Complex Forms of Picking 206

Forced Entry Resistance 206

Issues Not Addressed by UL 437 206

Bump Keys 207

Decoding Attacks 208

Key Control 208

Mechanical Bypass of Locking Mechanisms 209

BHMA/ANSI Standards: 156.50 and 156.30 210

BHMA/ANSI 156.50 210

High Security Locks and the BHMA/ANSI Standard 210

The Concept of Security 211

BHMA/ANSI 156.30 High Security Standard 212

Key Control 213

Destructive Testing 213

Surreptitious Entry Resistance 214

Deficiencies in the 156.30 Standard 214

Security Vulnerabilities of Conventional Locks: Why High Security Locks

Are Supposed to Offer More Protection Against Methods of Entry 215 Conventional Pin Tumbler Locks: Security Vulnerabilities and Their

Compromise 216

Lock Control Procedures 217

Key Control and Key Security 218

Key Security 218

The Concept of Key Control As It Applies to Security 219

The Importance of Key Control and Key Security 219

Rights Amplification 220

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Gathering Intelligence About a System from Its Keys 221 Covert Entry Techniques: Manipulation of Internal Locking Components .... 222

Bumping 223

Picking 223

Impressioning 223

Extrapolation of the TMK 223

Mechanical Bypass 223

High Security to High Insecurity: Real World Attacks 224

Summary 226

Solutions Fast Track 226

Frequently Asked Questions 228

Chapter 7 Bomb Threat Planning: Things Have Changed

231

Introduction 232

The Day Our World Changed 233

Insider Information:

Where Do These Guys Get This Stuff? 234

The Terrorist Profile 236

Potential Terror Targets 237

Statement Targets 237

Infrastructure Targets 238

Commercial Targets 239

Transportation Targets 239

What Should I Be Looking For? 239

The Container 240

The Power Source 240

Switches 240

Initiators 241

Main Charge 242

Searching: What Am I

Looking For and Where? 244

Recommendations for Target Hardening . 245

Outside 245 Employee Identification 246 Cameras 246 Deliveries 246 Interior 246 Mail rooms 247 Evacuation Plans 249 Summary 251

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Chapter 8 Biometric Authentication for SCADA Security

253

Introduction 254

Understanding Biometric Systems and How They Are Best Used for

SCADA Security 255

Footprints to DNA Readings 255

Human Measurements Can Slow Machines 255

Biometric System Imperfections Are at Odds with Perception 256

What is Biometric Authentication? 256

Multiple Factor Authentication 257

What Parts of You Can Be Measured for Security Purposes? 257 Common Measurements for Current Biometric Authentication 257

How Does Biometric Comparison Work? 258

Where Are Biometrics Used in SCADA Systems? 260

Choosing the Best Form of Measurement for Your System 261

Biometric Measurements Trigger Recognition 261

Biometric Measurements Useful in SCADA Security Processes 262 Identify Your System Priorities Before Choosing a

Biometric Application 264

Where are Biometric Authentication Regimes Vulnerable? 266

Tricking the Biometric Capture Device 266

Electronic Manipulation of the Authentication Process 268

Identity Theft with Biometric Files: Capturing Your Essence 269

Presumptions of Accuracy 270

How Can We Replace That Finger? 270

Measuring Minutia Can Be Safer Than Storing a Whole

Biometric Photograph 271

Anticipating Legal and Policy Changes That Will Affect Biometrics 272

Summary 274

Solutions Fast Track 274

Frequently Asked Questions 276

Appendix

279

References

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