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Evolutions  in  Browser  Security  

TRENDS  IN  BROWSER  SECURITY  PERFORMANCE  

 

Author  –  Randy  Abrams  

Overview  

This  analyst  brief  aggregates  results  from  NSS  Labs  tests  conducted  between  2009  and  2013  in  a  comparison  of   phishing  and  socially  engineered  malware  (SEM)  protection  by  the  leading  browsers.  Figure  1  reveals  trends  in   protection  levels  of  the  four  leading  browsers,  comparing  combined  test  results  from  2009  to  the  recent  2012  and   2013  scores.  

  Figure  1  –  Leading  Browser  Malware  and  Phishing  Block  Rates  (2009,  2012,  2013)  

2009  

2012  

2013  

2009  

2013   2009  

2012   2013  

2009  

2012  

Av er ag e   Ph is h  

Average  Malware  

0%  

10%  

20%  

30%  

40%  

50%  

60%  

70%  

80%  

90%  

100%  

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   100%  

Ma lw ar e  

Phishing  

Chrome   Firefox   IE   Safari  

Average  Phish  

Average  Malware  

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In  the  NSS  tests,  the  browsers  are  rated  on  performance  in  four  categories:  

• Average  phishing  block  rate  

• Zero-­‐hour  phishing  block  rate  

• Average  SEM  block  rate  

• Zero-­‐hour  SEM  block  rate  

Internet  Explorer  (IE)  shows  a  consistently  superior  ability  to  block  SEM,  while  providing  competitive  phishing   protection;  it  leads  the  tested  browsers  in  combined  protections  for  these  categories.  Google’s  Download   Protection  technology  has  improved  significantly  over  time,  placing  it  behind  IE  but  well  ahead  of  Firefox  and   Safari.  Both  Firefox  and  Safari  lead  the  other  browsers  in  phishing  protection  but  provide  negligible  protection   against  SEM  attacks.  

This  analyst  brief  includes  data  from  previously  published  NSS  phishing  tests  conducted  in  2009,  2012,  and  2013,   as  well  as  SEM  tests  published  every  year  from  2009  to  2013.  In  2010,  two  SEM  tests  were  published.    

Figure  2  shows  the  overall  performance  of  the  browsers  for  the  2013  browser  phishing  and  SEM  tests.    

  Figure  2  –  2013  Combined  Phishing  And  Malware  Block  Rates  

Figure  2  treats  all  protection  metrics  in  2013  equally.  Later  in  this  analyst  brief,  Figure  15  will  add  weighting  based   on  the  relative  protection  importance  of  the  tested  parameters  in  order  to  provide  a  more  realistic  ranking  of  the   browsers  in  2013.  Figure  14  provides  an  aggregation  of  all  of  the  tests  from  2009  to  2013,  with  emphasis  placed  on   freshness  and  relative  importance  of  the  test  metrics.  

   

52%  

53%  

76%  

89%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Firefox  

Safari  

Chrome  

IE  

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NSS  Labs  Findings  

• The  browser  is  the  first  line  of  defense  against  multiple  web-­‐based  threats;  however,  with  a  maximum   historical  protection  rate  of  just  80  percent,  the  browser  should  not  be  the  only  line  of  defense.    

• Products  that  do  not  provide  the  bulk  of  their  protection  in  the  earliest  hours  of  an  attack  are  not  meeting  the   security  requirements  of  today’s  threatscape.  

• Microsoft’s  Internet  Explorer  continues  to  provide  the  best  combination  of  malware  and  phishing  protection.  

• The  application  reputation  technologies  used  by  browsers  from  both  Microsoft  and  Google  provide  a   significantly  safer  browsing  experience  than  do  the  browsers  from  Apple  and  Mozilla.  

• User  education  is  often  better  protection  against  social  engineering  attacks  than  browser  technologies.  

NSS  Labs  Recommendations  

• Invest  in  awareness  education  about  social  engineering  for  all  users.  

• Evaluate  trends  that  may  indicate  the  need  for  browser  replacement.  

• Select  and  use  security  products  that  augment  the  protective  capabilities  of  the  browser.  

   

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Table  of  Contents  

Overview  ...  1  

NSS  Labs  Findings  ...  3  

NSS  Labs  Recommendations  ...  3  

Analysis  ...  6  

Phishing  Trends  and  Threats  ...  6  

NSS  Empirical  Results:  Phishing  Protection  ...  7  

NSS  Empirical  Results:  Socially  Engineered  Malware  Protection  ...  9  

Combined  Protection  Effectiveness  ...  11  

Aggregate  Values  ...  11  

Weight  A  Minute  ...  11  

Evaluating  the  Data  ...  11  

The  Great  Equalizer  ...  14  

Appendix  A:  Raw  Data  ...  15  

Appendix  B:  Weighting  Formulas  ...  17  

Protection  Multipliers:  ...  17  

Year  Multipliers:  ...  17  

Reading  List  ...  19  

Contact  Information  ...  20  

 

   

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Table  of  Figures  

Figure  1  –  Leading  Browser  Malware  and  Phishing  Block  Rates  (2009,  2012,  2013)  ...  1  

Figure  2  –  2013  Combined  Phishing  And  Malware  Block  Rates  ...  2  

Figure  3  –  Unique  Phishing  Attacks  ...  6  

Figure  4  –  APWG  Phishing  Uptime  Statistics  ...  7  

Figure  5  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Phishing  ...  7  

Figure  6  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Phishing  Block  Rate  ...  8  

Figure  7  –  Time  to  Block  Phishing  Attacks  Relative  to  Uptime  Trends  (Hours)  ...  9  

Figure  8  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Socially  Engineered  Malware  ...  9  

Figure  9  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Socially  Engineered  Malware  Block  Rate  ...  10  

Figure  10  –  Content  Agnostic  Malware  Protection  Breakout  ...  10  

Figure  11  –  Combined  Test  Results  (Not  Weighted)  ...  12  

Figure  12  –  Time  Weighted  ...  12  

Figure  13  –  Protection  Weighted  ...  13  

Figure  14  –  Time  and  Protection  Weighted  Scores  ...  13  

Figure  15  –  2013  Weighted  Scores  ...  13  

Figure  16  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Phishing  ...  15  

Figure  17  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  ...  15  

Figure  18  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  SEM  ...  15  

Figure  19  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  for  SEM  ...  16  

Figure  20  –  Time  Weighting  ...  17  

Figure  21  –  Protection  Type  Weighting  ...  17  

Figure  22  –  Type  and  Year  Weighting  ...  17  

 

   

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Analysis  

Socially  engineered  malware  and  phishing  attacks  are  two  of  the  most  significant  threats  against  which  web   browsers  must  defend.  NSS  has  for  several  years  tested  the  leading  browsers  for  their  ability  to  protect  against   these  attacks;  however,  each  test  has  been  presented  as  a  stand-­‐alone  snapshot  in  time.  While  these  real-­‐world   snapshot  tests  yield  useful  information,  a  correlated  report  is  equally  valuable  in  order  to  assess  trends  and   establish  vendor  track  records.  This  analyst  brief  examines  the  historical  performance  of  browsers  against  phishing   and  against  socially  engineered  malware  attacks.  The  browsers  are  evaluated  against  each  other  and  against  the   phishing  threatscape.  If  the  best  performing  product  affords  little  protection,  then  the  worst  performing  product  is   not  significantly  different.  Fortunately,  there  are  browsers  that  are  addressing  the  challenges  and  that  are  able  to   provide  significant  protection  for  users.    

Phishing  Trends  and  Threats  

The  Anti-­‐Phishing  Working  Group  (APWG)  has  collected  and  published  statistics  about  phishing  attacks  for  several   years.  The  APWG  “Phishing  Attack  Trends”

1

 and  “Global  Phishing  Survey”

2

 reports  provide  important  insight  into   the  phishing  problem.    

From  Figure  3  it  can  be  inferred  that  although  the  number  of  unique  phishing  emails  and  web  sites  has  varied  from   2009  to  2012,  the  scope  of  the  problem  remains  significant.  The  uptick  in  unique  phishing  sites  discovered  in  2012   is  not  accompanied  by  a  significant  uptick  in  reports  of  unique  phishing  emails.  While  this  may  be  due  to  under-­‐

reporting  of  phishing  email,  it  is  likely  indicative  of  cyber  criminals  increasingly  using  redirects  in  an  attempt  to   compensate  for  the  declining  lifetimes  of  their  attacks.    

  Figure  3  –  Unique  Phishing  Attacks  

                                                                                                                                       

1

 

http://www.apwg.org/resources/apwg-­‐reports/  

2

 

http://www.apwg.org/resources/apwg-­‐reports/whitepapers  

0   100,000   200,000   300,000   400,000   500,000   600,000   700,000  

2009   2010   2011   2012  

Unique  Phishing  Emails  Reported   Unique  Phishing  Web  Sites  Discovered  

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One  of  the  critical  metrics  surrounding  a  browser’s  effectiveness  in  combatting  phishing  attacks  is  how  quickly  it   adds  protection  once  an  attack  is  live.  Figure  4  illustrates  the  general  decline  in  the  lifetimes  of  phishing  sites.  In   2012,  the  average  phishing  site  was  live  for  just  under  25  hours,  and  the  median  lifetime  was  approximately  12   hours.  Products  that  do  not  provide  the  bulk  of  their  protection  in  the  earliest  hours  of  an  attack  are  not  meeting   the  security  requirements  of  today’s  threatscape.  

  Figure  4  –  APWG  Phishing  Uptime  Statistics  

NSS  Empirical  Results:  Phishing  Protection  

NSS  tested  the  leading  browsers  for  phishing  protection  in  2009,  2012,  and  2013,  with  the  results  presented  in   Figure  5  and  Figure  6.    

  Figure  5  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Phishing  

In  2009,  only  IE  and  Firefox  provided  competitive  block  rates  for  phishing,  with  results  in  2012  narrowing  the   differences  to  a  four-­‐point  spread  between  browsers.  In  2013,  Firefox  and  Safari  posted  modest  improvements  in   their  scores,  while  Chrome  dropped  by  2  percent.  IE  has  a  trend  of  solid  performance,  but  the  browser’s  phishing   block  rate  declined  from  92  percent  in  the  2012  “Browser  Security  Comparative  Analysis  Report”  (CAR)  on  

“Phishing  Protection”  to  83  percent  in  the  2013  CAR  on  “Phishing  Protection”.  

0   20   40   60   80  

1H2009   2H2009   1h2010   2h2010   1h2011   2h2011   1h2012   2h2012  

Average  Uphme  (Hours)   Median  Uphme  (Hours)  

0%  

10%  

20%  

30%  

40%  

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90%  

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2009   2012   2013  

Chrome  

Firefox  

IE  

Safari  

Average  

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The  lower  results  in  the  2013  test  should  be  evaluated  against  future  tests  to  determine  if  the  decline  in  IE’s  mean   block  rate  in  the  2013  test  indicates  a  problematic  trend.  

The  time  required  to  add  new  phishing  sites  is  an  important  metric  when  determining  the  relevance  of  the  mean   block  rate  to  consumer  protection.  For  example,  a  browser  that  blocks  more  phishing  sites  in  the  first  12  hours  will   provide  better  protection  than  a  less  responsive  browser  that  achieves  a  better  block  rate  in  the  long  run.  

Historically,  NSS  testing  has  found  that  the  browsers  with  the  best  early  detection  continue  to  lead  until  the  end  of   the  test;  however,  this  may  not  always  be  the  case.  

  Figure  6  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Phishing  Block  Rate  

During  the  2013  test,  all  browsers  showed  improvement  over  their  historical  zero-­‐hour  block  rates,  as  depicted  in   Figure  6.  A  metric  that  has  a  high  correlation  to  the  zero-­‐hour  block  rate  is  the  average  time  required  to  add   protection  for  new  phishing  sites.    

Figure  7  shows  the  APWG  average  phishing  site  uptime  statistics  and  the  mean  phishing  site  uptime  statistics   overlaid  with  the  results  of  the  tested  browser  performance  for  average  time  to  add  protection  for  new  phishing   sites.  (The  APWG  statistics  for  the  first  half  of  2013  were  not  available  at  the  time  of  writing.)  Note  that  the   browser  phishing  protection  tests  were  performed  only  in  2009,  2012,  and  2013,  so  performance  in  2010  and  2012   is  graphed  in  a  linear  fashion  and  may  not  reflect  actual  performance  in  those  two  years.  Safari  is  the  only  browser   to  have  had  a  worse  response  time  to  phishing  attacks  than  either  the  mean  or  the  average  uptime  for  phishing   sites  since  NSS  began  testing  browsers.  But  Apple  has  dramatically  improved  its  performance,  and  Safari  posted   the  fastest  response  times  in  the  most  recent  test  report.    

The  median  uptime  for  phishing  attacks  is  significantly  lower  than  the  average  response  time  and  is  the  more   important  metric.  All  of  the  browsers  are  adding  protection  very  quickly,  with  IE  requiring  2.6  hours  and  Safari   averaging  30  minutes.  Firefox,  however,  has  demonstrated  the  most  consistent  protection  for  phishing  over  time.    

0%  

10%  

20%  

30%  

40%  

50%  

60%  

70%  

80%  

90%  

100%  

2009   2012   2013  

Chrome  

Firefox  

IE  

Safari  

Average  

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  Figure  7  –  Time  to  Block  Phishing  Attacks  Relative  to  Uptime  Trends  (Hours)    

NSS  Empirical  Results:  Socially  Engineered  Malware  Protection  

Socially  engineered  malware  (SEM)  refers  to  an  attack  that  deceives  users  into  downloading  and  installing   malicious  software.  In  recent  years,  rogue  antivirus  programs  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  SEM;  however,  there   are  many  types  of  malicious  programs  that  criminals  use  in  conjunction  with  social  engineering  for  financial  gain.  

Figure  8  demonstrates  that  there  are,  and  historically  have  been,  dramatic  differences  in  browser  protection   against  SEM.  

  Figure  8  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Socially  Engineered  Malware  

NSS  conducted  six  browser  malware  protection  tests  between  2009  and  2013,  and  IE  significantly  outperformed   the  competition  in  all  six  texts.  Only  recently  has  Chrome  become  a  viable  option  that  provides  significant  malware   protection  for  users.  While  Chrome,  Firefox,  and  Safari  all  use  Google’s  Safe  Browsing  API,  Chrome  alone  

incorporates  Google’s  Content  Agnostic  Malware  Protection  technology  (CAMP).  Prior  to  2012,  all  three  of  the   browsers  using  Google’s  Safe  Browsing  API  performed  comparably.    

  0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70  

2009   2010   2011   2012   2013  

Chrome   Firefox   IE   Safari  

APWG  Average  Uphme   APWG  Median  Uphme  

u 

Google  Buys   VirusTotal  

0%  

20%  

40%  

60%  

80%  

100%  

2009   Q1  2010   Q3  2010   2011   2012   2013  

Chrome   Firefox   IE   Safari  

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When  Google  acquired  VirusTotal,  it  was  widely  assumed  that  the  service  would  be  used  to  improve  Chrome’s   malware  blocking  abilities.  The  2013  results  do  show  an  improvement  in  Chrome’s  mean  block  rate,  but  also  a   significant  drop  in  zero-­‐hour  protection.  If  Google  continues  to  improve  Chrome’s  SEM  protection,  it  may  be   difficult  to  differentiate  the  contribution  of  the  VirusTotal  acquisition  from  ongoing  investment  in  Google’s   Download  Protection  technology.  

As  with  phishing  attacks,  response  time  is  critical  when  providing  protection  against  malware  attacks.  Figure  9   shows  browser  performance  graphed  at  zero  hour  against  SEM  attacks.  IE  significantly  outperforms  the   competition  in  all  six  tests.  Both  Firefox  and  Safari  have  declined  in  SEM  protection  since  2010.  

  Figure  9  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Socially  Engineered  Malware  Block  Rate  

Google’s  Download  Protection  technology  and  Microsoft’s  App  Rep  technologies  are  the  reason  that  Chrome  and   IE  are  able  to  block  such  high  percentages  of  SEM.  Neither  Chrome  nor  IE  relies  on  the  certain  knowledge  that  a   file  is  bad;  rather,  they  block  files  that  do  not  meet  reputational  criteria.  

  Figure  10  –  Content  Agnostic  Malware  Protection  Breakout  

Figure  10  displays  the  combination  of  SEM-­‐blocking  technologies  used  by  Chrome  and  IE.  Both  URL  and  CAMP   protection  methodologies  can  suffer  from  false  positives;  however,  the  more  important  consideration  is  the   protection  that  URL  reputation  adds  over  CAMP.    

u 

Google  buys   VirusTotal  

0%  

20%  

40%  

60%  

80%  

100%  

2009   Q1  2010   Q3  2010   2011   2012   2013  

Chrome   Firefox   IE   Safari  

10.0%  

83.2%  

4.5%  

88.5%  

16.8%  

10.6%  

73.2%  

65.8%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

2013  Chrome   2013  IE   2012  Chrome   2012  IE  

URL  Reputahon   Applicahon  Reputahon   Download  Protechon  

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When  a  web  page  contains  both  exploits  and  SEM,  URL  reputation  will  protect  the  user  from  exploits,  in  addition   to  SEM.  Where  CAMP  is  the  only  protection  mechanism,  the  user  can  still  fall  victim  to  exploits.  Consequently,  IE’s   strong  use  of  URL  reputation  compared  to  Chrome’s  use  renders  IE’s  SEM  protection  significantly  more  valuable.  

Combined  Protection  Effectiveness  

Aggregate  Values  

The  purpose  of  combining  scores  to  arrive  at  a  single  value  is  to  allow  for  the  reuse  of  this  value  in  conjunction   with  other  metrics  in  order  to  select  the  browser  that  best  balances  selection  criteria.  Phishing  and  SEM   protection,  the  metrics  used  in  this  brief,  are  a  part  of  overall  browser  security.  The  number,  severity,  and  

longevity  of  exploits  against  a  browser  constitutes  a  metric,  and  security  of  stored  passwords  is  yet  another  metric.  

Privacy  protection  capabilities,  such  as  those  discussed  in  the  analyst  brief  “2013  Browser  Security  Comparative   Analysis:  Privacy,”  can  be  combined  with  vulnerability  metrics  as  well  as  other  performance  metrics  in  order  to   make  educated  product  selection  decisions  based  on  the  combined  performance  across  all  aspects  of  interest.  

Weight  A  Minute  

Not  all  protection  metrics  are  equal.  The  majority  of  phishing  attacks  will  fail  because  the  intended  victim  is  not  a   customer  of  the  targeted  brand.  A  customer  of  Barclays  is  not  going  to  fall  victim  to  a  phish  against  Wells  Fargo   customers.  A  user  without  a  Gmail  account  will  not  surrender  credentials  if  they  receive  a  phish  targeting  Gmail.    

SEM  attacks  are  brand  agnostic  and  can  even  customize  the  payload  for  specific  operating  systems.  A  larger   percentage  of  SEM  attacks  will  succeed  compared  to  phishing  attacks.  As  such,  protection  against  SEM  is  of  greater   importance  than  phishing  protection.    

For  both  phishing  and  SEM,  time  is  of  the  essence.  Zero-­‐hour  SEM  blocking  is  a  more  important  metric  than  overall   SEM  blocking.  Overall  SEM  blocking  is  of  more  significance  than  zero-­‐hour  phishing  protection,  and  the  mean  block   rate  for  phishing  ranks  lowest  in  the  protection  hierarchy.    

The  data  regarding  the  various  block  rates  is  empirical;  however,  the  weighting  of  relative  security  values  is   subjective  and  the  importance  of  protection  metrics  may  vary  based  on  other  layers  of  protection  in  different   environments.  With  the  exception  of  clearly  unrealistic  weighting  values,  significant  fluctuations  in  weights   assigned  to  protection  categories  and  test  dates  will  not  materially  alter  the  rankings  of  the  browsers.  A  scientific   approach  to  weighting,  if  possible,  would  not  alter  significantly  the  results  of  the  graphs.  The  raw  data  for  the   various  NSS  tests  are  provided  in  Appendix  A.  The  formulas  used  to  weight  the  scores  and  create  the  weighted   figures  are  provided  in  Appendix  B.  

Evaluating  the  Data  

Figure  11  depicts  the  rankings  of  the  browsers  without  ranking  the  importance  of  different  protection  metrics:  that   SEM  protection  is  significantly  more  important  than  phishing  protection,  or  that  newer  tests  are  more  relevant   than  older  tests,  and  so  on.  

The  relative  importance  of  protection  types  is  only  one  of  the  variables  that  require  weighting.  The  freshness  of  

tests  is  critical.  Old  tests  help  assess  a  track  record;  however,  browsers  that  have  added  new  technologies  are  

improperly  impacted  when  older  tests  are  weighted  too  highly.  Equal  value  for  older  tests  also  paints  an  unreliable  

picture  of  browsers  that  are  declining  in  protection  ability.  

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Figure  11  is  not  weighted,  and  it  shows  Firefox  as  out  performing  Chrome  in  the  combined  tests.  In  2009,  Firefox   outperformed  Chrome  by  26  percent  across  the  four  metrics.  In  2012  and  2013,  Chrome  eclipsed  Firefox  by  26   percent  and  25  percent  respectively.  Clearly,  an  accurate  ranking  of  the  browser  requires  more  recent  scores  to   carry  more  weight  than  older  results.  

  Figure  11  –  Combined  Test  Results  (Not  Weighted)  

Leaving  protection  scores  unmodified  and  assigning  older  tests  progressively  less  weight,  Figure  12  shows  Chrome   in  second  place  with  a  significant  lead  over  Firefox  and  Safari.  

  Figure  12  –  Time  Weighted  

Figure  13  does  not  weight  for  time;  however,  the  different  types  of  protection  are  weighted  based  on  relative   importance.  The  resulting  graph  does  not  adequately  reflect  performance  improvements  in  Chrome  with  respect   to  SEM  protection  in  2012  and  2013.  Weighting  values  can  be  found  in  Appendix  B.  

37%  

46%  

49%  

79%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Safari   Chrome   Firefox   IE  

54%  

56%  

66%  

83%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Safari  

Firefox  

Chrome  

IE  

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  Figure  13  –  Protection  Weighted  

  Figure  14  –  Time  and  Protection  Weighted  Scores  

Figure  14  incorporates  weighting  that  places  a  higher  value  on  newer  tests  and  a  higher  value  on  more  important   protection  categories.    

  Figure  15  –  2013  Weighted  Scores  

Both  Figure  14  and  Figure  15  display  a  wider  performance  margin  between  IE  and  Chrome,  as  well  as  between   Chrome  and  the  other  browsers  than  does  Figure  2.  Figure  15  does  not  consider  trends  or  track  records.  If  current   protection  value,  track  records,  and  trends  are  considerations,  then  Figure  14  provides  a  more  comprehensive  

picture  than  does  Figure  15.    

27%  

36%  

39%  

80%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Safari   Firefox   Chrome   IE  

39%  

40%  

58%  

85%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Safari   Firefox   Chrome   IE  

35%  

37%  

71%  

92%  

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100%  

Firefox  

Safari  

Chrome  

IE  

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The  Great  Equalizer  

Both  phishing  and  SEM  are  social  engineering  attacks.  By  definition,  these  are  social  problems,  and  technology  has   rarely  solved  a  social  problem.  Technology  can  help  to  mitigate  problems,  but  education  is  paramount.  For  users   who  are  adept  at  identifying  social  engineering  attacks,  the  browser  adds  little  additional  security;  however,  most   users  are  not  aware  of  the  dynamics  of  social  engineering  and  will  fall  prey  to  SEM  even  when  they  are  able  to   identify  many  types  of  phishing  attacks.  Proper  education  provides  the  best  protection  against  most  social   engineering  attacks.  

   

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Appendix  A:  Raw  Data  

The  figures  in  Appendix  A  provide  the  raw  data  from  NSS  testing  used  to  create  all  of  the  figures  in  this  analyst   brief,  with  the  exception  of  Figure  3,  Figure  4,  Figure  10,  and  the  APWG  metrics  in  Figure  7.  The  APWG  metrics  in   Figure  3,  Figure  4,  and  Figure  7  are  derived  directly  from  APWG  published  reports.  The  percentages  used  in  Figure   10  are  published  in  the  2012  and  2013  Browser  Phishing  Protection  CARs.  

Browser   2009   2012   2013  

Chrome   26%   94%   92%  

Firefox   80%   90%   96%  

IE   83%   92%   83%  

Safari   2%   91%   95%  

Figure  16  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  Phishing  

The  mean  block  rate  for  phishing  reflects  overall  phishing  detection  for  the  duration  of  each  test.    

Browser   2009   2012   2013  

Chrome   16.00%   53.20%   81.50%  

Firefox   48.00%   79.20%   93.30%  

IE   52.00%   55.90%   73.30%  

Safari   2.00%   76.90%   93.40%  

Figure  17  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  

The  zero-­‐hour  block  rate  is  a  critical  metric.  The  value  of  a  higher  mean  block  rate  can  be  marginalized  by  

ineffective  zero-­‐hour  performance.  Due  to  the  diminishing  uptimes  of  phishing  sites,  a  browser  with  a  lower  mean   block  rate  and  better  zero-­‐hour  response  times  may  provide  more  effective  protection  for  most  users  than  will  a   browser  with  a  better  overall  block  rate  but  poorer  zero-­‐hour  performance.  

Browser   2009   Q1  2010   Q3  2010   2011   2012   2013  

Chrome   16%   17%   3%   13%   70%   83%  

Firefox   30%   29%   19%   8%   4%   10%  

IE   69%   85%   99%   99%   99%   100%  

Safari   24%   29%   11%   8%   4%   10%  

Figure  18  –  Mean  Block  Rate  for  SEM  

The  mean  block  rate  for  SEM  reflects  the  SEM  performance  for  the  duration  of  each  test.  Throughout  a  test,   various  browsers  can  fluctuate  significantly  in  their  instantaneous  block  rate.  Histograms  in  NSS  CARs  provide   additional  detail.  

   

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Browser   2009   Q1  2010   Q3  2010   2011   2012   2013  

Chrome   25%   15%   4%   10%   67%   49%  

Firefox   28%   28%   18%   7%   6%   8%  

IE   41%   58%   89%   99%   86%   98%  

Safari   13%   27%   10%   6%   5%   12%  

Figure  19  –  Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  for  SEM  

The  zero-­‐hour  block-­‐rate  is  the  percentage  of  malware  each  browser  was  already  blocking  when  the  hosting  site   was  first  discovered.  Browsers  with  higher  zero-­‐hour  protection  generally  provide  better  protection  than  browsers   with  delayed  protection  times.  

   

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Appendix  B:  Weighting  Formulas  

The  following  multipliers  were  used  in  calculating  weighted  scores.  

Protection  Multipliers:  

Mean  Block  Rate  for  Phishing  =  Score  *  .3   Zero  Hour  Phishing  Block  Rate  =  Score  *  .5   Mean  SEM  Block  Rate  =  Score  *  .8   Zero  Hour  SEM  Block  Rate  =  Score  *  1  

Year  Multipliers:  

2009  =  Score  *  .1   2010  =  Score  *  .2   2011  =  Score  *  .4   2012  =  Score  *  .8   2013  =  Score  *  1  

Figure  20  displays  scores  weighted  for  date  and  not  protection  type.  Figure  21  displays  scores  weighted  for   protection  type  but  not  for  the  dates  of  the  test.  Figure  22  displays  the  combined  protection  type  and  date   weighting.  

Protection   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   10%   X   X   80%   100%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   10%   X   X   80%   100%  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   10%   20%   40%   80%   100%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   10%   20%   40%   80%   100%  

Figure  20  –  Time  Weighting  

Protection   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   30%   X   X   30%   30%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   50%   X   X   50%   50%  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   80%   80%   80%   80%   80%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   100%   100%   100%   100%   100%  

Figure  21  –  Protection  Type  Weighting  

Protection   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   3%   X   X   24%   30%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish   5%   X   X   40%   50%  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   8%   16%   32%   64%   80%  

Zero-­‐Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM   10%   20%   40%   80%   100%  

Figure  22  –  Type  and  Year  Weighting  

   

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The  maximum  time  and  protection  type  weighted  scores  attainable  for  four  protection  types  are  as  follows:  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish:  ((100*.03)+(100*.24)+(100*.3))/3=.19  or  19%.  

Zero  Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish:  ((100*.05)+(100*.4)+(100*.5)/3=.3167  or  31.67%.  

Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM:  ((100*.08)+(100*.16)+(100*.16)+(100*.32)+(100*.64)+(100*.8))/6=.36  or  36%.  

Zero  Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM:  ((100*.1)+(100*.2)+(100*.2)+(100*.4)+(100*.8)+(100*.1))/6=.45  or  45%.  

The  maximum  combined  total  score  is  therefore:  

(.19+31.67+.36+.45)/4=.3292  or  32.92%.  

To  normalize  to  a  100  percent  scale,  the  total  weighted  scores  are  divided  by.3292.  

For  Chrome,  the  total  weighted  performance  for  all  of  the  tests  would  be  calculated  as  follows:  

(((((((0.26*0.03)+(0.94*0.24)+(0.92*0.3))/3)+(((0.16*0.05)+(0.53*0.4)+(0.82*0.5))/3)+(((0.16*0.08)+(0.17*0.16)+(0.

03*0.16)+(0.13*0.32)+(0.7*0.64)+(0.83*0.8))/6)+(((0.25*0.1)+(0.15*0.2)+(0.04*0.2)+(0.1*0.4)+(0.67*0.8)+(0.49))/

6))/4)))/.3292  

Chrome  -­‐  Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish:  ((.26*.03)+(.94*.24)+(.92*.3))/3=17%  

Chrome  -­‐  Zero  Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  Phish:  ((.16*.05)+(.53*.4)+(.82*.5)/3=21%  

Chrome  -­‐  Mean  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM:  ((.16*.08)+(.17*.16)+(.3*.16)+(.13*.32)+(.7*.64)+(.83*.8))/6=20%  

Chrome  -­‐  Zero  Hour  Block  Rate  -­‐  SEM:  ((.25*.1)+(.15*.2)  +(.04*.2)+(.1*.4)+(.67*.8)+(.49*1))/6=.19%  

 

Chrome  -­‐  ((17%+21%+20%+19%)/4)/.3292=58%  

   

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Reading  List  

2013  Browser  Security  Comparative  Analysis  Report:  Phishing  Protection.  NSS  Labs  

https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/2013-­‐browser-­‐security-­‐comparative-­‐analysis-­‐phishing-­‐protection   2012  Browser  Security  Comparative  Analysis  Report:  Phishing  Protection.  NSS  Labs  

https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/2012-­‐browser-­‐security-­‐comparative-­‐analysis-­‐phishing-­‐protection   User  Education  Effectiveness  Can  Be  Measured.  NSS  Labs  

https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/user-­‐education-­‐effectiveness-­‐can-­‐be-­‐measured   2013  Browser  Security  Comparative  Analysis:  Privacy.  NSS  Labs  

https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/browser-security-comparative-analysis-privacy  

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Two functional groups can be identified: (1) process functionalities that support the use of monitoring and interaction data and functionalities in CRM systems

These hours are divided among primary preceptorships with family practice specialists (physicians and nurse practitioners), supplemental preceptorships (specialties), service

The paper compares the welfare properties of two competing organi- zations of the monetary system: The current fractional reserve banking system where banks create inside money versus

If she decides to default, she receives any positive remaining balance - the selling price of the house to the lender minus the outstanding mortgage debt - from the lender, makes

Received: 19 April 2019; Accepted: 23 July 2019; Published: 25 July 2019 Abstract: A study was performed to investigate the hydrogen embrittlement behavior of 18-Ni 300