PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES
IN POLITICAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.
- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands.
- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.
- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of
Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan.
- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as
scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ
- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.
- RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general
configuration of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS.
- It redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as “regime of islands”. They excluded from the baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.
- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) – consists of islands
or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high tide. The principle forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands.
- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago”.
- Constitutional issues:
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris vs. RA 9552
- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of overflight
- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone) – READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas) - Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline) - Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and
complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong.
- Kalayaan Island Group
a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978 c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446 c) RA 9552
- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
- Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation(Senate Blue Ribbon
vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008)
- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR, et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).
• Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10,
2005).
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005; Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI) 2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation)
Tests of valid delegation:
1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]
- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita,
462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws example. Immunity of our heads of state under the principle of exterritoriality and extraterritoriality, Pacta Sunt Servanda, (Mijares vs. Javier)
3. treaties which have become part of customary Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda
vs. Jalandoni (Kellog-Bryan Pact, Statute of Rome)
Transformation- process of adopting the above principles (genrally
adopted….etc.)
- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no
obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
- Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9, 2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated into
our domestic system. A mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. (Breast milk is still the best milk in the world
…
)- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. Because Police power cannot be subject of a treaty)
- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]
- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)- The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader and it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times.
- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is
based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. (Under the Chain of Command)
What is the role of the AFP?- protector of the people from
external threats of our sovereignty
- Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy
v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial
form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President
who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted
- Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear
arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004).
- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,
June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend “compelling state interest”.
- Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.
- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec.,
December 13, 2005)
- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an “imperium in imperio”
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.
- Equal access to opportunity for public service – Pamatong vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not
bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accomodate as many as possible into public office.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino
father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.
- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s
citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.
- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must be citizen of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the “evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.”
- The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.”
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.
- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor
age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that
Tabasa’s parents lost their Philippine citizenship “on account of political or economic necessity”].
- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. - Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite
in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s
application for repatriation. Supra.
- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he
lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino.
- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,
amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those repatriated.
- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19,
2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born
Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases “which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.]
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.”
- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 – Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship. - Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 –
Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.
- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January
19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June
19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the
law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an
additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing
of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of
Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual
citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine Bar.
- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when
he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007-
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1)
a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. - As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.
- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA
292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same.
- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and
jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. The “green card” status in the USA is a renunciation on one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.
ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)
- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)
- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled to do so.
- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996).
- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individual’s permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.
- Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision
in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with
other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.
- Non delegation of legislative power
- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power” and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177.
- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-
Power of Subordinate Legislation – with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling” the details which Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on
the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.-
The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the legislative policy.
- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement
that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.
- The President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s rule-making authority in implementing and executing constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-executory.
- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the
power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.
- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-
Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.
- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list
”
is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 – Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%
threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Rank Party Votes
Garnered Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % (A) Guaranteed Seat (First Round) (B) Additional Seats (Second Round) (C) (B) plus (C), in whole integers (D) Applying the three seat cap (E) 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A. 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A. 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A. 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A. 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A. 6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A. 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A. 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A. 9[31] COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A. 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A. 11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A. 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A. 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A. 14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A. 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A. 16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A. 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A. 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A. 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A. 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A. 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A. 23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A. 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. 25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. 26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A. 27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A. 28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A. 29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A. 30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. 31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A. 32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. 33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. 34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A. 35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. 36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. Total 17 55
- Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that
allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.
- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not
be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor. - Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the
filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20%
allocation of list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum population that must compose legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.
- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010-
In this case, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution.
- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards that the “marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.”
- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown “that the LGBT sector has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity.” It added that the magnitude of opposition against petitioner’s participation in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sector’s lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.
- LEGISLATIVE PERKS – (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) –
The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.
- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmeña vs. Pendatun).
- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a “private organization merely performing public functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not a government official or employee.” Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that “does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress”. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon can validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the members. The base in computing majority is normally the total membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate
President shall be elected by the majority it does not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The
defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are not necessarily the minority.
- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmeña vs Pendatun, The
House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as
congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and movement.
- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress
to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members
of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests
in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into office.
- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009-
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. - Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in
the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or
a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.
- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002-
Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.
- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of
the House of Representatives.
What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in the
certificate of canvass or election returns”. To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.
- This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).
- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution.
- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the case is terminated.
- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so
