Functional and Financial Devolution to Urban Local Bodies and their
Performance in India
*B. K. Bajpai
Professor, Giri Institute of Development Studies, Sector O, Aliganj, Lucknow- 226024 (India) Email address: [email protected]
Introduction
The term, local self-government is technically different from state or national level governments. Hence, for understanding the functioning and the problems of local self-governance, we need to understand the salient features of this connotation. According to dictionaries, ‘self-government’ is a government under the control and direction of the inhabitants of a political unit rather than by an outside authority. In fact, the alien rule did think of self-government at local level or sub-provincial level. In different phases, they had different philosophy for promoting it—right from training of politicians to gradual self-government at higher levels (Rao, V. Venkata (1965). The idea of local self-governance was not initially accepted wholeheartedly in our constitution. As the Constitutional directive (Art. 40) to the State (of India, which means the Union and the unit States) to take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self government, was followed more in breach than in observance (Singhvi, 1989). Notwithstanding, many unit States did good work in many respects. It is a sad story to recount that the Article itself was included as an afterthought, for which Gandhi Ji also had painful reaction for not adhering to democratic base (Mathews, 1996). However, urban local bodies that way were slightly more fortunate as they were in place and they were mentioned in the State List of the Seventh Schedule as item number 5.
In the present set-up, when the city area is self-governed, self-government should mean direct government of public affairs in which elected people have executive powers along with deliberative powers if not exactly what may termed as legislative powers. Local self-governments are expected to deal with local public affairs with the exercise of local public choice. In the economic domain, they are public goods, public utilities and public works of
* Paper for the presentation in Eleventh Himalayan Policy Research Conference (HPRC 2016) Nepal Study Centre, University of New Mexico. Conference venue: Madison, Wisconsin at the University of Wisconsin's, 45th Annual Conference onSouth Asia's (October 20-23, 2016)
2 local nature or local character. While public goods chiefly possess the characteristics of non-rivalry in joint consumption and non-excludability of any consumer in consumption of these goods like sweeping and street lighting. If all individual consumers consume the same amount of a good at the same time, then the consumption is said to be non-rival and therefore non-rival consumption is also referred to as joint consumption.
Yet there are only a few pure public goods. For example, beaches on holidays, parks in fine weather and city streets during rush hours become goods of rival consumption. Non-excludability is often technical but it may be political or economic too. While technically it may be feasible to debar the consumers, who do not pay for the service, the cost of excluding them may be sometimes prohibitive. As their consumption cannot be priced to individuals all of whom are supposed to consume the same amount, they need to be financed from common pool of resources.Some scholars therefore prefer to call them common pool services. There are other public goods, which share the property of non-rivalry but not that of non-excludability for example the use of roads. Such public goods can be accessed on payment (Chaube 2004). Important point to note is that local public goods are supposed to have local reach12.
Public utilities are often natural monopolies and their services are provided through over-ground or underover-ground networks. Some of these services like water supply or electricity can be priced with ease. As charges for some of the services are known as toll, some scholars prefer to call them toll services. Such business organizations are subject to special government regulations. Very often, they are in the charge of municipal governments and sometimes in the charge of some parastatal organizations.
In view of the above theoretical background and conceptual framework of local self-governance, the shape and quality of local self-governance has not been self-complacent in India. Until the recent 74th amendment, local governments in India were organised on the basis of the ‘ultra vires’ principle (beyond the powers or authority granted by law) and the state governments were free to extend or control the functional sphere through executive decisions without an amendment to the legislative provisions.
After this phase, nation has undergone drastic politico- economic transformation. India has headed towards a significant political revolution, almost simultaneously with economic reforms, in the early nineties of the twentieth century. Relative rise of market vis-à-vis state and relative importance of local governments vis-à-vis central and state governments may be viewed as extension of the same logic. The import of perpetual existence, ensured with passage
3 of 73rd and 74th Constitution Amendment Acts, 1992 is yet to be fully realized in terms of complete devolution of functional and financial powers to the elected local bodies across the states in India.
About the Paper
The present paper addresses the issues primarily related to the functional and financial devolution and powers of urban local bodies in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India.An attempt has been made as to why (urban) local bodies have become weak and are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. In order to attain this, the Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, has made it mandatory for the state governments to constitute Urban Local Bodies. A new part, Part IX A, has been enshrined in the Constitution after Part IX of the Constitution. It deals with matters like definition, constitution of municipalities and ward committees, reservation, disqualifications, powers and responsibilities, powers to impose taxes, all relating to the urban local bodies. Article 243 Y stipulates that the Finance Commission constituted under Article 243 I shall review the financial position of the urban local bodies and make recommendations regarding distribution of resources between the State and the urban local bodies, determination of taxes, duties etc. grants-in-aid to urban local bodies, among other matters.
To assess the performance of urban local bodies as enshrined in the principals of local
self-governance, the paper examines the status of functional and financial devolution to ULBs in
the state of Uttar Pradesh and to find out the perception and satisfaction level of the people about the quality of their service delivery. The analysis and results are based on official records, interviews with officials and elected representatives of the ULBs and a detailed field survey to assess the level of satisfaction of the people about the quality of service delivery of ULBs at various levels. Opinion of the public about various aspects of services has been collected on the scale of 1 to 10. The paper is based on a recent study undertaken by the author, sponsored by the Fourth State Finance Commission Uttar Pradesh, India (Bajpai 2004).
4 There are at present 13 Nagar Nigam, 194 Nagar Palika Parishads and 423 Nagar Panchyats in the state. Their regional distribution and percentage share is given below:
Table 1: Regional Distribution and Percentage Share of ULBs in U. P.
Sl. No.
Region Number of ULBs Percent
Nagar Nigam Nagar Palika Parishad Nagar Panchayat Nagar Nigam Nagar Palika Parishad Nagar Panchayat 1. Western 7 107 196 53.8 55.2 46.3 2. Central 2 27 67 15.4 13.9 15.8 3. Eastern 3 42 129 23.1 21.6 30.5 4. Bundelkhand 1 18 31 7.7 9.3 7.3 Total 13 194 423 100.0 100.0 100.0
For the sample design, one Nagar Nigam (NN) has been selected from each region. Apart from these, in view of the large number of other ULBs, around 10 percent of Nagar Palika Parishads (NPPs) and 10 percent of Nagar Panchayats (NPs) have also been selected for sample representation. Thus, in all 4 NNs, 20 NPPs and 42 NPs have been selected representing each of the three levels of urban local governed bodies of the state.
The findings are based on opinion survey of selected 1000 persons for from each of the sample Nagar Nigam, 250 persons from each Nagar Palika Parishad and 56 to 75 persons from each Nagar Panchayat. Thus, the total sample design consists of 66 ULBs and 12002 persons. Income of Urban Local Bodies
Table presented below gives percentage share of income from different sources in the four Nagar Nigams in 2013-14. It can be seen from the table the transfers from SFC contribute a high proportion of total income of the Nagar Nigams. However, the share varied from 24 per cent of total income in Lucknow to more than two-thirds share in Gorakhpur and Jhansi. Grants (mainly under JNNURM) constituted a very high proportion of total income in Lucknow and Meerut Nagar Nigams. One may conclude that the Nagar Nigams still depend largely on transfer of funds through statutory transfers and grants.
Table 2: Percentage Share of Income from Different Sources: 2013-14
5
1 Tax Revenue 13.27 12.07 19.00 17.87
2 Non Tax Revenue 3.98 10.80 6.97 5.18
3 Income from own resources 17.25 22.90 25.97 23.05 4 Transfer from State Finance Commission 23.96 32.46 66.01 72.78 5 Transfer from Central Finance
Commission
1.57 2.18 3.97 4.17
6 Total Transfer 25.53 34.64 69.98 76.95
7 Total Grants 57.22 42.46 4.05 0.00
8 Total Income (3+6+7) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Based on Secondary Data
Table 3 gives Compound Annual Growth Rate in expenditure on various heads during 2009-10 to 2013-14 in the four Nagar Nigams. The Nagar Nigams of Lucknow, Gorakhpur and Meerut show a high growth rate of over 30 per cent per year in their total expenditure. However, in Jhansi Nagar Nigam, CAGR of total expenditure was only 17.55 per cent. Expenditure on public expenditure shows fastest growth among various heads in all the four Nagar Nigams. Meerut Nagar Nigam shows a different growth pattern in expenditure on various heads as compared to other Nagar Nigams. It shows a very high growth under General Administration and Public Construction head, while expenditure on public health and amenities shows a negative trend. Growth pattern of expenditure on various heads was more balanced in the other three local bodies.
Table 3: Compound Annual Growth Rate of Expenditure on Various Heads (2009-10 to 2013-14)
(Figures in %) Sl.
No.
Expenditure-Heads Lucknow Meerut Gorakhpur Jhansi
1 General Administration and Other Expenses
18.57 84.45 21.46 15.26
2 Public Health 15.93 -24.48 20.95 9.36
3 Security and Amenities 14.78 -37.61 12.50 17.16
4 Education 17.79 -2.47 - -
5 Public Construction 22.63 89.79 25.31 20.16
6 Miscellaneous 59.88 -2.54 10.86 43.35
7 Total Expenditure 36.21 32.67 31.08 17.55
Source: Based on Secondary Data
In short, the analysis of financial position reveals that the financial situation in terms of most of the indicators is much better in Lucknow and Meerut Nagar Nigam as compared to Gorakhpur and Jhansi Nagar Nigam. This reflects the differences in the economic base of the different Nagar Nigams.
Transfers through SFC constitute the major source of income of the local bodies at the three levels. The SFC transfers have shown continuous increase over the years. However, the trends
6 in increase in transfers were not smooth. Normally the growth in SFC grants should be in proportion to the growth rate in state revenues. It has also been observed by the CAG that in some years the SFC transfers were lower than the recommended transfers. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that the Finance Department should ensure that the due share of the ULBs should be released to them. If there is any shortfall in a particular year the balance grant should be transferred next year. A smooth and predictable transfer of SFC funds would help the ULBs to plan their expenditure in a systematic manner.
It has been observed that there are very large variations in per capita income and expenditure of the different ULBs. This results in uneven quality of services provided by these bodies in their area. The transfer mechanism has not been able to deal with the issue of uneven fiscal capacity of the ULBs with a view to ensure a similar level of quality of services in the urban local bodies. The SFC should suggest a devolution mechanism which is able to deal with this situation so that a uniform level of public services is available in all the local bodies in the state. It has also been reported that a part of the devolution amount is deducted by the Urban Development Department at source to meet the dues of Power Corporation. This practice is not in consonance with the principle of decentralization. A suitable mechanism for payment of power dues by the ULBs should be devised.
The pattern of specific grants to different ULBs is erratic and leaves scope for favouritism due to political considerations. Certain norms should be laid down governing specific grants. Financial Performance of the ULBs
There is very high dependence of the ULBs at the three levels on the grants from the SFC and CFC. ULBs contribute only a small proportion of their total income from their own resources. The dependence is heavier in case of lower level ULBs. Consequently, the ULBs enjoy little fiscal autonomy.
The performance of different ULBs in raising resources shows wide variations. The revenue collection targets generally remain unmet. There are large amounts of dues against current and old demand. The tax collection machinery in the ULBs is lax and deficient in many ways. One also observes marked year-to-year fluctuations in the income of the ULBs. This affects the quality of expenditure planning. In many years total income exceeded total expenditure of the year. This reflects on the poor financial planning and low expenditure capability of the ULBs.
7 Administrative and establishment expenditure constitutes a large part of the total expenditure of the ULBs. Consequently they are able to spend a very small fraction of their income on public utilities like drinking water, sanitation, health and educational facilities, etc. Due priority to these services should be paid. Adequate resources should be put in the hands of the ULBs so that they are able to discharge their expected functions properly.
The analysis of the financial performance of the ULBs indicates the need of strengthening the financial planning as well as financial control and management systems of the urban local bodies. Effective monitoring is required in the process of tax collection. There should be a check on the high expenditure on general administration and other expenses.
Status of Functional and Financial Devolution to ULBs
It is observed that full functional and financial devolution to Urban Local Bodies as envisaged in the 74th Constitutional Amendment has not been made as it is felt that the capacity of the ULBs to discharge all these functions is limited. We sought the opinion of the officials and elected representatives of the urban local bodies regarding the status and future possibilities of functional and financial devolution of powers to the urban local bodies.
Table 4: Opinion about Financial Autonomy
Sl.No Reason Lucknow Gorakhpur Jhansi Meerut Total
1 No say in fixing tax rates
- 2(66.67) 1(50.00) - 3(27.27)
2 74th CAA not fully implemented
4(100.0) 1(33.33) 1(50.00) 2(100.0) 8(72.73)
Total 4(100.0) 3(100.0) 2(100.0) 2(100.0) 11(100.0)
Source: Based on Primary data
About 73 percent elected representatives complained about interference of government and departmental officers in their decision making process. Around 90 percent reported government and departmental officers’ role in taking ULBs’ policy decisions (Table 4). Over 65 percent found that only government and departmental officers take decisions for the promotion and appointment of the employees. About 85 percent held the view that administrative obligations cannot be fulfilled without taking permission from them.
All the elected mayors and other members of Nagar Nigams held the view that functioning of the urban local bodies will be improved with the attainment of functional autonomy to these
8 bodies. They also assured that full functional autonomy to the ULBs will not lead to any kind of problem.
Majority of the elected representatives interviewed were of the view that all administrative and financial rights should vest with the ULBs. They also felt that Nagar Nigams should be authorised to create and fill vacancies other than appointments of centralised vacancies in view of general shortage of employees in ULBs and they should be authorized for making adverse entries to the officers of ULBs to make them accountable to local bodies (Table 5).
Table 5: Items on which Financial Autonomy should be Granted to ULBs
Sl. No
Items Lucknow Gorakhpur Jhansi Meerut Total
1. Full Administrative and financial autonomy
4(80.00) 2(40.00) 2(40.00) 5(100.0) 13(65.00)
2. Appointment of Officials and staff
2(40.00) 3(60.00) 4(80.00) 2(40.00) 11(55.00) 3. Power to give adverse
entry
3(60.00) 5(100.0) 3(60.00) 4(80.00) 14(70.00) Total 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 20(100.0)
Source: Based on Primary data
A large number of elected representatives reported that permission is required from the government or officers of the related departments for various matters (Table 6).
Table 6: Issues on which Government Permission is Required
¼
Multiple Response½
Sl.No.
Items Lucknow Gorakhpu
r
Jhansi Meerut Total
1 Revision in tax rates 4(80.00) 4(80.00) 4(40.00) 3(60.00) 15(75.00 ) 2 Increasing fees and duties 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 20(100.0
) 3 Budget allocation among
different heads
2(40.00) 3(60.00) 5(100.0) 4(80.00) 14(70.00 ) 4 Financial sanctions 3(60.00) 5(100.0) 4(80.00) 3(60.00) 15(50.00
) 5 Receipt of grant from
internal and external agencies
2(40.00) 2(40.00) 3(60.00) 2(40.00) 9(45.00)
Total 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 5(100.0) 20(100.0 )
Source: Based on Primary data
Thus, most of the officials and elected representatives of the ULBs complained about lack of real autonomy and excessive interference of the government and the departmental heads in the
9 functioning and decision making process of ULBs. This is not in the true spirit of the 74th Constitutional amendment for empowering the local bodies to function as local self government. In view of this ULBs should be given more financial and administrative powers to take their own decisions. The role of the government should be to provide broad guidelines and exercise general supervision. Adequate checks and balances need to be put in place. Transfer of Functions to ULBs
At present only 12 out of the 18 functions listed in the Twelfth Schedule have been transferred to the ULBs. In general, the elected representatives and officials of the ULBs expressed the view that these functions should also be transferred to the ULBs as they have the capacity to handle them properly. However, most of the citizens interviewed had their reservation about transfer of more functions to ULBs particularly in the NNPs and NPs. On the question on transfer of other departmental functions like fire fighting, urban forestry, environmental protection, protection to weaker sections, developmental programmes for slum areas and other functions of development authorities, the opinion of respondents was solicited. Around 3 percent to 19 percent have suggested for transferring these function from different department to urban local bodies. Maximum, 19 percent have agreed for transferring developmental programmes for slum areas to local bodies. Whereas, only about 3 percent have agreed for the transfer of development authorities’ functions to the local bodies. More than 6 percent to 17 percent have also agreed to the transfer of other departmental activities to the local bodies (Table 7).
Table 7: Transfer of Departmental Activities to Local Bodies
Type of Habitation Slum area Traditional old area Housing Development Authority Colony on Personal/ Society Plotting Housing Scheme of Private Developer Total
Fire Bridge Yes 28 (6.01) 123 (6.21) 41 (5.30) 32 (5.25) 20 (11.49) 244 (6.10) No 400 (85.84) 1812 (91.52) 721 (93.27) 477 (78.33) 143 (82.18) 3553 (88.78) Can’t Say 38 (8.15) 45 (2.27) 11 (1.42) 100 (16.42) 11 (6.32) 205 (5.12) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00) Urban Forest Yes 30
(6.44) 231 (11.67) 84 (10.87) 59 (9.69) 52 (29.89) 456 (11.39) No 187 (40.13) 1495 (75.51) 533 (68.95) 505 (82.92) 110 (63.22) 2830 (70.71) Can’t Say 249 (53.43) 254 (12.83) 156 (20.18) 45 (7.39) 12 (6.90) 716 (17.89) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00) Environmental Protection Yes 26 (5.58) 215 (10.86) 122 (15.78) 72 (11.82) 41 (23.56) 476 (11.89) No 440 1765 651 537 133 3526
10 (94.42) (89.14) (84.22) (88.18) (76.44) (88.11) Can’t Say 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00) Protection of weaker section in Society Yes 55 (11.80) 319 (16.11) 172 (22.25) 117 (19.21) 32 (18.39) 695 (17.37) No 213 (45.71) 1600 (80.81) 450 (58.21) 349 (57.31) 132 (75.86) 2744 (68.57) Can’t Say 198 (42.49) 61 (3.08) 151 (19.53) 143 (23.48) 10 (5.75) 563 (14.07) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00) Improvement & Up gradation of slum area Yes 63 (13.52) 391 (19.75) 146 (18.89) 112 (18.39) 36 (20.69) 748 (18.69) No 245 (52.58) 1500 (75.76) 601 (77.75) 412 (67.65) 128 (73.56) 2886 (72.11) Can’t Say 158 (33.91) 89 (4.49) 26 (3.36) 85 (13.96) 10 (5.75) 368 (9.20) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00) Development Authorities function Yes 12 (2.58) 51 (2.58) 21 (2.72) 10 (1.64) 9 (5.17) 103 (2.57) No 243 (52.15) 1189 (60.05) 310 (40.10) 298 (48.93) 100 (57.47) 2140 (53.47) Can’t Say 211 (45.28) 740 (37.37) 442 (57.18) 301 (49.43) 65 (37.36) 1759 (43.95) Total 466 (100.00) 1980 (100.00) 773 (100.00) 609 (100.00) 174 (100.00) 4002 (100.00)
Source: Based on primary data
Thus, most of the respondents did not like the idea of transferring the government departmental functions to the local bodies across the state's ULBs.
Quality of Service Delivery by ULBs
As stated earlier, the quality of service delivery was rated by the beneficiary respondents on ten points scale. The behaviour and responses of local bodies’ functionaries towards attending the problems of citizens were found to be good only according to 20 percent respondents across the four sample cities representing Nagar Nigams of the state. About 50 percent found their behaviour as satisfactory. According to 30 percent respondents, the attitude of officials/ functionaries has been bad towards required cooperation for solving their problems (Table 8).
11
Table 8: Ranking the Responses of Local Bodies’ Functionaries regarding Solving the Problems in City According to Satisfaction Level on 10 Point Scale
(1being worst and 10 the best) – Combined Type of
Habitation
Poor Satisfactory Good Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Slum area 2 37 44 76 122 83 44 33 14 11 466 (100.00) (0.43) (7.94) (9.44) (16.31) (26.18) (17.81) (9.44) (7.08) (3.00) (2.36) 159(34.12) 249(53.43) 58(12.45) Traditional old area 4 49 156 418 327 346 330 194 102 54 1980 (100.00) (0.20) (2.47) (7.88) (21.11) (16.52) (17.47) (16.67) (9.80) (5.15) (2.73) 627(31.67) 1003(50.66) 350(17.68) Housing Development Authority 4 11 47 128 182 125 90 99 57 30 773 (100.00) (0.52) (1.42) (6.08) (16.56) (23.54) (16.17) (11.64) (12.81) (7.37) (3.88) 190(24.58) 397(51.36) 186(24.06) Colony on Personal/ Society Plotting 4 20 42 97 157 64 64 88 48 25 609 (100.00) (0.66) (3.28) (6.90) (15.93) (25.78) (10.51) (10.51) (14.45) (7.88) (4.11) 163(26.77) 285(46.80) 161(26.44) Housing Scheme of Private Developer 0 5 13 30 25 19 39 30 8 5 174 (100.00) (0.00) (2.87) (7.47) (17.24) (14.37) (10.92) (22.41) (17.24) (4.60) (2.87) 48(27.59) 83(47.70) 43(24.71) Total 14 122 302 749 813 637 567 444 229 125 4002 (100.00) (0.35) (3.05) (7.55) (18.72) (20.31) (15.92) (14.17) (11.09) (5.72) (3.12) 1187(29.66) 2017(50.40) 798(19.94)
Source: Based on primary data
The results of satisfaction levels of beneficiary respondents at second tier of ULBs, i.e. NPPs were clubbed into four regions of the state. Above 50 percent to more than 56 percent respondents of four regions rated their working system and functioning at average level. The poor ratings for the same were reflected from 19 percent to above 23 percent respondents of NPPs across the regions.
Overall, working system and functioning of members of NPPs in four regions was rated to be good by 25 percent, average by 53 percent and poor according to minimum 23 percent respondents (Table 9).
12
Table 9: Ranking the Functioning of Elected Representatives of NPPs According to Beneficiary Satisfaction Level on 10 Point Scale (1being worst and 10 the best) –
Combined Region Type of
Habitation
Poor Satisfactory Good Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Slum area 5 20 95 137 234 202 121 194 120 52 1180 (100.00 ) (0.42 ) (1.69 ) (8.05 ) (11.61 ) (19.83 ) (17.12 ) (10.25 ) (16.44 ) (10.17 ) (4.41 ) 257(21.78) 557(47.20) 366(31.02) Traditional old area 3 60 160 247 445 381 335 318 154 71 2174 (100.00 ) (0.14 ) (2.76 ) (7.36 ) (11.36 ) (20.47 ) (17.53 ) (15.41 ) (14.63 ) (7.08) (3.27 ) 470(21.62) 1161(53.40) 543(24.98) Housing Developmen t Authority 2 15 76 117 213 184 149 99 80 23 958 (100.00 ) (0.21 ) (1.57 ) (7.93 ) (12.21 ) (22.23 ) (19.21 ) (15.55 ) (10.33 ) (8.35) (2.40 ) 210(21.92) 546(56.99) 202(21.09) Colony on Personal/ Society Plotting 0 11 39 90 170 117 62 77 31 16 613 (100.00 ) (0.00 ) (1.79 ) (6.36 ) (14.68 ) (27.73 ) (19.09 ) (10.11 ) (12.56 ) (5.06) (2.61 ) 140(22.84) 349(56.93) 124(20.23) Housing Scheme of Private Developer 0 1 6 12 23 12 7 8 5 1 75 (100.00 ) (0.00 ) (1.33 ) (8.00 ) (16.00 ) (30.67 ) (16.00 ) (9.33) (10.67 ) (6.67) (1.33 ) 19(25.33) 42(56.00) 14(18.67) Total 10 107 376 603 1085 896 674 696 390 163 5000 (100.00 ) (0.20 ) (2.14 ) (7.52 ) (12.06 ) (21.70 ) (17.92 ) (13.48 ) (13.92 ) (7.80) (3.26 ) 1096(21.92) 2655(53.10) 1249(24.98)
Coming down to the third tier of ULBs in the state, i.e. Nagar Panchayats (NPs), the responses of the beneficiaries are presented in Table 10. The regional level results are clubbed in to a single table. Overall, working system and functioning of members of NPs in four regions was rated to be good by 24 percent, average by 53 percent and poor according to minimum 22 percent respondents.
Table 10: Ranking the Functioning of Elected Representatives in City According to Satisfaction Level of Beneficiaries on 10 Point Scale (1being worst and 10 the best) –
Combined Region
Type of Habitation
Poor Satisfactory Good Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Slum area 0 5 17 23 48 30 18 33 17 12 203 (100.00) (0.00) (2.46) (8.37) (11.33) (23.65) (14.78) (8.87) (16.26) (8.37) (5.91) 45(22.17) 96(47.29) 62(30.54) Traditional old area 2 7 216 321 590 461 269 276 207 109 2458 (100.00) (0.08) (0.28) (8.79) (13.06) (24.00) (18.76) (10.94) (11.23) (8.42) (4.43) 546(22.21) 1320(53.70) 592(24.08) Colony on Personal/ Society Plotting 0 13 19 44 90 66 31 45 20 11 339 (100.00) (0.00) (3.83) (5.60) (12.98) (26.55) (19.47) (9.14) (13.27) (5.90) (3.24) 76(22.42) 187(55.16) 76(22.42) Total 2 25 252 388 728 557 318 354 244 132 3000 (100.00) (0.07) (0.83) (8.40) (12.93) (24.27) (18.57) (10.60) (11.80) (8.13) (4.40) 667(22.23) 1603(53.43) 730(24.33)
13 Conclusively, the quality of services provided by the local bodies is not found to be satisfactory by a large majority of the respondents. Moreover, there are variations in the quality of services provided in different areas of the same city or town. As many as 24 percent respondents have found the performance of the Nagar Nigams as good. 54 percent rated their performance as satisfactory. 22 percent rated the performance as poor. Overall working of the NPPs was rated to be good by 25 percent respondents, satisfactory by 52 percent and poor by 23 percent respondents. One-fourth respondents rated working of the NPs as good. 53 percent rated them as satisfactory and the remaining 22 per cent as poor.
Many suggestions have come up to improve the quality of services provided by the ULBs. Some of the important ones are ensuring regular piped water supply for longer hours, appointment of adequate number of cleaning staff, proper garbage collection and disposal system and construction and maintenance of roads in urban areas should be the exclusive domain of ULBs. However, the funds may be mobilised from other line departments.
Huge investments are required to improve the quality of services provided by the local bodies. Funds from various sources have to be mobilized for this purpose. These would include the following:
1. Higher transfers to the local bodies through SFC and CFC.
2. Higher plan grants for infrastructure through schemes like JNNURM.
3. Higher user charges for the services provided. At least O & M cost should be recovered. 4. Outsourcing of services to private agencies through PPP model.
5. Municipal bodies particularly the Nagar Nigams should be empowered to raise resources by floating bonds.
Conclusion
The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 has brought about a revolutionary change in local self-governance in Uttar Pradesh in particular and across the states of India in general. It provides a basis for the State Legislatures to guide the State Governments in the assignment of various responsibilities to municipalities and to strengthen municipal governance. Accordingly, several State Governments have amended their Municipal Acts/Laws/ Legislations so as to bring these in conformity with the Constitutional Provisions.
14 Yet, the local bodies have not been able to fulfill the expectations, particularly in case of the state of Uttar Pradesh, which were aroused by the 74th Constitutional amendment. The major reason has been the lack of political commitment and unwillingness to devolve funds and functions to the local bodies on the part of the state government. This is sometimes justified on the ground that the local bodies do not have the capacity to discharge the functions. Some basic factors like, lake of own income sources, non-transfer of all mandatory functions, weak administrative system, un healthy relations between elected representatives and officials of ULBs and unsatisfactory service delivery have emerged as basic bottlenecks in the process of healthy functioning of ULBs. The correct approach would be to empower the local bodies in terms of functions, funds and functionaries. Simultaneously, in view of the public opinion that ULBs are not capable of handling more than existing functions, measures are required to built up the capacity of the local bodies so that they can handle all functions expected from them as mentioned in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution.
References
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L.M. Sighvi (1989), Report on Revitalisation of PRIs for Democracy and Development, as excerpted in Kuruksheta, Vol. 37, No.5.
Mathews, George (1996), Panchayats: The Local Self-Government System in India, Included in Decentralised Governance in Asian Countries, edited by Abdul Aziz and David D. Arnold, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
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Bajpai, B. K. (2014), Report on ‘Functional and Financial Devolution to Urban Local Bodies and Quality of their Service Delivery in UP’, Sponsored by Fourth State Finance Commission, government of Uttar Pradesh, Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow.
