Auditing Internet Security
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Session Objectives
IS Auditors have enough confidence to use ITGC skills to audit Internet security to a medium assurance level
Internet Security Audit =
1. IT General Control
+
2. Access control audit – of the Internet gateway vis
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Agenda
What is Internet security Internet security technology Common IT General Controls Specific Internet security controls
Agenda
Internet security - Goals
Secure connection to the Internet
Block access to internal systems
Protect Web Applications
Control internal personnel use of the Internet Secure remote access
Threats and Risks
Threats Risks
Hackers extract and publish sensitive information
Databases
Executive files, negotiation strategies
Legal files IP
Staff publish sensitive info
x Damages – litigation x Loss of business position x Breach of legal duties x Loss of competitive
advantage
Denial of service x Cash flow – loss of sales
x Reputation
Theft of credit card details x Liability to bank
Spoofing of your email x Damages and litigation Staff and porn x Damages and litigation
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Network Layers
Application Physical Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Application (HTTP, FTP) Host-to-host (TCP, UDP) Network (IP) Network Access OSI Model TCP/IP ModelFiltering Layers
AUD11 SPEAKER: Gary Gaskell (QLD), Infosec Services 12
Filtering Layers
Copyright (c) Infosec Services
Pty Ltd 2008 14
IP Types
IP
Basic type
Competitor to IPX, SNA, Decnet, etc
ICMP – Internet Control Message Protocol
Used for flow control, ‘pinging’
TCP – Transmission Control Protocol
3-way handshake
Starts with a ‘SYN’ synchronise request State maintained in the kernel
UDP – Universal Datagram Protocol
‘stateless’
A look back to 2002
Rating Maturity
Objective
Controls
Gateway
User
1 Initial Basic filtering, block incoming Home user, SOHO
2 Repeatable Customised filtering, good technician SME
3 Defined Content scanning, change control, logging Major companies and Government 4 Managed Risk management, compensating
controls, monitoring, CSIRP, Industry evaluated products
Banks, high information asset companies
5 Optimised ISO 15408 Evaluated products, formal accreditation process
Sensitive Government
Auditing
Context
Review enterprise security policy, network security standards Identify regulatory information security requirements
Review security incident history Review service provision model
In house
Outsourced – IAAS, PAAS, SAAS, etc
Determine assurance requirements
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Network access control – AKA packet
filtering
Basic packet filtering
Rare these days Filtering on
Destination IP address Source IP address
Destination port (AKA service, eg, HTTP, telnet) Source port
Network Access Control
Stateful
Most common, Checkpoint, Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance, PIX, e.g.
Recent outgoing DNS name lookup Permit the DNS response
Firewall understands ‘network’ sessions
Application level
Network Access Control – Application Level
Application protocol compliance and misuse
Enforce protocol rules
E.g. Only DNS over the DNS port
Block risky but compliance protocol options, e.g. SMTP - EXPN
Content filtering
Filtering – What to look for
Ingress
Very restricted rules
Restricted access to DMZ resources No access direct to internal networks No blanket access for remote access
DMZ to internal networks
only essential connections
Egress
Enforcement of use of proxies, e.g.
SMTP = enforce use of corporate email HTTP = enforce use of content filter DNS = enforce use of trusted DNS server
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Content Inspection
Malware
Viruses, worms
Buffer overflow attemtps Other exploitations
Unauthorised content
Keywords, e.g. F**K Images – skin tones, etc
Intrusion Prevention Systems
Evolution from Network IDS
Historically separate IDS with feedback to the firewall
Now mostly part of a firewall but licensed separately
Requires annual subscription
IDS engine dynamically writes firewall rules
Detection techniques
Signatures
Anomaly / Heuristics Blacklists
Disclosure Loss Prevention tools (DLP)
(rarely tuned well)
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Testing - Passive
AUD11 SPEAKER: Gary Gaskell (QLD), Infosec Services 24
Ask the administrator to show you the settings
Less audit risk than accessing the admin account yourself
Inspect key controls
Applicable security policy
Technical configuration settings
Logging and incident response capability
Review the firewall ruleset
Inspect the IDS/IPS console
Testing – Review Firewall Rules
Default deny policy?
Permit risky protocols?
Protocols with plaintext passwords
Protocols permitting remote control or access
Decisions based on untrustworthy source information?
Rules match authorised usage
Rule documentation
Testing – Passive (3)
AUD11 SPEAKER: Gary Gaskell (QLD), Infosec Services 26
Documentation
Network diagrams
Secure architecture?
Ruleset descriptions? Maintainable? Periodically reviewed?
Infrastructure inspection
Patch cables
Match diagrams?
Software flaws patch plans/records
Check for evidence of control effectiveness
Test reports (including regression testing)
System logs
Testing – Passive (4)
Change Control
Security risk
Normal ITIL controls
Administrator
Authentication and logging From a trusted location Skills
DMZ Servers Operating Systems
Use standard server security checklist
At the high security level
Vendor security manual, ASD or AusCERT list, Center for Internet Security
Inspect
Usual ITGC
Running network services
“netstat –a”
“rpcinfo –p” (on unix)
Patching
Malicious software controls
Logging – sent to a separate trusted repository?
Multiple homed DMZ servers – get the admin to show it is not a router
Get the admin to run the vendor’s security tools for you
DMZ Middleware
Often the weakest point
Web services access control
Middleware ‘containers’ have access control list – Inspect Web services – access control
Authentication to access web services? Logging?
Databases
DMZ Servers Continued
Backed up?
Part of an IT Disaster Recovery Plan ?
Tested?
Increasing using “High Availability” and auto failover
ASD’s Top 35 Mitigations
Firewalls, network segmentation, proxy enforcement
Host and network IPS, centralized network logging
Email spoof controls – Sender Policy Framework
Block certain file types
Email and Web content filtering, malware controls
Web domain whitelisting, blacklist known malicious domains
Patching
Dynamic analysis of email and web - sandbox
Testing – Active
AUD11 SPEAKER: Gary Gaskell (QLD), Infosec Services 32
Check control effectiveness
Scan accessible ports – does the admin have the tools?
Tools: nmap
Scan application vulnerabilities
Tools: nessus, acunetix, Appscan, Burp Suite, Hailstorm, NTO Spider, Qualsys, WebInspect
Penetration tests by service provider?
Testing – Analysis v’s Pen Tests
Pen tests and scans great for obvious stuff ups
Weaknesses hard to find by pen tests
Rules with source network filters
Rules for decommissioned servers (firewall rule reuse) No filtering from DMZ to internal networks
No egress filtering
Messed up firewall object definitions Firewall software flaws and patches
Finifter and Wagner, UC Berkley
Scope: code review
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/webapps11.pdf
?
Analysis
Testing
Web Deployment Trends
Virtualisation, virtualisation, virtualisation
Co-hosting with other’s web services Server virtualisation
Storage virtualization
Voice over IP security
Trends - Storage Virtualisation
Alternative routes into the inside
Shared server virtualization infrastructure Stretching of SANs into the DMZ
All of an organisation’s data in one place
SAN controls
Zoning, with Host Bus Adapters LUN masks or Access Control Lists
Virtual servers can have very broad SAN access Use a separate SAN
OWASP
Trends - Server Virtualisation
Internet servers on the internal VM farm,
but mainly separate VM farms
Several key controls not on by default
ARP spoofing MAC changes
Many DOS controls Persistent log files
Trends - Server Virtualisation (2)
Sprawl
Duplicates running
AV forgotten on virtual server clones Copies of other system snapshots
Clones of insecure development configurations
VM Snapshots unprotected on file system
References
Vmware Security Hardening Guides
17 September 2002 CACS 2002 48
Corrective Controls
Incident Response
Is there an incident response plan?
Does the CSIRP cover management processes and technical responses? Is evidence protected?
Controls Effectiveness
Logs
Are they protected?
Are they stored on a separate server?
Is it the only gateway?
Wireless Modems
17 September 2002 CACS 2002 53
Controls Effectiveness
Malicious content scanning
Frequency of signature updates Quality of tool
Scan by heuristics and signatures
Additional scanning on server or desktop Inspection regardless of file type
Inspection inside of archive files HTTPS scanning
HTTPS whitelisting, or blacklisting
Internet Routing Authenticity
BGP authentication
Border router outside the firewall
Reference, NIST SP800-54
Real world attacks and accidents
China Telecom advertised 37 000 unowned networks 2010 Pakistan Telecom blocks YouTube 2008
Malaysian ISP blocks Yahoo 2004
Turkish ISP takes over the Internet 2004,
TTNet sent out a full table of Internet routes via BGP that routed most Internet traffic through Turkey for several hours
Standards and Guidelines
ISO 27002, 27005
Australian Government Information Security Manual Security
Vendor Guides
COBIT
NIST
csrc.nist.gov
Center for Internet Security (SANS)
www.cisecurity.org
O’Reilly & Assoc publications
Spafford Cheswick
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Threats, Vulnerabilities and Risks
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Threats exploit Vulnerabilities expose
Value
Assets
(incl Business Processes)