It is of course perfectly possible that advocates of associate European citizenship themselves do not exactly know what they are proposing or what the implications of their proposal might be. As noble as their motives may be, if these advocates have more in mind than merely freezing the legal status of UK nationals living in “Europe”, one must be cautious. Critical questions must be addressed. If this envisaged status is meant as a status separate from EU citizenship, yet encompassing the same or very similar rights as the latter, does it not undermine EU citizenship? Even if it were estab- lished that the EU can formally confer all rights that it offers to its own citizens to third country nationals, does the very existence of EU citizenship not command restrictions? Further, and recalling what has previously been said about Art. 50 TEU, why is there at all a need for the EU to consider introducing a new status to the benefit of people who have collectively, and fully in accordance with their own internal constitutional norms and procedures, decided to step out of the Union and decided to give up their EU citi- zenship? Apparently, the majority who voted in favour of Brexit did not consider EU citi- zenship important enough. And whatever others may think of this choice, the choice to leave the EU made was entirely legally. Those who voted to remain simply have to ac- cept that they, as a result of UK constitutional rules, lost the battle and, with that, EU citizenship and all rights flowing from this status. In fact, by offering one-sidedly associ- ate citizenship to those UK nationals who wish to remain part of the European integra- tion project, the EU is meddling in the internal affairs of a former Member State in which it arguably should not meddle.
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Furthermore, the EIB’s role in mandate management means that it has taken an important step in terms of assuming indirect responsibility over the implementation of Cohesion Policy budget. However, under the shared management model final responsibility for implementation of Cohesion Policy lies with the Member State and the Commission. Over time, the EIB’s role has expanded to include a wide range of analytical and advisory services as well as capacity-building activities. Of particular importance in the 2007-13 period was the EIB and EIF’s roles in the development and implementation of ‘Special Support Instruments’. JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) – a TA initiative to help managing authorities set up investment funds supporting sustainable urban development. The JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises) initiative offered EU Member States TA assistance, through their national or regional managing authorities, the opportunity to explore possibilities of using part of their EU Structural Funds to finance small and medium-sized enterprises by means of equity, loans or guarantees. The EIB and EIF were involved by:
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For one thing, adding the adverb “manifestly” in point 1 underscores the exceptional nature of the public policy ground. For another, the ground most commonly relied on by debtors to oppose enforcement has been modified to avoid abuses of procedure. To prevent enforcement being excluded, it will be enough for the defaulting defendant in the State of origin to have been served with notice in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. A mere formal irregularity in the service procedure will not debar recognition or enforcement if it has not prevented the debtor from arranging for his defence. Moreover, if the debtor was in a position to appeal in the State of origin on grounds of a procedural irregularity and has not done so, he is not entitled to invoke that procedural irregularity as a ground for refusing or revoking a declaration in the State addressed. Thirdly, the ground of failure to abide by a rule of private international law in the State addressed relating to personal status and capacity of natural persons has been dropped as these rules are gradually being approximated in the Member States. Lastly, to fill a gap in the Brussels Convention, the ground of irreconcilable judgments has been extended to cover judgments given in another Member State. Of course, the court may not review the judgment as to substance. Article 42
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Where UCITS are distributed by MiFID firms, the latter will have to comply with the rules on inducements. Because UCITS management companies are allowed to distribute third party funds under the Management Company Directive (at least according to CESR’s interpretation), it was considered necessary to extend MiFID rules on inducements to cover the remuneration agreements struck between UCITS management companies and the fund management groups whose funds they may distribute in addition to their own, precisely in order to ensure that the playing field would be level. How exactly the complex interaction between the UCITS and MiFID Directives plays out in practice will therefore have an important impact on the European fund industry, not least because UCITS constitute the vast majority of funds in the EU. This interaction is further complicated by the very real possibility that MiFID will be applied and interpreted differently in the various EU Member States, meaning that the way MiFID and UCITS interact is also likely to vary from Member State to Member State. In reality, the potential impact of MiFID on the asset management industry, especially on distribution, could well reach far beyond what anyone had anticipated, or indeed, the European Commission intended.
The First Directive only outlined in broad terms the working of the harmonised VAT system and was accompanied, at the same time, by the Second VAT Directive, which specified the principles regarding rates and the right of deduction. However, spurred on by the Council Decision of 21st April 1970 stating that, from 1975, the Community budget would be financed by own resources, of which VAT would be an innovative feature, the concept of a harmonised VAT system was further developed with the introduction of the 6th Directive (77/388/EEC) in 1977 (itself recast and simplified in Directive 2006/112/EC). This Directive brought together the rules for the common system of VAT, and acts as a model for many tax systems internationally. The Directive aimed to further align the system, and whilst it did not achieve complete harmonisation, allowing Member States some flexibility on various aspects such as rates, it was a significant step towards the commonality which had been the driving principle of the Community. Many of the flexibilities and derogations allowed to Member States are either explicitly limited in time or remain in place until the imposition of a definitive, harmonised system based on a system of taxation in the Member State of origin.
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The implications for the model as a whole are more easily substantiated. The inclusion of the array of country fixed effects variables forces us to reconsider the importance of relative per capita income in the determination of member state attitudes about enlarging the European Union to particular candidate countries. We have no clear explanation for this outcome except to suggest that our presumption that a vague understanding of relative income is sufficient to drive attitudes for the reasons we outlined is incorrect or overdrawn. The same reasoning applies to the variable for the relative importance of agriculture in total employment. Again, as our theoretical expectations were predicated upon somewhat unrealistic information requirements, the mitigation of this statistical relationship is unproblematic (and indeed vaguely reassuring).
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The environment in which trade statistics are collected has changed radically in recent years, leading to a detailed revision of the regulations. For statistics on trade with non-member countries, the introduction in 1988 of the Combined Nomenclature of goods (CN) and the Single Administrative Document had already led to considerable methodological changes. However, the major changes were brought about by the introduction of the single market on 1 January 1993. This led to the abolition of customs formalities between the Member States which had served as the traditional source of trade statistics, and the introduction of a special collection system called INTRASTAT. The accession of three new member states in 1995 led Eurostat to recalculate its historical series for the European Union to include Austria, Finland and Sweden; therefore figures published here concern the fifteen Members unless stated otherwise. Trade statistics - both detailed and global results - have now proved their worth. They are an instrument of prime importance for both public and private users. For instance, they enable Community authorities to prepare multilateral and bilateral negotiations on common trade policy; they help European businesses to carry out market surveys and thus improve their competitiveness; they are an essential source of information for statistics on the balance of payments, the national accounts and short-term economic studies. This non-exhaustive list highlights the variety of users and their requirements.
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towards a deeper and more integrated economic union (encompassing a ‘fiscal union’) that would reinforce the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) whose weaknesses the crisis revealed. Such a contract would bind a Member State in adopting structural reforms, while some EU financial support may be granted to the contracting Member State. They would be mutually agreed between the Commission and Member States and would involve all eurozone Member States, but be voluntary for the others. They would aim at strengthening the coordination of economic policies, notably by increasing the level of commitment, ownership and implementation of economic policies and reforms in the eurozone. This would in turn ensure the smooth functioning of the EMU, in particular by avoiding excessive divergences in competitiveness among its members.